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On November 24, 1952, hundreds of delegates and observ-
 ers gathered at the Sir Cowasji Jehangir Hall in Bombay to inaugurate a 
conference of the International Committee for Planned Parenthood (ICPP). 
The crowd exceeded the expectations of the organizers, who had been 
unsure of the interest that the event— the first of its kind in in de pen dent 
India— might generate. The main auditorium was soon overflowing, attend-
ees jostled for space in the standing- room- only balcony, and late arrivals 
 were turned away.1 The first person to address this assembled Indian and 
foreign audience was the venerable Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay. A found-
ing member of the All India  Women’s Conference, a stalwart nationalist, 
and former leader of the Congress Socialists, Chattopadhyay was a longtime 
advocate for birth control. In her capacity as the chair of the conference 
reception committee, she reiterated her support for contraception within a 
broadly internationalist and anti- imperialist framework while calling upon 
her audience to support the “sanctity attached to  human life.”2 She then 
introduced the main speaker of the day, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, a scholar 
of comparative religion and philosophy who had become India’s first vice 
president  earlier that year.
In a wide- ranging address, Radhakrishnan quoted Sanskrit texts to dem-
onstrate that controlling birth was in line with indigenous Hindu- Indian 
ideas and called for  family planning as a vital national need to combat pov-
erty. “The poorer we are,” Radhakrishnan argued, “the more ill- nourished 
we are. Sex is the only indoor sport open to us, and large families are pro-
duced.” Since the country could no longer sustain such large families, he 
concluded, “our need is desperate” to find methods of controlling reproduc-
tion.3 With  these words, Radhakrishnan inaugurated the conference and 
was met by a standing ovation from the audience.4 Several days  later, at the 
conclusion of conference proceedings, delegates reassembled and voted to 
create the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF), a group that 
would soon become one of the largest and most influential organ izations 
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in the fields of contraceptive advocacy,  family planning, and population 
control anywhere in the world.5
The achievements of the Bombay conference may have come as some sur-
prise to the leadership of the  Family Planning Association of India (FPAI), 
which had hosted the event. The president of the organ ization, Dhanvanthi 
Rama Rau, had been excited to receive an invitation from the American 
birth control advocate Margaret Sanger to hold the conference in India.6 
While welcoming the opportunity to forge transnational connections, Rama 
Rau and other FPAI leaders  were concerned that the organ ization was too 
new— and the issue itself too novel—to raise sufficient support for an inter-
national conference. It was difficult to bring  family planning to public atten-
tion, Rama Rau  later recalled,  because  people  were hesitant to discuss 
issues of reproduction and sexuality. The Indian government had not yet 
committed its support to  family planning, and Health Minister Rajkumari 
Amrit Kaur, a Gandhian and veteran nationalist, was opposed to “artifi-
cial” modes of contraception. Nevertheless, Rama Rau saw in the early 1950s 
a new opening. “ Family planning was a new and controversial subject for 
the general public,” she acknowledged, “but the close relationship of popu-
lation to the development of the country’s economic resources had been so 
emphasized” that the question of reproductive regulation could no longer 
be ignored.7 In other words, Rama Rau aimed to make reproduction a ques-
tion of public discussion as part of a broader discourse on population and 
economy. The growing population of India and its supposed national eco-
nomic impact could bring reproduction to the forefront of debate and 
policy- making.
Rama Rau understood the Bombay conference, which brought together 
Indian and foreign birth control advocates to develop a global population 
agenda, to be a pivotal moment in this pro cess. The year 1952 was monu-
mental for another reason as well. In its First Five Year Plan, which began 
that year, the Indian government allocated funds for  family planning in 
order to “stabilize population at a level consistent with the requirements of 
national economy,” thus making the country the first in the world to launch 
a program of state- sponsored population control.8 However, while the plan 
marked a notable realignment of reproduction, population, and economy 
with the goals of the postcolonial Indian state,  there was a much longer his-
tory to  these connections as well. Despite Rama Rau’s concern that repro-
duction was too sensitive a topic for public discussion in the 1950s,  people 
had in fact engaged in public debate about a variety of reproductive norms 
and practices for de cades. Over the course of the nineteenth and twentieth 
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centuries, colonial administrators alongside Indian nationalists, eugenicists 
alongside feminists, and demographers alongside  family planners had all 
questioned reproduction in a variety of ways. They asked, for instance, how 
individuals’ ages at marriage might afect their health and the vitality of the 
population. They debated about how many  children married  couples  ought 
to have and how to raise them. They interrogated existing sexual practices 
and asked what might constitute a modern and Indian (hetero)sexuality. 
They challenged social norms about remarriage, monogamy, and celibacy 
and examined the impact of  these practices on individual bodies, families, 
and wider communities. The result was the wide- ranging, complex, and 
sometimes contradictory reproductive politics that forms the subject of this 
book.
The question of reproduction in modern India was thus not  limited solely 
to biological pro cesses but became a place to work out the relationships that 
linked biological life to historical change. To trace this history, I focus on 
two key concepts that animated reproductive politics at the Bombay con-
ference but also reverberated across the de cades: population and economy. 
As we  shall see, reproduction became a public question— that is, it acquired a 
politics— beginning in the late nineteenth  century, in relation to anx i eties 
about the size of India’s population. Reforming individual reproduction, via 
changing marriage practices or introducing birth control, became a means 
to shape the life of the population as a  whole. In other words, reformers 
promised to curb the growth of the population and to improve its health 
and eugenic “quality” through intervening in reproductive sexualities. As 
concerns grew about Indian “overpopulation” in the mid- twentieth  century, 
 these reproductive interventions intensified in state- led campaigns for pop-
ulation control. However, while the state’s campaigns may represent the 
most obvious and well- known example of the intersections between repro-
duction and population, this book documents a much longer genealogy of 
their connections. By historicizing population control more deeply in time, 
I suggest that the ideologies and institutions that encouraged the Indian 
government to intervene in the reproductive lives of its subjects  were not 
mid- twentieth- century inventions but arose from a nexus of population and 
reproduction that first took shape in colonial India.
 These anx i eties about population, in turn, led many to argue that repro-
ductive reform was a vital economic question. Radhakrishnan’s inaugural 
address in Bombay amplified this long- standing argument, suggesting that 
curbing Indian reproduction would enable the population to align with the 
country’s economic needs. As reproduction was rendered into a category 
I n t roduc t ion6
whose value and meaning  were thus understood in economic terms, repro-
ductive practices became sufused with claims about their macroeconomic 
benefits and costs. Within a wide range of public discourse, suggested 
reforms to sexuality, marriage, and childbearing  were explained and justi-
fied within economic frameworks. Reproductive reformers began to repre-
sent individual reproductive practices as  either an economic opportunity 
or a threat to pro gress, prosperity, and development. When reproduction 
was thus situated on an economic grid, life itself was calibrated against the 
costs of its subsistence; the value of lives born or “births averted” was mea-
sured in terms of their impact on “the economy.” Borrowing from Michelle 
Murphy’s conceptualization of the economization of life, I term this dense 
entanglement of reproduction and economy a pro cess of economizing repro-
duction, whereby economic calculations saturated pro cesses of biological 
reproduction, in the pro cess transforming bodies and lives, sexualities and 
sentiments.9
The book traces  these histories from the 1870s to the 1970s, asking how 
biological reproduction—as a pro cess of reproducing  human life— became 
central to reproducing a modern India. My analy sis brings together three 
histories that have often remained distinct within existing scholarship: his-
tories of marriage and birth control, of ideas of “population” and “econ-
omy” as abstractions, and of famine and crises of subsistence. The book 
begins its narrative during a period of British imperial consolidation in 
India, when I locate the emergence of new ideas linking reproduction, pop-
ulation, and economy in the context of massive famines that devastated 
lives across the subcontinent. Although the existing historiography of repro-
duction has paid  little attention to  these nineteenth- century developments, 
focusing instead on the interwar period, pushing the chronology back to 
the 1870s makes clear the enduring relationship between the politics of 
reproduction and the po liti cal economy of empire.10 In other words, I argue, 
the contours of Indian reproductive politics took shape alongside pro cesses 
of imperial consolidation. The book then turns to new forms of nationalist 
reproductive politics, which engaged questions of land and migration along-
side anx i eties about gender and bodies during the last de cades of colonial 
rule.  These national politics of reproduction took new shape in the after-
math of in de pen dence and partition, with the emergence of state- led pop-
ulation planning and increasingly intensive regulation of reproduction to 
meet the needs of national economic development. The historical narrative 
concludes with the massive expansion of population control during the 
1960s and with the years of Emergency rule  under Indira Gandhi from 1975 
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to 1977. The draconian policies of the Emergency years have been repre-
sented, and rightfully so, as a watershed moment in postcolonial Indian 
history. However, as a longer view makes clear, Emergency- era population 
policy was also deeply embedded in the reproductive politics of  earlier 
de cades, and its ideologies and assumptions have carried on well beyond 
1977.
The book demonstrates that, across a  century, historical actors of vary-
ing po liti cal stripes used a flawed narrative about population and economy 
to justify interventions into  people’s reproductive bodies and lives. This nar-
rative emerges in both expected and unexpected places. I find it, for 
instance, in the words of Malthusian colonial administrators explaining 
why it was impor tant to limit aid for famine relief, or among postcolonial 
bureaucrats aiming to meet state- assigned targets for controlling popula-
tion. However, I also locate this narrative in less expected places, including 
in the words and actions of activists in the  women’s movement, who claimed 
that  family planning was a critical part of national planning.  Women like 
Dhanvanthi Rama Rau and Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay, alongside numer-
ous  others who implemented  family planning programs, positioned their 
work as a ser vice both to  women, whose contraceptive use would improve 
their health and well- being, and to the nation, which could meet its eco-
nomic development goals by curbing population growth. They thus insisted 
that controlling population was a key component of their activism on behalf 
of  women. This early alignment of feminism and  family planning might 
seem surprising, since the Indian government’s  family planning programs 
would eventually sacrifice  women’s bodies and reproductive autonomy in 
 favor of a relentless drive to meet population targets. In fact, con temporary 
feminist activists have documented  these programs’ violations of  women’s 
rights.11 However, across the  middle de cades of the twentieth  century, 
middle- class and upper- caste activists in the  women’s movement  were 
among India’s most committed  family planners, and they positioned repro-
ductive control as an impor tant part of their po liti cal commitments. The 
book traces the historical conjunctures and complicities that prompted fem-
inists to connect reproduction to population and economy in this way, and 
its implications for regimes of population control and development.
While focused on colonial and postcolonial India, the book also dem-
onstrates that India was central to a global history of reproduction. Begin-
ning with a set of imperial circulations between India and Britain, I consider 
India’s presence within a wider transnational network of feminists, Malthu-
sians, eugenicists, and  family planners, which, as in the case of the Bombay 
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conference, extended across many parts of the world. My focus on India 
within  these networks complicates existing historical scholarship on global 
or transnational population control, which, although including India and 
Indians in impor tant ways, tends to recenter Eu rope and the United States 
as the  drivers of historical change.12 My point  here is not simply that “India” 
was a national space upon which “global” forces operated. Rather, I dem-
onstrate how Indian developments transformed the “global,” and helped 
to produce the very grounds over which reproduction was called into ques-
tion in the modern world.
This India- in- the- world approach draws upon recent feminist scholar-
ship, which traces historical change across transnational encounters, sug-
gesting that “Indian” history is not easily separable from the broader world 
of which it is a part.13 Moreover, “India” as a national space was re imagined 
during this time, and claims about population and economy  shaped this 
imagination. Po liti cal bound aries in the subcontinent shifted during the 
de cades examined  here, most notably with the partitions in 1947 and 1971, 
and remain contested. Although I begin in colonial India, which included 
the territories that now constitute India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, subse-
quent chapters focus only on Indian reproductive politics  after in de pen dence. 
I hope the book may invite further research on reproductive histories in 
South Asia more broadly.14
Before turning to this history in the following chapters, I focus in the 
remainder of this introduction on the three key concepts that animate my 
analy sis: reproduction, population, and economy. Of course,  these terms are 
in wide popu lar use, and their meanings may seem to be obvious or self- 
evident. However, each concept also carries with it a history and, as I suggest 
 here,  these histories are deeply interconnected. In the sections that follow, 
I trace the meanings of  these concepts as they took shape across the nine-
teenth and twentieth centuries and ask how— and with what implications— 
these meanings continue to shape popu lar understanding and academic 
scholarship.  These sections on reproduction, population, and economy 
thus develop the conceptual framework of the book and suggest the theo-
retical interventions that a feminist history of reproduction may make to 
the historiography of India in the modern world.
Reproduction
Reproduction, as Sarah Hodges reminds us, is “always si mul ta neously a 
physiological as well as social act,” and its meanings rely on this “slippage 
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between society and biology.”15 We may trace the history of reproduction 
by investigating the social meanings that adhere to biological acts, even as 
we consider how social norms and practices construct reproduction as a bio-
logical category. In developing this historical perspective, the book draws 
inspiration from Linda Gordon’s insistence that reproduction is not trans-
historical but is embedded in, and contributes to, historical change. She 
argues that “in dif er ent historical periods  there are specifiable hegemonic 
and resistant meanings and purposes to reproduction control; that  these 
meanings are socially and po liti cally, not individually, constituted; and that 
they express the (unstable) balances of po liti cal power between dif er ent 
social groups.”16 While  people have aimed to control their own reproduc-
tion across time, in other words, their reasons and means for  doing so have 
not remained static. The values associated with reproductive be hav iors, the 
assumptions about which bodies and lives may be “appropriate” to repro-
duce, and the laws and norms governing reproductive practices have all 
changed over time— responding to and shaping a wide array of social, po liti-
cal, and economic relations.17 Historians of reproduction have aimed to 
document  these shifts, while asking how  these changes might illuminate 
broader histories.
My work takes this historical approach to reproduction. The book inves-
tigates the wide implications of the politics of reproduction across the 
colonial/postcolonial divide and demonstrates that  these politics  shaped 
fundamental aspects of Indian life. This includes areas we might conven-
tionally associate with reproduction, namely histories of gender, sexuality, 
and the body. However, investigating histories of reproduction can also take 
us in less expected directions. As I argue  here, from the late nineteenth 
 century onward, reproductive politics engaged claims about colonial pov-
erty and scarcity, about the nation and its sovereignty, and about modern 
pro gress and development.18 In short, Indians negotiated their pre sent  and 
 imagined their  futures  through debates about reproductive norms and 
practices. Indeed, as we  shall see in the pages to follow, attention to  these 
histories makes clear the connections between the supposedly “private” 
domains of reproductive sexualities or reproducing bodies and the “pub-
lic” arenas of nations and states. Therefore, through its investigation of 
reproduction, the book ofers a reassessment of histories of gender, sexual-
ity, and the body as they intersect with the trajectories of colonialism, 
nationalism, and development.
Specifically, I trace how  these intersections rendered reproduction into 
an economic question— asking how reproductive discourses and practices 
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 were calibrated within a calculus that rendered life itself an economic cost. 
This pro cess of economizing reproduction profoundly transformed how 
Indians understood their own reproductive practices, including marriage, 
childbearing, and contraceptive use. It also transformed how they understood 
“the economy”: that is, how they mea sured poverty and wealth, in equality 
and hierarchy, sovereignty and national status. In short, as reproduction 
was figured as a point of intervention into the economy, both “reproduc-
tion” and “economy” shifted in complex, sometimes unexpected ways. To 
understand  these changes, the book locates reproductive politics in a variety 
of places: some that addressed specific reproductive practices,  others that 
brought reproduction to bear on a wider discourse. This includes the history 
of contraceptive advocacy and the rise of population control programs. It 
also includes moments and events that  were less obviously connected to 
reproduction, such as the colonial administration of famine, the intersec-
tion of feminist activism with state- led development, and the repre sen ta-
tion of small families as a site of desire. Locating contests over reproduction 
in  these disparate spaces, my work outlines the wide- ranging scope and 
impact of reproductive politics across a  century of Indian history.
My arguments join with an emerging feminist historiography that tracks 
how reproduction has been a site to uphold, and also challenge, in equality 
and hierarchy and implicates the gendered politics of reproduction in the 
politics of race, class, caste, and sexuality. To take just a few examples, fem-
inist historians have shown how control over  women’s reproduction has 
helped to maintain racist regimes of power, to underwrite colonial policies, 
to mark national bound aries, to regulate migration, to shape social welfare 
policies, and to influence international diplomacy.19 Reproductive rela-
tions have thus also been relationships of power. Consequently, as Aiko 
Takeuchi- Demirci argues, “the knowledge and discourses regarding female 
reproduction have been socially constructed to justify hierarchical power 
relations: between men and  women, Westerners and non- Westerners, whites 
and nonwhites, and the elites and the masses.”20 The centrality of repro-
duction to relationships of power is also made clear by scholarship in queer 
studies, which scrutinizes the production of heterosexuality and its mar-
ginalization of queer subjects. Reproduction, as scholars such as Judith 
Butler, Penelope Deutscher, and Lee Edelman suggest, was central to the 
creation and normalization of heterosexual identities; the queer was marked, 
by definition, as a nonreproductive subject who was not committed to the 
 future, represented by the figure of the child.21
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Historicizing reproduction thus requires attention to the multiple inter-
sections that link individual reproducing bodies to the reproduction of a 
wider body politic, and that connect systems of reproduction to wider sys-
tems of power. A rich scholarship has documented  these connections across 
varying times and places, tracing the contours of reproductive oppression 
alongside strug gles for reproductive autonomy, freedom, and justice. Much 
of this work uncovers how the regulation and control of reproduction sus-
tains hierarchies whereby some  people’s reproduction is valued and that of 
 others is devalued. The sociologist Shellee Colen, in a study of West Indian 
childcare workers in New York City, terms this a pro cess of “stratified repro-
duction” or “the power relations by which some categories of  people are 
empowered to nurture and reproduce, while  others are disempowered.”22 
This selective valuing of certain  people and bodies as reproducers has been 
the crux of reproductive oppressions of vari ous kinds. For example, in the 
Indian case, the reproduction of lower- caste, poor, and non- Hindu  women 
was marked as the source of colonial poverty and blamed for the failures of 
postcolonial economic development. Within transnational population con-
trol movements, the childbearing of black and brown  women— both in the 
“Third World” and among racial minorities in the “First World”— was held 
responsible for putting the very planet at risk through a population explo-
sion.  These are just a few examples, among many, that suggest how repro-
duction intersects with sites of in equality and oppression, diferentiating 
among  people as appropriate or inappropriate reproducers.
This approach to reproduction necessarily challenges the liberal femi-
nist assumption, common in public discourse, that the trajectory of repro-
ductive history can be encapsulated as a “ simple passage from subjection 
to freedom.”23 That is,  there was no straightforward path from a lack of 
reproductive control in the past  toward greater autonomy in the pre sent due 
to changing sexual norms or more efective reproductive technologies. The 
history of reproduction is simply too complex for such a trajectory. The ideas 
and practices that shape  people’s reproductive lives cannot be abstracted out 
from their wider histories, and reproductive politics can just as easily main-
tain inequalities and injustices as challenge them. Moreover, even while 
the narratives of greater freedom may hold true for some  people— especially 
elite  women in the “First World” or Global North— a wealth of scholarship 
on both the past and the pre sent shows that gains for some  people have often 
occurred at the expense of  others and that technological developments do 
not automatically expand reproductive freedoms.
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Scholars of South Asian reproduction history make this point abundantly 
clear. Perhaps this is  because, following Hodges, “unlike the American or 
Eu ro pean historiography of birth control, the uneasy legacy of population 
control is not part of any emancipatory narrative.”24 The mea sures under-
taken by the postcolonial state to control  women’s reproduction ofer a cau-
tionary tale against assumptions that contraceptive technologies or 
reproductive reforms are necessarily liberating. The grim history of Emer-
gency rule connects reproductive regulation to antidemo cratic and author-
itarian politics while challenging any simplistic narrative about pro gress 
over time. Historians of colonial India also testify to this complexity, point-
ing out that support for reproductive technologies did not necessarily sig-
nify support for reproductive freedoms. For instance, as Sanjam Ahluwalia 
maintains in her study of birth control in the early twentieth  century, 
“within the dominant feminist understanding, birth control and contracep-
tive technologies are largely represented as necessarily empowering for all 
 women at all times. The history of birth control in colonial India, however, 
did not empower all  women to control their bodies and determine their fer-
tility.”25 Moreover, as Asha Nadkarni notes, even movements claiming to 
support “reproductive rights” have “been aligned with far less emancipa-
tory discourses” of racism and imperialism, and have sometimes deepened 
caste, race, gender, and class inequalities rather than challenging them.26 
 These are difficult and disturbing histories that feminist scholars must grap-
ple with if we are to imagine more just reproductive  futures.
Despite  these grim histories, however, not all reproductive politics prior 
to the 1960s was a prehistory of population control, a term that references 
top- down policies and programs to limit the growth of population. In the 
Indian case, this term was often used interchangeably with  family planning, 
which, at least ostensibly, refers to the policies that support individual  people 
in determining their own fertility. The collapse of  these two terms— 
including at the Bombay conference that created the IPPF— should not 
obscure the fact that not all programs to support individual decision- making 
about fertility  were necessarily a means to regulate population.27 Indeed, 
scholarship on colonial India documents a history that was at once more 
complex and multilayered, ofering multiple possibilities for change. Not all 
campaigns promoting reproductive reform centered on controlling popu-
lation, and not all reproductive politics centered only on changing marriage 
or implementing birth control. The book thus understands reproduction 
broadly, and not only as a history of contraceptive technologies or popula-
tion regulation.
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To build this analy sis, I draw upon an existing historiography, which, 
although it does not necessarily name reproduction as a category of analy-
sis, has touched on reproductive questions. For instance, scholars have 
documented how colonial- era reproductive reforms—to the practices of sati, 
 widow remarriage, child marriage— were critical to fashioning a modern 
gendered and sexual politics in the nineteenth  century.28 By the 1920s and 
1930s, moreover, reproduction became discursively central both to Indian 
nationalism and to the Indian  women’s movement, as practices of birth con-
trol, childbirth, and reproductive healthcare  were newly politicized. Dur-
ing the same period, as I discuss in more detail in chapter 2, reproductive 
politics also became entangled in a politics of land, migration, and sover-
eignty as a global “color line” made reproduction a key rationale in the sep-
aration of white and nonwhite races. Meanwhile, across the twentieth 
 century, the reform of reproductive practices surrounding marriage,  family 
life, and patrilineality was critical to the construction of modern subjectivi-
ties.29  These are just a few examples of topics that might be included in 
histories of reproduction in modern India; they point  toward a narrative 
that acknowledges, but cannot be collapsed into, a history of postcolonial 
population control. While space limitations prevent my addressing all of 
 these topics, the book aims to make this expansive history more vis i ble.
Fi nally, in developing this perspective on reproductive history, I draw 
inspiration from scholarly and activist understandings of reproductive jus-
tice as a politics of liberation. Concepts of reproductive justice, as first 
developed by  women of color activists in a US context, aim to expand the 
terrain of po liti cal strug gle beyond the dominating framework of abortion 
and to contest a range of hierarchies and forms of oppression that cur-
tailed reproductive freedom. As articulated by Loretta Ross and Rickie 
Solinger, reproductive justice rests on three princi ples: “(1) the right not to 
have a child; (2) the right to have a child; and (3) the right to parent  children in 
safe and healthy environments. In addition, reproductive justice demands 
sexual autonomy and gender freedom for  every  human being.”30 By such a 
mea sure, much of the history recounted in this book may read as a dispir-
iting account of reproductive injustice, whereby  people’s reproductive lives 
 were subjected to ever- more- intimate forms of oppression as reproduction 
was economized and population control became a dominant mode of repro-
ductive politics. Nevertheless, I highlight a reproductive justice frame for 
its consistent reminder that reproduction is always about gender (and gen-
dered forms of oppression and liberation) but is never only  limited to a gen-
dered politics. Reproductive justice compels an investigation of intersecting 
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axes of diference but, equally importantly, calls attention to how reproduc-
tive oppression and liberation are deeply implicated in wider histories. 
Fi nally, I suggest that reproductive justice cannot be envisioned solely in 
relation to a single intervention—be it birth control, abortion, or popula-
tion control— but must situate the impact and possibilities of  these inter-
ventions within a deep analy sis of in equality and oppression.
Population
Population, according to its Merriam- Webster dictionary definition, refers 
to the “ whole number of  people or inhabitants in a country or region,” as 
well as “the organisms inhabiting a par tic u lar locality.” Bringing in repro-
duction, the definition also names the “group of interbreeding organisms” 
as constituting a population.31 It links aggregate life (numbers of  people or 
organisms) to identifiable place (country, locality) and to reproductive pro-
cess (“interbreeding”). In this sense, “population” is a mea sur able, concrete, 
and bounded  thing; we observe populations of bacteria in a petri dish, fish 
in a lake, or  people on the planet. We mea sure population densities— how 
many organisms exist in relation to their bounded space— and its increase 
or decrease. However, while population thus has concrete manifestations, 
it is also an idea, a categorization, and a way of imagining and understand-
ing the world. In this sense, “the population” is an abstraction, produced 
through identifiable modes of thought and habits of classification. This con-
cept of the population as an entity whose life can be mea sured, regulated, and 
compared with other populations underpins what Michel Foucault identi-
fies as a “biopolitics of the population.” The reproductive politics I examine 
in this book  were an aspect of this biopolitics— this management of the life 
of populations.
Foucault traces the history of biopolitics to seventeenth- and eighteenth- 
century Eu rope, when new forms of biopower challenged older notions of 
sovereign power. Within mercantilist regimes of sovereign power, the pop-
ulation was  imagined as a group of juridical subjects who held an individ-
ual and collective relationship with the sovereign. A large population might 
indicate the power of the ruler, since many  people might allow for the mobi-
lization of a large army or signal a thriving marketplace.32 By contrast, bio-
power, which Foucault links to the rise of a cap i tal ist modernity, understood 
the population not as a group of individuals but as a species body, or the 
“body imbued with the mechanics of life, and serving as the basis of the 
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biological pro cess.”33 Population became a set of pro cesses to be managed— 
processes of birth and death, of health and disease, of life itself.
This politics of life, or biopolitics, as Asha Nadkarni suggests, prompted 
the “birth of population as a po liti cal actor in its own right.”34 Reproduction 
became a key point of entry to manage this newly constituted population. 
By regulating the “anatamo- politics of the  human body,” in Foucault’s 
terms, reproductive reform became a site to intervene in the “species body” 
of the population.35 This centrality of reproduction  shaped how biopolitics 
was gendered. As Ruth Miller argues through a case study of abortion and 
adultery in the Ottoman Empire and Turkey, biopo liti cal power was founded 
on “the right to make live rather than the right to take life.” It rooted  women’s 
po liti cal subjectivities in their presumed capacity to reproduce life—to make 
live— and thus create the population. Consequently, biopo liti cal regimes 
aimed to include in the space of politics not only the public square, but also 
the womb, justifying their reproductive interventions in terms of “the com-
mon good.”36 Twentieth- century programs of population control, as several 
scholars suggest,  were quin tes sen tial examples of this gendered Foucaul-
dian biopolitics.37 Targeting individual bodies at the most intimate level— 
through surgical sterilization, intrauterine device (IUD) insertion, or 
menstrual cycle monitoring, for instance— these programs invoked as their 
rationale the “species body” of the population as a  whole.
This notion of the population depended upon a pro cess of disindividu-
ation: that is, it de- emphasized the individual characteristics of  people in 
 favor of norms and pro cesses that  shaped the life of the population as a 
 whole. However, the biopolitics of population also diferentiated among 
 people, marked out social margins, and valued some lives and bodies over 
 others. Within an imperial world, race became a central axis of diference 
that distinguished the life pro cesses of one “population” from that of another 
and enabled a “politics of life” in which some bodies  were devalued and ren-
dered suitable for death.38 Moreover, whereas all biopolitics pathologized the 
social margins, scholars suggest that “colonial biopolitics” pathologized 
entire populations, rendering the “native” outside the bound aries of the nor-
mative “population.”39 In the aftermath of colonial rule, indigenous elites 
countered  these racist under pinnings of population discourse while repo-
sitioning themselves as the appropriate regulators of their “own” lower- class, 
lower- caste, or subaltern populations. Their drives for economic development 
depended upon a biopolitics of the population in which life pro cesses 
became the site of state intervention.
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The eighteenth- century En glish po liti cal economist Thomas Malthus 
must loom large in any historical account of  these biopolitics of population. 
Malthus, perhaps more than any other thinker of his time, gave life to the 
concept of “the population” and articulated its relationship to place, repro-
duction, and economy. In his enormously influential Essay on the Princi ple 
of Population (1798), Malthus argued that  human population would always 
overrun its means of subsistence. This was  because  human reproduction 
proceeded “geometrically” (as in 2, 4, 8, 16), whereas food production 
increased only “arithmetically” (as in 1, 2, 3, 4). The result of this imbal-
ance was a continual strug gle for land, a finite and  limited resource. The 
rapid growth of  human population thus always threatened to exceed the 
available land. For Malthus, the reason the population had not already 
overrun the land was due to both “positive” and “preventive” checks on its 
growth. “Positive” checks increased death rates; they included war, disease, 
infanticide, pestilence, and famine. “Preventive” checks, on the other hand, 
controlled reproduction to reduce birth rates. Late marriage or sexual 
abstinence  were the principal preventive checks Malthus outlined; he dis-
approved of contraception.40
Malthusian ideas proved to be remarkably enduring both in India and 
globally and have formed the common sense of modern thinking about the 
relationship between population and reproduction. In late nineteenth- 
century India, as I discuss in chapter 1, Malthusian theories seemed to 
explain famine, which some commentators understood as a “positive check” 
on an Indian population whose “overreproduction” had caused widespread 
poverty and hunger. This prompted fears that India was overpopulated well 
before  there was any demonstrable increase in population size. Malthu-
sian claims about population continued into the twentieth  century, when 
they joined with eugenic thinking, which was widely accepted as the “sci-
ence” of improving the ge ne tic and racial characteristics of populations. 
Malthusianism and eugenics enjoyed a particularly close relationship in 
India, where, as Rahul Nair suggests, they  shaped a growing “population 
anxiety” during the interwar de cades.41 This period also witnessed the 
emergence of communal discourses on population, whereby “Hindu” and 
“Muslim” populations  were  imagined as distinct entities and compared with 
each other. Indeed, claims about population came to underpin a growing 
communalization of Indian politics overall, especially in the Hindi- speaking 
north and in Bengal, where proponents of communal discourse aimed to 
mobilize “Hindus” or “Muslims” in census counts and claimed that the 
“opposing” community was reproducing more rapidly than their own.42 The 
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partition of the subcontinent in 1947, which depended upon Hindu and 
Muslim population counts, both drew upon and reshaped this kind of com-
munal demography.
In the aftermath of Indian in de pen dence and World War II, Malthusian 
thinking reemerged through social- scientific research about the population. 
In par tic u lar, the science of demography, a discipline devoted to the study 
of populations, arguably has Malthusian roots.43 However, whereas Malthus 
had understood population growth as a grim inevitability, periodically 
checked by famine and disease, mid- twentieth- century demographic mod-
els insisted that population growth could be managed through targeted 
interventions. Far exceeding the Essay’s suggestions about forgoing sexual 
intercourse and postponing marriage, demographers  imagined a range of 
policies and tactics that might encourage populations to limit their repro-
duction. Their models, in turn, gave shape to population control programs 
that began in India, and elsewhere in Asia, Africa, and Latin Amer i ca dur-
ing the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. As Mohan Rao documents in devastating 
detail, Malthusian assumptions underpinned Indian campaigns to manage 
population, and regimes of population control adhered to  these theories 
despite mounting evidence about their damaging impact on individual lives, 
especially the lives of  women.44 In a brutal biopo liti cal calculation, as I dis-
cuss in chapter 4, some individual lives  were curtailed or sacrificed in pur-
suit of benefit to the “species body” of the population. As individual life was 
valued diferentially— along lines of caste, race, nationality, gender, class, 
and religion— population control programs became increasingly draconian 
in meeting their goals and targets.
Of course, Malthusian ideas have also been challenged by critics, who 
suggest that Malthus’s theory of population simply blames poor  people’s 
reproduction for their poverty. This way of thinking, they argue, serves to 
obscure the true  causes of in equality and misunderstands the reasons for 
population growth. One of Malthus’s early and influential critics along  these 
lines was Karl Marx; since the mid- nineteenth  century, Marxist critiques 
of Malthus have argued that poverty is not caused by poor  people having 
“too many”  children but by an inequitable distribution of wealth due to the 
exploitation of  labor within systems of cap i tal ist production. Building from 
this critique, more recent challenges to Malthusianism have documented 
its empirical inadequacies. As they note, Malthus never foresaw the mas-
sive increases of agrarian production that could support much larger pop-
ulations than he  imagined.45 Consequently, the balance between resources 
and population was not quite as fragile as Malthus suggested. Moreover, 
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 human beings do not simply reproduce ad infinitum but make childbear-
ing decisions in relation to the circumstances around them. Far from exac-
erbating poverty, bearing many  children may actually increase economic 
security for some rural families and communities by providing necessary 
 labor and support in old age.46 Further, as Betsy Hartmann suggests, Mal-
thusian thinking has historically carried with it a racist and sexist disre-
gard for variously “othered” populations— such as poor  people in formerly 
colonized countries and racial and ethnic minorities in the former imperi-
alist nations.47  Here again, the issue is of in equality and stratification rather 
than numerical growth in population. All this is not to say that population 
size is immaterial. Rapid growth or decline in population can have impor-
tant impacts on individuals, communities, and environments. Numbers do 
 matter, in other words, but we can draw no straight Malthusian line from 
population to poverty. Numbers alone can be only part of the story.
Despite  these critiques, the legacy of Malthus continues to shape think-
ing about population  today. Although the sustained activism of feminist 
groups has successfully eliminated the term population control in  favor of 
a focus on “reproductive health,” Hartmann notes that “the belief that over-
population is a root cause of poverty, environmental degradation, resource 
scarcity, migration, violent conflict, and even climate change is pervasive.”48 
Indeed, Malthusian fears about the unmanaged growth of population have 
gained new life in con temporary climate change debates, as some environ-
mental activists call for reducing fertility as a means to reduce carbon emis-
sions globally. As I discuss in the epilogue, environmentalist critics of 
Malthusianism have questioned this connection between reproduction and 
climate through documenting that unequal patterns of consumption, driven 
by a fossil fuel economy, are far more responsible for climate change than is 
population increase in the Global South. Despite this evidence, the notion 
that reproduction is a central driver of planetary catastrophe—an idea that 
motivated so many population control campaigns in the mid- twentieth 
 century— remains power ful many de cades  later. In India in recent years, 
moreover,  these discourses have combined with an ongoing communaliza-
tion of population to fuel a majoritarian Hindu nationalist politics, thus 
recentering population in a wide range of claims about con temporary 
India.49
My work is indebted to  these scholarly and activist critiques of Malthu-
sian population politics and to the analy sis of modern biopolitics more 
broadly. From Foucauldian investigation of population as a target of gov-
ernance, to empirical critiques of Malthusian theory, to historical research 
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on the communalization of population, to feminists’ emphasis on the real 
and devastating consequences of population control for ordinary  people, 
this body of work makes vis i ble the ways in which “population” is never just 
a number that exists in de pen dent of a wider history. In other words, colo-
nial and postcolonial anx i eties about population in India  were not simply 
a result of population growth. Rather, vari ous historical conjunctures— 
from ideas about population size to the material impact of scarcity and 
hunger— rendered “population” into a prob lem and made it the target of 
control, management, and intervention. This historicized understanding of 
population underpins my analy sis of reproduction. Without assuming that 
reproductive anx i eties  were an automatic outcome of population numbers, 
I approach them as a par tic u lar set of po liti cal questions that engaged spe-
cific relationships of power within colonial and postcolonial society. The 
book traces  these po liti cal questions— these biopolitics of population 
management— across landscapes of famine and scarcity, of imperial econ-
omies and national development, and of bodily and sexual politics.
Economy
In India during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, biopo liti cal con-
cerns about reproduction and population hinged on claims about the 
economy, and the reproductive practices of ordinary Indians  were blamed 
for population growth and consequent economic failures. However, even 
though con temporary commentators insisted that reproduction thus 
afected the economy, historical research shows that “the economy” is not 
a transhistorical object “out  there” that exists prior to its analy sis.  Whether 
in colonial India or in our con temporary moment, “the economy” has been 
brought into being through a set of identifiable historical practices, discur-
sive repre sen ta tions, and theoretical claims. This requires a delineation of 
“the economy” as distinct from an implied noneconomy of relationships and 
interactions that are then rendered outside of economic rationality or cal-
culation. In broad terms, it has meant a separation of certain market- based 
transactions from other social, po liti cal, moral, or material relationships. 
Moreover, “the economy” is constructed through techniques of mea sure-
ment and calculation, such that the generation and organ ization of data 
helps to produce “the economy” as a knowable entity— indeed, as a way of 
knowing the modern world itself.
As a category of the imagination— and buttressed by ever- growing reams 
of data— the economy, of course, has real material efects. How we mea sure 
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“the economy” shapes who and what gets counted, what policies exist and 
can be  imagined, and how we understand life and well- being. Among  these 
myriad efects of constructing the economy as a category of life in modern 
India was the rearticulation of reproduction to align with goals of economic 
pro gress and development. This pro cess, as I outline in more detail below, 
was twofold. First, the creation of “the economy” in the eigh teenth and nine-
teenth centuries excluded reproduction, gendering it private rather than 
public, par tic u lar rather than universal, and cultural rather than po liti cal. 
However, with the rise of anx i eties about population in the late nineteenth 
 century, reproduction re entered public and po liti cal debate. But this time, 
it was legible only as an economic cost, its “public” meanings  limited to an 
economic calibration about reproducing the life of the population. In this 
sense, the pro cess of economizing reproduction did not imply that repro-
ductive practices  were mea sured against an already existing economy; 
rather, reproduction and economy  were co- constituted in a mea sure ment 
of  human life.
Historians trace the elaboration of “the economy” to the eighteenth- 
century Enlightenment, arguing that the creation of the concept was 
inseparable from the development of capitalism.50 This notion of the econ-
omy, as Manu Goswami suggests, was a “concrete abstraction” that classi-
cal po liti cal economists  imagined as “an autonomous, self- contained, and 
objective realm.”51 During the nineteenth  century, the relatively deterrito-
rialized conception of the classical po liti cal economists gave way to more 
specific spatial references. That is, as the “economy” became bound up with 
colonial and national space, both in Eu rope and in its empires, colonial 
administrators and Indian nationalists came to speak of an “Indian econ-
omy” as a distinct set of relations that circulated within a bounded territo-
rial space.52 However, the economy so  imagined did not simply exist but 
was actively distinguished from other social relations. In colonial India, as 
Ritu Birla demonstrates, this act of delineation depended upon the colo-
nial law, which distinguished between “legitimate” forms of cap i tal ist eco-
nomic activity it  imagined to be universal and rooted in markets and 
“illegitimate ones,”  imagined as local, par tic u lar, and rooted in kinship. 
Birla argues that the category of “the economy” was demarcated against a 
separate arena of “culture” to produce “economy and culture as exclusive, 
a priori ethico- political arenas.”53
Moreover, “the economy” was assumed to be public and thus a legitimate 
site of state governance; it was also universal, insofar as all countries “had” 
economies that could be compared with each other. Not coincidentally, this 
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place- making function of the economy helped to make economic pro gress 
a centerpiece of the colonial civilizing mission. Colonial administrators thus 
claimed to be contributing to what they termed India’s “moral and mate-
rial” pro gress through British rule.54 The economy si mul ta neously became 
an arena of nationalist contention, as thinkers like M. G. Ranade, R. C. Dutt, 
and Dadabhai Naoroji aimed to document that colonial rule had stifled 
India’s path on a universalizing course of economic development. Their eco-
nomic critique, exemplified by Naoroji’s calculation of Indian per capita 
income and his comparison with British figures, would eventually become 
the ideological foundation of Indian nationalism’s challenge to colonial rule. 
For nationalism as for colonialism, reference to the economy  shaped what 
could be counted as public— and thus a legitimate terrain of nationalist con-
tention with the colonial state— and what  were rendered private cultural 
and social relations that  were ostensibly separate from the public domain. 
Nationalist discourses depended and built upon  these distinctions, such that 
a private sphere incorporating reproduction became a national counterpoint 
to a public sphere governed by the imperial state.55
The idea that “the economy” was a separate and distinct arena of life 
gathered force during the early de cades of the twentieth  century.56 The new 
discipline of econometrics, alongside the conceptual invention of the “mac-
roeconomy,” helped to make the economy a target of state calculation and 
regulation.57 Much of the data for  these new calculations came from colo-
nial contexts, notably from British India. For instance, John Maynard 
Keynes— the preeminent theorist of the macroeconomy— worked in the 
India Office and began his  career by trying to mea sure the circulation of 
money and its efects on the Indian colonial economy, which he published 
as Indian Currency and Finance (1913). Keynes’s articulation of the macro-
economy, as Suzanne Bergeron notes, “provides an early encounter with the 
idea that the nation is a manageable economic unit represented in terms of 
aggregate data.”58 Econometric mea sure ments like the gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), first calculated in the US in 1937 and widely  adopted by other 
countries  after the Bretton Woods conference in 1944, came to encapsulate 
the idea that the nation and its economy could be represented by a single 
numeric figure.
In the aftermath of Indian in de pen dence, this relationship between 
nation and economy took new shape through the intervention of the post-
colonial state. Jawaharlal Nehru and other Congress leaders staked the 
state’s legitimacy upon its ability to foster economic growth and develop-
ment, and state- led planning became the means to achieve this goal. The 
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National Planning Commission (NPC), a state agency responsible for cre-
ating the country’s Five Year Plans, relied upon econometric mea sure ment 
and such mea sures as GDP to mark the successes or failures of national 
development. In its First Five Year Plan in 1952, as noted above, the NPC 
included population as a key variable, arguing that it had to be aligned with 
the economic needs of the nation. Economic planning, in this sense, required 
and depended upon population planning, paving the way for state- directed 
programs to regulate reproduction in the ser vice of population goals. The 
biopolitics of population management  were thus part of the very architec-
ture of the postcolonial economic planning regime.
Across this shifting discursive history of “the economy”— and its rela-
tionship to nation, state, and development planning— there was a founda-
tional continuity: the separation of “the economy” from social relations that 
 were then termed “noneconomic.” In other words, identifying something 
called “the economy,” mea sur ing it, and intervening in it required a set of 
princi ples and assumptions about what exactly  ought to be counted and who 
might do the counting. On the surface at least, reproduction appeared to 
be quintessentially “private” and outside  these conceptualizations of the 
economy.  After all, biological reproduction has long been gendered femi-
nine and connected with sexuality, another intimate and ostensibly private 
domain. Moreover, although it was arguably central to cap i tal ist economic 
growth, the  labor associated with reproducing life— which Marxist feminists 
have since termed social reproduction— was not figured into the calculus of 
economic activity in its eighteenth- century origins, its nineteenth- century 
nationalist configurations, or its twentieth- century econometric elabora-
tion.59 The work of childcare, cooking, cleaning— typically unwaged work 
and generally performed by  women— was not considered an “economic” 
activity and was thus excluded from such critical calculations as the GDP. 
Moreover,  women’s  labor in agrarian production was similarly discounted 
in the calculations of mid- twentieth- century development economics and 
was left out of analy sis of the costs and benefits of economic planning across 
the Global South.60 As a result, the very concept of “the economy” was built 
upon the exclusion of reproductive  labor, which remained unmea sured 
and unmarked,  imagined as separate from economic life. A major task of 
feminist research has thus been to make this  labor “count,”  whether it be 
the tasks of social reproduction, the work of subsistence agrarian produc-
tion, or the gendered “care  labor” that makes con temporary neoliberal glo-
balization pos si ble.
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Historical analy sis can contribute to this feminist proj ect by investigat-
ing the co- constitution of “reproduction” with “the economy” over time. 
As I argue, once reproduction was rendered not part of the economy, it 
re entered economic discourse from the outside, as a set of practices and 
social relations that had the power to impinge upon the economy so con-
stituted. By increasing (or decreasing) the population, reproduction could 
now foster or threaten economic development, raise or lower the GDP, and 
mark the distinction between poverty and prosperity. Reproduction, in 
short, would eventually become one point of intervention into an economy 
always marked as external to it. One of the clearest examples of this logic 
that I have encountered in the historical archive comes from Behramji 
Malabari’s appeal in 1884 to the British colonial government to legislate on 
“infant and  widow remarriage.” As I discuss in more detail in chapter 1, 
Malabari acknowledged that a “foreign government” might hesitate to 
intervene in Indians’ marriage practices, an arena already constituted as 
“private” and outside the ordinary domain of public debate and contesta-
tion. However, Malabari urged the colonial regime to reconsider this assump-
tion, arguing that marriage in fact had a public aspect: its connection to the 
economy. The early age of marriage in India, he claimed, had promoted 
the increase of the country’s population and the poverty of its inhabitants. 
As this was undoubtedly an “economic phase of the evil,” Malabari sug-
gested that this was a legitimate terrain of colonial lawmaking.61 The public 
face of marriage and reproduction, in short, was at its point of intersection 
with the economy.
As we now live in a neoliberal age when the economization of every thing 
is alternately deplored and celebrated, Malabari’s comments may not seem 
so startling. Moreover, we have witnessed de cades of population control 
programs that have rested on precisely this assumption that state inter-
vention in pro cesses of biological reproduction is justified in the name of 
economic growth and development. The book traces the long historical 
pro cesses that have brought together reproduction, population, and econ-
omy in this way. In the pages that follow, I investigate a range of historical 
conjunctures and contingencies that  shaped how reproduction came to be 
articulated in economic terms, as a force si mul ta neously outside the economy 
and integral to it.  There was nothing inevitable about this pro cess. Rather 
than documenting the slow unfolding of a hegemonic conception, the book 
studies contests over the meaning of reproduction, its connection to “pop-
ulation” and “economy,” and its relationship to life itself.
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Plan of the Book
The book traces  these intertwined histories of reproduction and economy, 
population and development, bodies and sexualities, across a  century. To 
tell this story, I rely on archival texts from a wide variety of sources ranged 
across three continents. Within colonial and postcolonial state archives, I 
ask how “reproduction” became defined and targeted for regulation. I locate 
the state’s reproductive politics not only in its reports about marriage prac-
tices or birth control use, but also in dispatches about famine, inquiries 
about food production, and plans for agricultural and industrial develop-
ment. By the mid- twentieth  century, transnational donors and foundations 
aimed to shape, and sometimes implement, government policies. Their 
grant programs, scientific conferences, and propaganda are all part of the 
reproductive politics I consider  here. The book also looks to a range of 
organ izations, both large and small, that debated, re imagined, and reformed 
reproduction. Some focused explic itly on population and  family planning, 
such as the Madras Neo- Malthusian League, or the  Family Planning Asso-
ciation of India;  others made reproduction part of other agendas, such as 
the All India  Women’s Conference, or the Self Re spect movement. Beyond 
 these orga nizational spaces, reproduction was also called into question 
within a wider public sphere of contraceptive manuals, self- help books, 
scholarly works, and newspaper editorials. With the institutionalization of 
population control  after in de pen dence, the public sphere was saturated with 
state propaganda— film and radio broadcasts, alongside posters, billboards, 
and pamphlets— that constitutes part of the archive of reproductive 
politics.
Many of  these sources come from the perspective of elite actors, and I 
do not assume that the nexus linking reproduction, population, and econ-
omy was a shared concern that cut across hierarchies of class, caste, reli-
gion, or gender. While reproductive politics as articulated by elites had 
outsize efects in the form of laws, policies, and programs, their targets of 
intervention did not necessarily share a common understanding of repro-
duction as a social question. Wherever pos si ble, I aim to make vis i ble alter-
native and competing perspectives. I find  these alternatives in some 
unlikely places, such as in the actions of  people in famine relief camps, in 
radical anticaste arguments for birth control, in debates about racialized 
migration laws, and in the questions that ordinary  women raised when con-
fronted by feminist  family planners. Although  these interventions tend to 
appear only as fragments in the archive, they also point  toward dif er ent 
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frameworks for understanding the connections between biological repro-
duction and its social meanings— between bodies and the body politic— that 
I examine in the book. I revisit questions of alternatives in the epilogue, in 
dialogue with oral history interviews collected for this proj ect in rural Tamil 
Nadu, in which  women shared accounts of their own reproductive lives.
The remaining chapters document this history. The narrative begins in 
the late nineteenth  century, when colonial administrators and Indian com-
mentators began to frame Indian reproduction as an economic question. 
They forged  these connections in the crucible of the massive famines that 
rocked India from the 1870s to the 1890s. Although the population was not 
increasing at the time, the specter of widespread starvation fostered Mal-
thusian fears that the land could no longer sustain the  people who depended 
upon it and prompted a new calibration of life that mea sured the survival 
of the population against the cost of its sustenance. In this new mea sure-
ment of life, I suggest in chapter 1, we may find the origins of a new repro-
ductive politics, which turned to reproduction as a point of intervention in 
the economic life of the population. For some colonial administrators, 
Indian reproductive practices seemed to explain poverty in the colony. They 
blamed “native” marriage and sexuality for creating the conditions that kept 
so many Indians living on the edge of starvation. Reproductive reformers— 
both Indian and British— also seized upon this moment of economic crisis 
and food scarcity. They called upon Indians to transform their marriage 
practices and utilize birth control, with the goal of realigning reproduction 
to meet the economic constraints of colonial rule.
Connections between reproduction and economy persisted across sub-
sequent de cades, taking new shape in the context of anticolonial national-
ism, global economic depression, and the rise of eugenic thinking. While 
the massive famines that  shaped late nineteenth- century life did not recur 
during the 1920s and 1930s, population continued to be a source of anxiety 
across a wide spectrum of public opinion. Malthusian fears that India’s pop-
ulation was too large joined eugenic concerns about its health, vitality, and 
ge ne tic fitness. Many reformers wondered how India, with a population that 
was both eco nom ically impoverished and eugenically “unfit,” might take 
its rightful place in an emergent “comity of nations.”62 Chapter 2 traces the 
entanglement of reproduction with two distinct but related sets of debates 
about the nation and its  future sovereignty during the late colonial de cades. 
The first, sparked by the publication of Katherine Mayo’s incendiary  Mother 
India in 1927, grappled with the relationship between the biopolitics of 
Indian reproduction and the geopolitics of race, migration, and rights to 
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land. The second, encapsulated in a series of reforms that centered on birth 
control and the age of marriage and  were promoted by the Indian  women’s 
movement, aimed to solve the supposed prob lems of Indian reproduction 
within the territorial framework of the Indian nation and, more specifi-
cally, within the constraints of an Indian national economy. Yet, even as the 
question of reproduction was increasingly asked and answered through the 
prism of the nation, I argue, alternative frameworks also developed. Radi-
cal critiques of patriarchy found a place alongside challenges to class and 
caste oppression, albeit at the margins of interwar reproductive politics.
As in de pen dence neared, the nationalist politics of reproduction began 
to focus more narrowly on national development; that is, on the role of the 
state in promoting economic and social pro gress. By 1952, India’s First Five 
Year Plan formally charted out the national state’s development vision and, 
as mentioned above, included a program of “ family planning.” As I argue 
in chapter 3, the Indian  women’s movement played a critical role in this pro-
cess, helping to position reproductive reform as a vehicle for economic 
development in in de pen dent India. The chapter traces the activities of a 
range of  women’s movement leaders, such as Dhanvanthi Rama Rau, Ava-
bai Wadia, and Lakshmibai Rajwade, during the transitional de cade from 
the early 1940s, when they incorporated  family planning into their devel-
opment vision, to the early 1950s, when the ideological and institutional 
foundations of Indian  family planning  were put into place.  These  women 
mobilized their connections within the Indian  women’s movement while 
si mul ta neously intervening in transnational population control networks 
to argue that  family planning represented a form of development for and 
by  women. Their approach centered the postcolonial nation- state as an agent 
of  women’s emancipation, linking the  women’s movement to the agenda of 
state- led development.
However,  women leaders’ ostensibly feminist commitments to  family 
planning advanced a population control agenda that ultimately had  little 
interest in challenging the structures of  women’s oppression. Rather, with 
the promise of alleviating poverty without tackling class, caste, or gender 
inequalities,  family planners targeted the reproduction of poor  women as 
the cause of the nation’s economic prob lems. As I discuss in chapter 4, this 
targeting intensified during the 1960s and 1970s, when  family planning pro-
grams gained urgency amid growing fears about India’s rate of population 
growth and global anx i eties about a “population bomb” that threatened the 
planet. Meanwhile, new reproductive technologies enabled more intensive 
scrutiny of sexualities and bodies, notably in campaigns to insert IUDs and 
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to promote surgical sterilization. Within this context, poor  women  were 
represented as dangerous bodies— sometimes just as dangerous uteruses— 
whose reproductive capacities posed national and global threats. As a 
result, their bodies became the very ground over which key debates about 
Indian population and economic development played out.  These gendered 
politics of population control shifted briefly during the Emergency period, 
when men emerged as targets of reproductive regulation. However, as the 
chapter demonstrates, the Emergency also deepened the long- standing 
connections that linked reproduction to population and economy in mod-
ern India and, in its aftermath, again placed  women’s bodies at the center 
of debate.
Even while feminists and activists, nationalists and bureaucrats, and 
eugenicists and Malthusians all aimed to control reproduction to align with 
“the economy,” they also envisioned an alternative model of  family life. Spe-
cifically, they  imagined a “small  family”— composed of a husband, wife, and 
their two or three  children—as the exemplar of rational reproductive plan-
ning, responsible citizenship, and economic foresight. Chapter  5 traces 
 these discourses of the small  family as they came to saturate public space 
across the mid- twentieth  century. I examine repre sen ta tions of the small 
 family from the 1920s, when they first began to appear in print media, to 
the height of population control campaigns in the 1960s and 1970s, when 
spreading a “small  family norm” became the explicit goal of communica-
tions experts devoted to  family planning. Exhorting audiences to remem-
ber that “A Small  Family Is a Happy  Family,”  these discourses situated the 
small  family as a site of desire and aspiration, suggesting that controlling 
one’s reproduction would promote both individual and national prosper-
ity. Considering a variety of texts and images depicting small families— 
including cartoons, drawings, advertisements, and films— the chapter 
examines how the institutions and structures of heterosexuality came to 
underpin development planning, merging marriage with population con-
trol and marshaling afect in ser vice of economy. Fi nally, the epilogue con-
siders the enduring impact of the reproductive histories examined in the 
book. Drawing upon oral history interviews with  women in rural Tamil 
Nadu who rely on the state for access to reproductive health care, I ask how 
discourses of population and economy both enter into and are challenged 
by  women’s repre sen ta tions of their reproductive bodies and lives. By his-
toricizing the nexus of reproduction, population, and economy— and dem-
onstrating how and why  these connections took shape as they did— the 
book questions some of the fundamental assumptions that continue to 
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underpin the politics of reproduction  today. I hope, as well, that it contrib-
utes to visions of more just reproductive  futures.
A Note on Terms
My use of terms draws inspiration from Loretta Ross and Rickie Solinger, 
whose book “recognizes the limits of traditional, biologically based binary 
definitions of gender at the same time as it chronicles and analyzes histo-
ries that  these definitions have produced.”63 In writing about the past, I use 
the term  women when discussing discourses, policies, and programs that 
claimed to target cisgender  women. In hopes of not echoing the historical 
erasure of transgender lives and experience, however, I also aim to use more 
inclusive, context- sensitive language, recognizing that gender identity can-
not be assumed to flow simply from a bodily capacity to menstruate, become 
pregnant, or give birth.
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Chapter 1
ECONOMIES OF REPRODUCTION  
IN AN AGE OF EMPIRE
 After traveling for several weeks through the parched 
and famine- stricken districts of Madras Presidency in early 1877, Sir Richard 
 Temple arrived at the seacoast town of Mahabalipuram, south of the city of 
Madras, on the eleventh of March. He immediately felt refreshed by the 
weather, and rejoiced that “in the midst of this drought- stricken district . . . 
the breeze is so fresh and cool that we are wearing flannel.”1  Temple seated 
himself upon a granite slab beside the ruins of a Pallava- era  temple, and 
 there, in the shadows of another bygone empire, he composed a letter to Sir 
John Strachey, the finance member of the viceroy’s Executive Council. 
 Temple had been appointed by the viceroy to inquire into the Madras 
and Bombay governments’ administration of famine relief. As the famine 
raged and many thousands perished from hunger and disease,  Temple had 
visited famine- relief camps and conferred with local administrators. When 
he fi nally reached Mahabalipuram, removed from proximity to the starv-
ing and gazing outward to the sea, he was apparently at leisure to reflect on 
broader questions about the finances of the British Empire and the life and 
death of its Indian subjects. Writing of the condition of the hungry with 
equanimity, he noted that  there was “distress” in the famine districts. What 
concerned him more, however, was that Madras administrators  were sup-
posedly giving indiscriminate relief, in the form of food and wages, to 
hungry  people. Invoking Adam Smith’s theories about the role of  free 
markets in supplying grain, alongside Thomas Malthus’s strictures about 
limiting poor relief to control overpopulation,  Temple argued that the 
government must rein in its famine expenditures immediately.2 Leaving 
Mahabalipuram,  Temple launched a campaign to do precisely this, by 
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reducing the number of  people receiving state support and limiting the 
amount of relief they received. The government of India seemed to approve 
of  Temple’s eforts, and he was soon promoted to become governor of Bom-
bay Presidency. Meanwhile, by the government’s own estimate, at least five 
million  people died from starvation and disease during the famine of 
1876–78.3
While  Temple was advocating his cost- cutting mea sures across the Dec-
can plateau and peninsular India, the activist Annie Besant, who would 
 later become known for her Indian nationalist leadership, was formulating 
a campaign for birth control in London. In March 1877— coincidentally just 
days  after  Temple’s Mahabalipuram letter— Besant and her associate Charles 
Bradlaugh  were arrested for publishing a book by the American physician 
Charles Knowlton that outlined methods to prevent conception. Accused 
of spreading obscenity, Besant and Bradlaugh defended their actions on 
Malthusian grounds, arguing that birth control was necessary to prevent 
overpopulation and reduce poverty in Britain.  After a sensational trial, they 
 were acquitted on a  legal technicality, and Besant immediately continued 
her contraceptive campaign. As summer turned to fall in London, British 
newspapers  were filled with accounts of the Indian famine, and the trag-
edy soon came to occupy a central place in Besant’s rationale for birth con-
trol. In October of that year, she authored a best- selling pamphlet on 
contraception, The Law of Population: Its Consequences, and Its Bearing 
upon  Human Conduct and Morals. For Besant, the famine seemed to ofer 
proof that “our Indian empire” was beset by overpopulation and that birth 
control was the best solution. As she asked her readers, “Is it pos si ble to sit 
down with folded hands and calmly contemplate the recurrence at regular 
intervals of such a famine as lately slew its tens of thousands?”4 Resolving 
that the answer was no, Besant ofered contraception as a solution to pov-
erty, overpopulation, and famine in Britain’s Indian empire.
At first glance,  Temple’s letter from Mahabalipuram may seem an odd 
juxtaposition with Besant’s birth control pamphlet. The letter was intended 
for  limited circulation to the highest levels of the colonial administration, 
documented bureaucratic details about famine relief, and made an eco-
nomic case to rein in state expenditures. The pamphlet, by contrast, aimed 
for a massive public audience, ofered detailed information about bodily and 
reproductive pro cesses, and made an impassioned argument that contracep-
tion was a remedy for the economic prob lems of empire. Yet taken together, 
the two texts suggest the contours of a distinct moment in the history of 
reproductive politics. This was a moment, during the late nineteenth  century, 
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when food scarcity and economic crisis called Indian reproduction into 
question and provoked demands for reproductive reform. As we  shall see in 
this chapter,  these calls for reform encompassed every thing from the uni-
versality of marriage to the structures of Hindu conjugality to the advo-
cacy of contraception. Remedies difered in their specifics but  were held 
together by a common set of assumptions about poverty and population 
that was indebted to Malthusian ideas and gained strength in the context 
of the famines that recurred across India during this period. As the texts 
from  Temple and Besant suggest, further, this new reproductive politics 
developed through a series of imperial circulations—of food, of finance, 
and of frameworks of ideas between the British metropole and the Indian 
colony. We cannot understand the history of reproduction, therefore, with-
out attention to the politics and economies of empire.
To trace this history, the chapter follows two lines of inquiry, each of 
which was critical to a new politics of reproduction during the “high noon” 
of the British Empire in India. The first was an emerging concern that India 
was overpopulated. This population anxiety was not due to any demonstra-
ble increase in numbers. In fact, and in contrast to Western Eu rope at the 
time, population in most parts of India stagnated between 1870 and 1920.5 
Concern about Indian overpopulation was provoked less by population 
growth than by famine. The scale and massive mortality rates of late 
nineteenth- century famines prompted claims that the land held more 
 people than it could reasonably support and that the food available was 
inadequate to the needs of the inhabitants.  These concerns  were indebted 
to the thinking of Thomas Malthus; for many con temporary observers, 
both British and Indian, the fact of famine seemed to indicate that India 
had already reached a Malthusian limit of population.  These claims about 
the population also depended upon practices of enumeration and, more 
generally, upon the role of numbers in the colonial administration; this 
represents a second line of inquiry. The late nineteenth  century marked 
the beginning of the all- India census, first attempted in 1872, then estab-
lished more comprehensively in 1881. Alongside  these counts, the colo-
nial state increasingly relied on numbers to rationalize its administration, 
leading to a “quantificatory episteme” that  shaped colonial policy and 
rule.6 Famine administration was one impor tant site for this turn  toward 
quantification.
Together,  these anx i eties about population and focus on numbers as a 
mode of governance produced a new reproductive politics that linked con-
jugality to economy. Some colonial administrators developed  these links to 
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argue that Indian marital, sexual, and familial practices  were responsible 
for Indian impoverishment. Among some Indian intellectuals and reform-
ers,  these concerns about reproduction provoked demands to change Indian 
conjugality in order to avert economic disaster. This included a reform of 
marriage and, in some cases, birth control. Such connections between mar-
riage and famine, and between childbearing and impoverishment, created 
the terms by which reproduction became a question of public debate. To 
investigate  these connections, the chapter begins with the discourses of 
quantification and population that  shaped nineteenth- century colonial 
administration, in par tic u lar the administration of famine. As I argue, the 
logics of colonial famine administration provoked a new calibration of life 
that mea sured the survival of the population against the cost of its suste-
nance. The chapter then turns to the famine of 1876–78, an event that helped 
to crystallize and make vis i ble  these new calculations about the cost of life. 
In the context of this crisis and its aftermath, anx i eties about the life and 
death of the population helped to make reproduction into a target of scru-
tiny and a site for reform in ways that would have lasting impact in colo-
nial India. It would also place India at the center of an emerging global 
politics of population, whose implications would reverberate into the twen-
tieth  century.
Counting and Quantifying Population
Practices of enumeration and quantification  were critical to emergent dis-
courses about population in the nineteenth  century. Although the fact of 
counting itself was not new to this period, colonial modes of generating and 
recording numerical data helped to connect population to reproduction in 
novel ways. Specifically, the task of managing population became intimately 
linked to gathering quantitative and statistical data about reproduction. In 
a shift that began with the all- India censuses, the pro cess of enumerating 
population would eventually situate such mea sures as fertility and nuptial-
ity on a quantitative grid, paving the way for reproduction to be connected 
to economy in new ways.
To trace this history, I begin with early colonial modes of counting, which 
relied heavi ly on precolonial enumeration practices. The Mughal Empire 
and its successor states counted as a way to determine taxes and land rev-
enue. What they counted, and how, depended upon the structure of reve-
nue demands. For instance, if the state taxed each  house hold, then censuses 
of  house holds ensued; if  house hold taxes  were diferentiated by caste or 
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occupation, then revenue administrators counted and recorded  these 
categories. If the state collected a portion of the crop, then assessing the area 
of land planted or the number of  cattle became ways to determine land rev-
enue.7 The East India Com pany drew upon  these  earlier exercises in count-
ing, and their debts to indigenous systems  were multiple. Com pany officials 
found census enumerators among village- level accountants who had 
engaged in administrative counting in precolonial regimes. They de cided 
what to count, in part, based on interaction with  these indigenous enumer-
ators, and their purposes for counting held much in common with  earlier 
rulers.8 During the eigh teenth and early nineteenth centuries, the Com pany 
counted as part of taxation and land revenue assessment. Its  great proj ects 
of “settling” the land revenue, as in the case of the Bengal Permanent Set-
tlement of 1793, depended upon a massive cadastral exercise of surveying, 
counting, and mea sur ing. Such proj ects helped to develop the expertise for 
 later  human censuses.9
The Com pany’s interest in counting also developed vis- à- vis a British and 
Eu ro pean milieu in which statistics  were increasingly a mode of governance. 
Through the course of the seventeenth and eigh teenth centuries, develop-
ments in numeracy, literacy, state fiscalism, and actuarial thinking made 
numbers part of the British po liti cal imagination.10 This emphasis on enu-
meration produced the country’s first national census in 1801. It also found 
expression in new institutions, most notably the Statistical Society of Lon-
don, founded in 1834. The turn to numbers, as Arjun Appadurai suggests, 
was part of a growing sense that a power ful state could not survive without 
making “enumeration a central technique of social control.”11 This resulted 
in interconnections among developments in statistical science, the genera-
tion of statistical knowledge for purposes of governance, and the policies 
of the state.  These changes occurred within a broader imperial network that 
encompassed both metropole and colony.
The Indian census of 1872 marks an impor tant moment within this lon-
ger history of quantifying population across the British Empire. The idea 
for such a census had been floated in the final years of Com pany rule. The 
rebellion of 1857 put a temporary halt to  these plans, but they  were resumed 
 after the establishment of Crown rule to produce the first count of popula-
tion in British Indian territories in 1872. This was followed by the more com-
prehensive census of 1881, ushering in a series of decennial counts that 
continued unbroken through in de pen dence. While drawing upon  earlier 
enumerations, the new censuses also marked a significant departure from 
their pre de ces sors. Unlike prior eforts, which had been localized and did 
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not aim to generate data commensurate with other local counts,  here the 
goal was to conduct a national census. This was not quite achieved in 1872, 
since the enumeration did not include all areas  under Crown rule and did 
not count the princely states at all. Beginning in 1881, however, the census 
became more truly national and was forced to generate nationally commen-
surate categories of caste, religion, and occupation. The 1881 census was 
also synchronous; that is, it counted every one on the same day.12 This 
required employing an army of census enumerators and producing an ever- 
growing library of census reports to pre sent the data collected. In this 
sense, the census became a major administrative undertaking of the colo-
nial regime. At the same time, it produced vastly more statistical data than 
could be used for directly utilitarian purposes like revenue or taxation, 
unlike  earlier enumerations that privileged information collection for 
clearly defined ends.  After 1872, the census became at once justificatory, dis-
ciplinary, and pedagogical, far exceeding the more specific purposes for 
which numbers had been generated before.13
Significantly, the new mode of national census- taking enumerated indi-
viduals. While previous counts had sometimes hazarded population esti-
mates based on numbers of  house holds, the census of 1872 and its successors 
aimed to count each person by age, sex, and social identity. The novelty of 
this practice is suggested by the Madras census commissioner, W. R. Cor-
nish, who noted with some frustration that the “female population” was 
likely undercounted in the presidency. He attributed this failure to the local 
census enumerators, who had “been singularly obtuse in comprehending 
the fact that the counting of females was a  matter of any importance in cen-
sus work. To understand how this is, we must take into account the low 
estimation in which females are held in this country, and also the reticence 
of the  people on all  matters connected with their female relatives.”14 Per-
haps census enumerators— accustomed to  earlier regimes of counting that 
emphasized the household— did not see the purpose of inquiring into the 
details of  house hold inhabitants. However, the administrators of the 1872 
census and its successors  were far more ambitious in their goals and even-
tually built the kind of population profile that we associate with census data 
in our own time.
When census enumerators  were pressed to uncover how many  people 
lived in the  house hold, alongside their age, gender, and marital status, they 
began to generate new kinds of data that situated reproduction within a 
quantitative grid. To understand the significance of this shift, we might 
compare this moment with  earlier eras, when such data was not collected. 
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As Sumit Guha argues, seventeenth- and eighteenth- century accounts 
explained population growth primarily through migration and movement. 
Administrative benevolence or tax concessions might induce  people to 
migrate into a kingdom and thus increase population. In precolonial India, 
“the West Eu ro pean concern with fecundity was therefore absent” and “it 
was not necessary for such an administration to penetrate into the  house hold 
to ascertain its demographic contents.”15 But once the 1872 census enumer-
ators had, so to speak, “penetrated the  house hold,” their data began to 
quantify population in new ways. As Foucault argues for modern Eu rope, 
states began to understand the “population” less as  people and more as a 
phenomenon to be managed to maximize wealth or  labor capacity; this was 
a population “balanced between its own growth and the resources it com-
manded.”16 Increasingly, managing this population seemed to depend on 
generating statistical data about reproduction, which of course was inti-
mately connected to sex and sexuality. Through collecting information 
about individuals within  house holds, statisticians could surmise how many 
 children  women had, on average, and could correlate this with markers of 
social identity, such as caste or religion. They could generate new informa-
tion about  mothers’ average ages when their  children  were born and could 
document the  children’s rates of survival through infancy. In short, aspects 
of population size and rate of growth could now be mea sured in relation to 
quantified markers of reproductive be hav ior. Fertility, nuptiality, and age 
of marriage thus became foundational to collecting data about and man-
aging the population as a  whole.  These figures existed “at the boundary line 
of the biological and the economic domains,” merging a set of claims about 
reproductive sexuality with assertions about the economic prosperity of the 
population.17
Historicizing Famine
Even as new methods of enumeration provoked a new way of understanding 
the “population” in the late nineteenth  century, the frequency and severity 
of famines during  these de cades prompted a concern that this population 
was, in fact, an “overpopulation,” an excess of  people in relation to the land. 
To explain why famine, rather than  actual population growth, led colonial 
administrators to claim that India was overpopulated, this section turns to 
the history of late nineteenth- century famine, and to the wider po liti cal 
and economic relations that made famines so devastating wherever they 
occurred across the subcontinent. Considering this history, which takes us 
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through the  causes and consequences of famine events, helps to clarify 
how the “population”— and its reproduction— emerged as a target of gover-
nance in the late nineteenth  century. Claims about the population that first 
developed in the context of famine, I argue, would become foundational to 
the new reproductive politics that I examine  later in the chapter.
Famine had been a feature of South Asian life even before colonial rule, 
but it occurred with depressing regularity during the nineteenth  century.18 
Some of the major instances included famines in Guntur District in Madras 
Presidency from 1832 to 1833; in the North West Provinces, Punjab, Raja-
sthan, and Kutch from 1860 to 1861; in Orissa and Bihar from 1866 to 
1867; in the Central Provinces and Rajasthan from 1868 to 1870; and in 
Bihar from 1873 to 1874. But even  these massive calamities  were relatively 
 limited in their geo graph i cal range, in comparison with the more wide-
spread disasters to follow in the last quarter of the nineteenth  century. The 
famine of 1876–78 afected much of Madras and parts of Bombay Presiden-
cies, alongside the North West Provinces and the princely states of Mysore 
and Hyderabad. Even more severe famines closed the  century: in 1896 and 
1897 across most of India, and again in 1899 and 1900, when large parts of 
western, northwestern, and central India  were impacted.19 Colonial admin-
istrators tended to blame famines on the failure of monsoon rains; indeed, 
each of  these crises was accompanied by adverse weather conditions. But 
while climate was crucial in the timing of famines, the extreme “social 
vulnerability to climate variability” still needs to be explained.20 That is, as 
many contemporaries recognized and as scholars have since confirmed, 
famines  were not necessarily provoked by an absolute lack of food but by 
 people’s inability  either to buy food or to secure the means of subsistence in 
any other way. This collapse of  people’s means to access subsistence— their 
“exchange entitlements,” in Amartya Sen’s terms— requires explana-
tion.21 In other words, what made  people so vulnerable that a failure of 
monsoon rains could bring many millions to the brink of starvation?
The short answer to this question is colonialism. The conditions of colo-
nial rule produced or exacerbated a slow erosion of food security among 
landless laborers and smallholding peasants, the two groups most likely to 
face starvation during periods of famine. Over the course of the nineteenth 
 century, a decline in other sources of employment, including weaving and 
other industries, rendered agriculture the only source of livelihood for an 
increasing percentage of the population. At the same time, farming became 
an increasingly precarious source of employment. Growing commercializa-
tion of agriculture exposed peasants to the risks of market fluctuation with 
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few of its rewards, and in consequence, landowners had  little incentive to 
invest in the land, and agriculture was undercapitalized.22 Shifts away from 
food crops to commercial production also reduced food security in times 
of crisis. Meanwhile, the burdens of colonial taxation fell especially hard 
on the agrarian economy.23  These taxes raised funds not only for Indian 
administration but also for British expansion in Asia and Africa, thus weld-
ing the Indian agriculturist to the finances of the British Empire.24 Increases 
in land revenue rates sometimes coincided with and prompted the onset of 
famine conditions; more broadly, the demand for land revenue and its mode 
of collection squeezed the most marginal occupants of the land during 
both “ordinary” and famine years.25 When the monsoon rains failed, there-
fore,  people  were left with few resources to fall back upon.
Landless laborers and smallholding peasants thus constituted an impov-
erished population that lived on the edge of subsistence even in ordinary 
years and risked starvation during periods of famine. Moreover, as Mike 
Davis reminds us, the financial precarity of Indian peasants in the late nine-
teenth  century did not develop outside of an emergent cap i tal ist and impe-
rialist world system. Rather, millions died “in the very pro cess of being 
forcibly incorporated into its economic and po liti cal structures.”26 More spe-
cifically, Eu ro pean governments’ continuing capacity to feed their own 
populations, as David Arnold suggests, was “achieved at the expense of 
hardship and hunger in the colonial world.”27 Famines in late nineteenth- 
century India  were thus both a consequence of a global transfer of wealth 
and resources to the Western imperialist powers and a further engine to 
accelerate inequalities on a world scale.28 However, they  were not, as colo-
nial administrators often assumed, a consequence of population growth; 
population size was, in fact, mostly stagnant at this time. The connection 
administrators made between famine and population depended upon Mal-
thusian theories, as I discuss in more detail below.
The devastating impact of famine was magnified by the limitations of 
state support for afected populations; in most cases, the colonial adminis-
tration failed to prevent large- scale mortality during periods of famine.29 
During the late eigh teenth and early nineteenth centuries, state assistance 
was constrained by  limited technologies of communication and transport; 
in addition, East India Com pany administrators had  limited knowledge of 
Indian agriculture and rural conditions. As the  century wore on, however, 
and modes of transport and communication improved,  limited state fund-
ing continued to constrain famine relief eforts. The same logic that man-
dated a high rate of land revenue— which required the Indian taxpayer to 
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bankroll both colonial administration and imperial expansion— also 
severely reduced funds for supporting starving populations.  Free charita-
ble relief was therefore always  limited. Punitive regimes required famine- 
afected populations to  labor on public works distant from their homes, and 
 these conditions dissuaded many from even applying to the state for help. 
Private charity, though locally efective at times, could never exist on the scale 
that was required. Consequently, many famines resulted in massive mortal-
ity. In the Guntur famine, for instance, historians estimate that one- third 
of the population died; in Orissa, one- quarter of the population may have 
perished.30 Not coincidentally, the only famine in which state eforts sub-
stantially  limited mortality was in Bihar in 1873 and 1874, when the govern-
ment expended significantly more per capita on the afected population 
than in other relief eforts.31
The colonial regime’s  limited funding for famine relief rested upon a 
broader ideology that  limited state intervention in market operations—
a laissez- faire economic policy indebted in par tic u lar to Adam Smith. Clas-
sical po liti cal economy, as developed by Smith and his followers, began from 
the premise that individuals’ unconstrained pursuit of their own interests 
would necessarily produce the greatest social good. As Smith’s Wealth of 
Nations (1776) notes, the state’s role was therefore to avoid regulation of 
markets, leaving an “invisible hand” to efect both individual good and 
social benefit. The princi ple of state nonintervention extended to a “ free 
trade” in food supplies. Smith rejected previous po liti cal theory that made 
securing food a state responsibility, arguing that state actions to fix prices, 
punish hoarding, or purchase grain risked exacerbating the prob lem they 
 were intended to solve.32 Such action would only turn “dearth,” which Smith 
termed an “unavoidable misfortune,” into a full- scale famine. As a case in 
point, Smith wrote about the East India Com pany’s market interventions 
in Bengal in 1770, claiming that “famine has never arisen from any other 
cause but the vio lence of government attempting, by improper means, to 
remedy the incon ve nience of a dearth.”33 State intervention in food markets 
was thus not only futile but also harmful.  These doctrines became increas-
ingly impor tant to how colonial administrators approached famine in India, 
as they had in Ireland. Although Smith’s ideas did not provide a detailed 
blueprint for each specific case of famine, a devotion to free- market ideol-
ogies built the foundation of nineteenth- century famine policy in colonial 
India.34
Within this longer history of colonial famine and its administration, the 
famine of 1876–78 marked a watershed moment. Like its pre de ces sors, the 
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famine was prompted most immediately by a disruption in the monsoon 
rains. This disruption— likely caused by an El Niño southern oscillation 
pattern— was exceptionally severe, of the sort to occur only once in two 
hundred or even five hundred years.35 The crisis was unpre ce dented in its 
geographic scale and impacted districts previously considered immune to 
famine. Still, as in other famines, afected districts did not sufer from an 
absolute lack of food; with a sharp rise in food prices in late 1876, however, 
many  people found themselves unable to buy food or to access it in other 
ways.36 Contemporaries recognized this distinction. Thus, writing in 
December  1876, one correspondent for the Marathi newspaper Dnyan 
Prakash argued that “the pre sent distress cannot, in strict truth, be called 
a scarcity of food. . . .  The real fact is that, the sufering  people have no power 
of purchasing food, and therefore, they are experiencing all the horrors of 
a famine.”37
In piecemeal fashion, local and provincial governments began to insti-
tute relief mea sures. As the crisis worsened in the early months of 1877, the 
Indian government grew concerned about the growing cost of  these eforts 
and attempted to rein in expenditures by appointing Richard  Temple as its 
famine delegate. Within months,  Temple followed his mandate to curtail 
the number of  people receiving state support, increase  labor requirements 
on relief works, and reduce the food and cash wages ofered in exchange 
for this  labor. The goal, on some level, was to make relief as unpleasant as 
pos si ble, so as to minimize the number of  people who sought assistance. 
Men,  women, and  children over ages seven or eight  were required to pass a 
“distance test” for relief, which meant they had to travel at least ten miles 
away from their homes to be eligible for support.38 Once arrived at the relief 
camps, applicants  were tested for their physical fitness, sometimes via blows 
to the chest. If deemed capable of work, they would  labor in gangs to com-
plete assigned tasks; partial completion would mean only a partial wage. 
 Those determined to be unfit for manual  labor  were eligible for charita-
ble relief, which was distributed  under punitive conditions that could include 
forced residence in camps.
Famine- afected populations resisted  these mea sures in multiple ways, 
such as refusing to seek state relief and even  going on strike to protest wages 
and conditions on the relief works.39 In the meantime, the crisis continued 
its grim course. By 1878, newspapers reported that  people  were reduced to 
eating inedible foods, and even the carcasses of dead animals.40 Families 
 were being destroyed, lamented the Paschima Taraka and Kerala Pataka in 
October 1878, as “parental and other natu ral afections and sympathies are 
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losing their force.”41  Eager to end its relief administration as soon as pos si ble, 
the government declared the famine over with the onset of some seasonal 
rains in 1878. For  people who had lost their  cattle, seed, and tools, how-
ever,  there was no clear end to the crisis, whose efects  were long- standing 
even  after the government declaration.
The scope of the disaster provoked an administrative reckoning in its 
aftermath. The British government appointed a Famine Commission to 
investigate the  causes and consequences of the crisis and, in 1880, instituted 
its first official Famine Code. This document, which David Arnold terms 
“one of the most significant administrative mea sures devised during the 
entire period of British rule in India,” would set state policy for de cades to 
come.42 It helped to enshrine Smith’s ideas about the primacy of the mar-
ket in grappling with famines, while regularizing systems of relief admin-
istration. In retrospect, then, the famine of 1876–78 was the last to occur 
before the development of more fixed policies. It aforded officials “their last 
chance to dispute the adequacy of cost- cutting relief, or to challenge pre-
suppositions about the famine pro cess and the population” before official 
positions on  these issues  limited the scope of debate.43 Therefore, although 
famine policy was not unchanging in  later de cades, this crisis prompted the 
articulation of princi ples and practices that would have a long life in colo-
nial India.
Calibrating the Cost of Life
Among the efects of the famine was a new quantification of life and life 
pro cesses. Linking famine administration to enumeration as a mode of state 
power, colonial officials counted the famine in multiple ways. They docu-
mented the number of  people afected; noted how many had applied for 
relief; divided this population by sex, age, and bodily capacities; and fi nally 
accounted for the number who had died from starvation. Administrators 
marked increases and decreases in  these numbers, calculated the percent-
age of the population receiving state support, and compared  these figures 
across villages and districts.44 In short, numbers  were the language with 
which colonial officials told the story of famine, and numbers  shaped how 
they responded to the crisis. In the pro cess, the lives of famine- afected 
 people became newly quantifiable, and colonial administrators calibrated 
the cost of saving life against the finances of the imperial government.
On one level, numbers served to document the extent and severity of the 
famine. A tele gram from the viceroy, Lord Lytton, to the secretary of state 
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for India in January 1877 exemplifies this use of numbers. In a few terse sen-
tences, the text notes that the situation was especially grave in Madras 
Presidency, “where 13 districts out of 21, containing a population of 20 mil-
lions,”  were afected. The number on relief works was over 840,000, which 
the author compares with only 250,000 in Bombay. The result was an esti-
mated loss of five million rupees to the Madras revenue, though Bombay 
was unaltered. The author concludes that through all this  there  were per-
haps “one or two isolated” cases of starvation, but that the government had 
endeavored to prevent any mortality due to famine.45
Numbers also structured the narrative of famine at the level of the indi-
vidual body. Famine administrators debated the exact amount of food 
required to sustain the life of famine- afected  people. For instance, during 
his cost- cutting tour of Madras Presidency,  Temple pushed to reduce the 
wages on famine- relief works to just sixteen ounces of grain per day for adult 
men, with lower amounts for  women and  children. This shocked observ-
ers, who noted that it was less than what the government provided for pris-
oners in jails, or for laborers sent on ships overseas, neither of whom 
performed hard manual  labor.46  Temple’s opponents, most notably the for-
mer Madras census commissioner W. R. Cornish, insisted that this wage 
was insufficient “for the physiological requirements of the body” and it “can-
not be said to preserve life, although it may postpone death.”47 Cornish 
drew upon scientific studies and personal observation to argue for anywhere 
from twenty- four to forty- eight ounces, with precisely calibrated ratios of 
“carboniferous” and “nitrogenous princi ples” in the food.48 Another medi-
cal officer documented the insufficiency of food by weighing the inhabit-
ants of famine- relief camps, then compared this data with information 
obtained from jailed prisoners in the district.49
Even as the government thus assigned meaning to the famine through 
numbers, quantification also ofered a language with which to contest the 
government’s narrative about the famine administration. For instance, the 
Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, a civic association supported by some of the Dec-
can’s largest landholders, conducted its own village- level censuses to  counter 
the state’s claims. Working with village accountants, postmasters, school-
teachers, and retired civil servants, the Sabha gathered data about rainfall, 
food prices and availability, the condition of  cattle, and the numbers of 
mi grant populations. In a series of published “famine narratives,” it docu-
mented “disproportionate” rates of birth and death and enumerated star-
vation deaths to  counter the state’s claims that the famine had not resulted 
in significant mortality.50 In response to the sixteen- ounce “ Temple wage,” 
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the Sabha generated its own data about the food needs of afected popula-
tions and concluded that, with only sixteen ounces, “ people starve or are 
half famished.”51 Numbers thus became the grounds to evaluate the success 
or failures of the state’s famine administration.
Most significantly, numbers in the famine administration enabled a pre-
cise calculation of the cost of life itself, and a calibration of this cost against 
the finances of the imperial government. This calculus of life unfolded in 
debates about famine mortality due to starvation. On the one hand, the gov-
ernment claimed responsibility for preserving the lives of famine- afected 
populations; in  Temple’s terse summation, “ Every efort is to be made for 
the prevention of deaths by famine.”52 On the other hand, famine adminis-
trators  were urged to balance their mandate to save lives with the costs 
entailed in  doing so. In the words of one government missive, “While the 
necessity of preventing, as far as practicable, death by starvation is para-
mount, the financial embarrassment which must in any case arise  will be 
most difficult to overcome.”53 Indeed, as  Temple added, this “embarrassment 
of debt” through relief expenditures would be “more fatal to the country 
than famine itself.”54 Administrators sought to manage  these contradictions 
by assuring each other and the public at large that saving all lives was the 
primary goal of relief eforts, and they claimed success in their implemen-
tation. When faced—as they inevitably  were— with the deaths of their sub-
jects, they tended to blame epidemic disease rather than starvation. Often, 
they critiqued individuals’ “obstinacy” in refusing to seek relief, rather than 
acknowledging that the state’s  limited and punitive relief regime contrib-
uted to the deaths.55 In other words, the finances of the imperial adminis-
tration would limit the par ameters by which lives could be saved or deaths 
prevented, even as colonial rhe toric insisted that  there was only negligible 
mortality due to famine.
 These competing princi ples—of saving lives or saving imperial finances— 
resulted in tense negotiations among the upper administration, the lower- 
level officials who or ga nized famine relief, and famine- afected populations 
themselves, who demanded a subsistence that exceeded the  limited food and 
wages provided by the state.  After much internal discussion, the government 
of India fi nally outlined its competing priorities in a careful calibration that 
mea sured the state’s financial responsibilities against the lives of its subjects: 
“Considering that the revenues are barely sufficient to meet the ordinary 
expenditure of the empire, and that heavy additional taxation is both finan-
cially and po liti cally impracticable we must plainly admit that the task of 
E c onom i e s of R e produc t ion 43
saving life, irrespective of the cost, is one which is beyond our power to 
undertake.”56
This weighing of life against cost produced a kind of economization of 
life, in which the financial resources required to sustain a population  were 
compared with the value of its life. This calculation was perhaps implicit in 
ordinary years, but it became especially fraught in the context of famine, 
as millions of  people left their homes, sought relief elsewhere, and suc-
cumbed to disease and death. In this moment of crisis, it became necessary 
for the government of India to make explicit that imperial finances would 
not allow the sustenance of life  under any and all conditions. Critics of the 
famine administration, notably the Poona Sarvajanik Sabha, ofered an 
alternative calculus. Just as they provided numerical data to contest the gov-
ernment’s repre sen ta tion of the famine itself, the Sabha also outlined a dif-
fer ent rationale of relief, arguing that it was not an inadequacy of resources 
but a failure of policy and po liti cal  will that prevented the state from sav-
ing life.57
Ultimately, however, even as deaths mounted, the state remained unwill-
ing to embrace the full implications of its own calibration of life, death, 
and finance. The same memo that announced lives would not be saved “irre-
spective of cost” concluded that the government could still apply “rules of 
action” that would allow “efficient assistance” and prevention of mortality.58 
Though the government had limits to its expenditures, in other words,  these 
expenditures could still save all lives if properly managed. Despite this res-
olution of the prob lem on paper, famine mortality was in fact im mense, as 
was recognized by many  people at the time and as is perfectly clear in hind-
sight. Indeed, as the Madras census commissioner acknowledged in the 
first census conducted  after the famine, in 1881, “The mark which that 
calamity made upon the population was so deep that it stains  every column 
of  these [census] returns.”59
In sum, the state’s famine administration developed at the par tic u lar 
intersection of new rationales for counting, the consequent emergence of a 
new idea of the “population,” and the material conditions of crisis and scar-
city. My point  here is not that counting leads to starvation, or that enu-
meration practices led directly to famine policies, which is of course not 
the case. Rather, the new regimes of counting that developed during the 
late nineteenth  century, and the accompanying importance of numbers 
in the colonial administration, prompted a new economization of life, 
whereby the benefit of lives saved was calibrated against the cost. Thus, as 
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the “population” became a target of governance, it was also mea sured against 
other imperatives of imperial rule. In the specific context of famine in 
1876–78, this calibration forced a question about the lives and deaths of 
 people in the Deccan and peninsular India.
Famine and Colonial Malthusianism
Colonial administrators calibrating life in the context of famine found in 
Malthusian theories of population and reproduction an explanation for the 
crisis that surrounded them. They  were likely familiar with  these ideas since 
Thomas Malthus himself, who served as the first chair of po liti cal economy 
at the East India Com pany’s training college, had introduced several gen-
erations of the Com pany’s servants to his own theories and to the princi-
ples of classical po liti cal economy more generally. Even  after the closure of 
the Haileybury College in 1855, po liti cal economy remained a required sub-
ject in the Indian Civil Ser vice Examinations, thus ensuring that aspiring 
British administrators in India  were educated in the doctrines of Malthus 
alongside  those of Adam Smith.60
Like colonial famine administrators, Malthus, in his Essay on the Princi-
ple of Population, engaged in a calculus of life that weighed the growth of a 
population against the costs of its sustenance. This calibration was prompted, 
for Malthus, by the extension of the En glish Poor Laws. He argued that sys-
tems of poor relief in  England subsidized “paupers” regardless of  whether 
they worked, thus acting as a stimulus to their unfettered reproduction. He 
noted that ordinarily, the poorest classes  were most likely to die in a sub-
sistence crisis like a famine; however, poor laws would prevent  these deaths 
while allowing the poor to marry  earlier and bear more  children. This grow-
ing population of the poor would strain the food supply, and  under free- 
market conditions, this would result in rising grain prices.  These higher 
prices, in turn, would make it more difficult for the next higher class to 
obtain food, and so would raise their mortality. Consequently, Malthus con-
cluded, supporting the poor would only spread poverty to higher classes of 
society. This somewhat abstract conclusion stood side by side with one 
of Malthus’s more practical remedies: allowing abandoned illegitimate 
 children to die so as not to swell the ranks of the poor, and forcing their 
parents to pay for their upbringing if they wanted them to live.61 It was left 
to John Stuart Mill, Malthus’s mid- nineteenth- century interpreter, to ele-
vate  these claims to the status of utilitarian princi ple: “Every one has a right 
to live. We  will suppose this granted. But no one has a right to bring creatures 
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into life, to be supported by other  people.”62 In other words, Malthus and 
Mill called for the regulation of poor  people’s reproduction as a ser vice to 
the “population” as a  whole.
At the center of Malthus’s claim about the population and its reproduc-
tion, Catherine Gallagher argues, was a disjuncture between the health of 
the individual body and that of the body politic. Unlike the ideas of most 
of his contemporaries, who  imagined a correlation between a healthy soci-
ety and healthy individual members, Malthus’s theories suggested that the 
health of the individual body would, through reproduction, “eventually gen-
erate a feeble social organism.” As a result, “the healthy, and consequently 
reproducing, body . . .  is a harbinger of the disordered society of starving 
bodies.”63 To check this disorder, Malthus ofered the remedy of sexual con-
tinence. Foreshadowing late nineteenth- century imperial discourses that 
linked sexual control to white, bourgeois masculinity, Malthus regarded 
sexual continence “as a criterion of civilization and even a major ele ment 
in the civilizing pro cess.”64 Thus, although Malthus may not have called 
himself a phi los o pher of sexuality, his concerns about overpopulation  were 
intimately connected to fears about the oversexuality of poor and “uncivi-
lized” classes and nations. In Mervyn Nicholson’s terms, “population in 
Malthus’s text is also a codeword for sex: the result (population) stands met-
onymically for its cause (sex).”65 The sexuality of the poor, by resulting in 
overreproduction, becomes a power ful threat to a status quo that divides 
the propertied and laboring classes, the civilized from the uncivilized. 
Moreover, as Alison Bashford demonstrates in her “spatial history of Mal-
thusianism,” population was rendered overpopulation for Malthus when it 
surpassed the food- producing capacities of available land; that is, reproduc-
tive sex became a prob lem when it overturned the balance with space.66 
Consequently, in a Malthusian calibration of life, sexuality and reproduc-
tion  were balanced against land and economy.
By the late nineteenth  century, some British administrators, especially 
at the higher levels, looked to Malthusian theories to explain famine. They 
understood events in India as proof of Malthus’s argument that population 
would overrun its means of subsistence. Administrators speculated that the 
colony had already reached a Malthusian limit and that population was out 
of balance with the land available. In the midst of famine in 1877, the vice-
roy, Lord Lytton, made  these concerns public, suggesting that the Indian 
population “has a tendency to increase more rapidly than the food it raises 
from the soil.”67 In the aftermath of the famine, the government- appointed 
Famine Commission reinforced Lytton’s assessment, concluding that “the 
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numbers who have no other employment than agriculture, are in large 
parts of the country greatly in excess of what is needed for the thorough 
cultivation of the land.”68 The balance between sex and space had been 
overturned.
This assessment of Indian overpopulation did not depend upon any 
demonstrable increase in population numbers. Too  little information 
existed, in any case, for contemporaries to make definitive claims about 
 whether or not population was increasing, since census data was just begin-
ning to be collected. We know in retrospect, however, that in most parts of 
the subcontinent, population was relatively stagnant between 1870 and 1920, 
though  there was some slow growth  after 1880. We know, as well, that  there 
was substantial regional variation in population growth rates. According 
to Sumit Guha, peninsular and eastern India witnessed relatively rapid 
growth between 1800 and 1870, whereas the central Indo- Gangetic plain 
did not experience a similar population increase.69 However, more than 
numbers, the fact of famine itself seemed to provide colonial administra-
tors with proof of overpopulation. They suggested that the death of so many 
Indian peasants confirmed that the land they inhabited could not sustain 
all  those who depended upon it. Such was the view of James Caird, an agri-
cultural scientist and member of the Famine Commission. “The greatest dif-
ficulty with which the Indian statesman is confronted,” Caird wrote in 
1879, “is over- population, with constant increase.” This was a prob lem, since 
India was a “country already full of  people, whose habits and religion pro-
mote increase without restraint.”70 One of Caird’s correspondents went even 
further. Famine in Madras and the Deccan, he argued, was due to the “radical 
dangers and ultimate result of Indian social life and habits.” Specifically, he 
claimed that “Malthusian practice of marriage,” by which he may have meant 
reproduction without regard to population growth, was pursued “without 
the slightest reference to the consequences.” Only “nature” could restore the 
balance by carry ing of “tens of millions” through repeated famines.71
This image of the overly prolific and hypersexual “native” is not new to 
scholars of imperial history, who have demonstrated that the production 
of a racialized, bourgeois, and masculine Eu ro pean sexuality was premised 
on an “other” that was not white, not bourgeois, and not masculine.72 Colo-
nial repre sen ta tions of famine contributed to this sexual discourse by 
bringing Indian conjugal and reproductive practices forcefully into the 
realm of economy; they held the “native” responsible not only for sexual per-
version but also for his or her own poverty and starvation. As the under-
secretary of state for India, Louis Mallet, thus concluded, “a  people with 
E c onom i e s of R e produc t ion 47
such practices as prevail in India with regard to marriage and inheritance 
must be miserable.”73 This supposed connection between reproduction and 
famine appears starkly in a document that one historian terms the “most 
Malthusian” in colonial famine administration. In a memo to Viceroy Lord 
Ripon, Finance Secretary Sir George Couper insisted that the famine was 
afecting only the lowest stratum of the population: “If the famine mortal-
ity in 1879 be tested, it  will be found that about 80 per cent of the deaths come 
from the laboring classes.”  These laborers died in large numbers, but “still 
they reproduce themselves with sufficient rapidity to overcrowd  every 
employment that is opened to them.” In classic Malthusian fashion, Couper 
argued that keeping this class alive would only push wages down further 
while threatening the classes above it. Indeed, Couper concluded, any change 
in famine policy that would maintain the laboring classes “to the full span of 
 human existence, without at the same time providing safeguards against 
their reproduction” would only exacerbate prob lems of Indian poverty.74
In its final report, the Famine Commission brought together  these vari-
ous strands of debate to conclude that British rule in India had changed the 
balance between life and death in the country. With  little empirical evi-
dence, it claimed that British technology and civilization had “fundamen-
tally changed the position of the  people for the better” by giving “a check to 
some of the  great  causes of mortality among them.” This reduced mortality 
rate, however, brought its own grave consequences, which the report defined 
as “an increase of the population” and a “pressure on the means of subsis-
tence.”75 In this view, vulnerability to famine was due to population growth 
brought about by British civilization and was thus a mark of the success of 
the imperial administration, rather than its failure. In the Famine Commis-
sion’s Financial Statement, Sir Evelyn Baring made this point even more 
directly, noting that “ every benevolent attempt made to mitigate the efects 
of famine . . .  serves but to enhance the evils resulting from overpopula-
tion.”76 Too many lives saved through famine relief would only increase poor 
 people’s reproductive capacities. Thus, when life was calibrated against the 
price of its sustenance, reproduction threatened to tip the balance—to push 
the scales into a Malthusian “overpopulation.” In the context of famine, 
reproduction thus became an economic cost that had to be accounted for.
Marriage and National Malthusianism
In the waning days of famine, the Quarterly Journal of the Poona Sarvajanik 
Sabha similarly counted reproduction as an economic cost in an article 
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titled “Over- Population and Marriage Customs.” Appearing alongside the 
Sabha’s detailed “famine narratives” about the impact of the crisis on spe-
cific villages and districts, the article took a more expansive view on the 
 causes and consequences of famine in India. The author, who remained 
anonymous, suggested that Hindu marriage practices had led to the 
rapid growth of population, which in turn exacerbated the country’s pov-
erty and ultimately led to famine. Consequently, he argued, “among the 
principal  causes of the brutal ignorance and degraded poverty and pau-
perism of the  people of India must be reckoned the Hindu law and custom 
of marriage.” It was a “source of fearful diseases and plagues, and of more 
fearful famines.” Having witnessed the terrible sufering of the famine’s 
victims, the author concluded that it was time to make radical changes in 
Indian reproductive practices.77
The anonymous author of “Over- Population and Marriage Customs” was 
likely Mahadev Govind Ranade, a  lawyer and judge active in Poona’s pub-
lic life who was among the chief architects of Indian economic nationalism 
in the late nineteenth  century. Ranade was a founding member of the Poona 
Sarvajanik Sabha in 1876, and he played a leading role in the organ ization’s 
eforts to collect information about the famine. The Quarterly Journal was 
created at his instigation.78 The article reflects this kind of personal experi-
ence with the famine, which the author describes as having “seen with our 
own eyes.”79 It also resonates with Ranade’s developing critique of colonial 
po liti cal economy and with his documented attempts to reform marriage 
practices. Thus, although I have not located definitive proof of authorship, 
I follow other historians in suggesting that Ranade is the most likely author 
of the text.80
Ranade’s article welds his rejection of Hindu marriage practices to a cri-
tique of the po liti cal economy of colonial rule. Beginning from the Mal-
thusian premise that  there was an “over- growth” of population in India, as 
evidenced by the recent famine, Ranade argues that the country could no 
longer sustain its rate of reproduction. Whereas population growth may 
have been necessary in  earlier eras of  human history, the constraints of colo-
nialism now mandated a new balance between the life of the population 
and its economic prospects. In other words, Indian reproduction had to 
account for the country’s poverty. In terms that anticipated the economic 
nationalist critique that Ranade would develop— alongside Dadabhai 
Naoroji, Romesh Chunder Dutt, and  others— “Over- Population and Mar-
riage Customs” indicts colonial economic policy as the chief cause of this 
poverty. India’s unfavorable balance of trade with Britain, alongside the 
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“home charges” that funded the colonial administration, had drained the 
country’s savings. Meanwhile, the imperial government supported the inter-
ests of the British textile industry at the expense of Indian manufacturing, 
thus “inflict[ing] upon the land all the evils, without most of the blessings 
of a so- called  free trade policy.” Ranade also lamented soil exhaustion due 
to “pauper cultivation” and lambasted the “stress of rack- rent and rigid [land 
revenue] settlements” that had forced peasants to cultivate uncultivable 
land. Fi nally, the government had not encouraged emigration as a means 
to relieve the pressures on the land. By listing  these  factors, the article chal-
lenges Malthusian arguments that stressed a natu ral propensity of all spe-
cies to reproduce beyond their means of subsistence. Instead, Ranade 
develops a historical critique of colonial policies making the population 
unsustainable. He insists that the prob lem in colonial India has been, more 
than any “natu ral” increase in numbers, the “slow development of [the pop-
ulation’s] means of subsistence”  under British rule.81 Indian reproduction 
only magnified a poverty whose fundamental origins  were found in the 
colonial economy.
Given  these impoverished conditions, Ranade argues, it became imper-
ative that Indians reform their marriage practices. For “in  these days, no- 
body  will be prepared to dispute the position that the law and custom of 
marriage in any country are closely connected with the eco nom ical condi-
tion of the bulk of its population.”82 Such recognition was prompted, for 
Ranade, by the fact of famine itself: “If the multiplication of the population 
had not been encouraged and ensured by the supposed sanction of religion 
and caste opinion, and each man and  woman had been left to exercise a pru-
dential restraint on the instinct of propagation,  there would not have been 
such helplessness and such fearful pauperism in this country, nor such dev-
astating famines.”83 Ranade targeted two conjugal customs that prevented 
this “prudential restraint” on propagation: marriages that occurred before 
puberty and universal marriage. The custom of prepuberty marriage 
 violated true Hindu tradition, which insisted on four “Ashrams or divisions 
of  human life.” Of  these four, the married condition was only one, and for 
Ranade, it lasted “between the age of 20 and 45 years of a man’s life.” Before 
and  after  those years, he maintained that “the single or celibate life is 
enjoined as a virtue and a duty upon all.” But in con temporary times,  people 
had ignored this call to celibacy by marrying girls even before puberty and 
commencing sexual intimacy soon thereafter and thus had increased their 
numbers rapidly. This increase was exacerbated by an imperative for uni-
versal marriage. In contrast to Eu rope, where peasants would not marry 
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 unless they could provide for  children, Ranade claims, Indian peasants 
believed that “their religion inculcates marriage as a sacred duty.”84
From this perspective, Indian “overpopulation” was the product of a 
specific intersection of colonial policies with customary conjugal practices 
of universal and prepuberty marriage. The article called upon readers to 
question  these practices as a way to bring reproduction in line with colo-
nial economic constraints. For Ranade, such a shift in marriage could not 
occur via legislation by a foreign government; it required the “educated 
and reflective” among the native population to change public opinion 
among the masses.85 He figures the middle- class intelligent sia— men very 
much like himself—as the central historical actors, capable of efecting 
change in the reproductive sexualities and economic fortunes of its “own” 
peasantry. Despite their po liti cal disenfranchisement, and without access 
to financial capital,  these men could still intervene in the economic life of 
the nation through the reform of marriage.
I term Ranade’s intervention a national rereading of Malthus  because it 
adopts core Malthusian princi ples about population but refutes colonial dis-
courses that claimed Indian overpopulation was the sole cause for poverty. 
This endeavor to theorize overpopulation and poverty in the context of 
specific colonial conditions parallels Ranade’s more influential work on 
po liti cal economy, in which he proposed an Indian inquiry that challenged 
the supposedly universal princi ples of the discipline.86 The result, in “Over- 
Population and Marriage Customs,” is a reading of Indian reproduction 
that is at once pro- Malthusian and anticolonial. Moreover, in mobilizing a 
middle- class intelligent sia to transform the nation’s reproductive practices, 
the text sidelines the colonial regime and centers a section of the Indian 
population as the agents of change for the nation. Ranade understands 
marriage reform as ofering “economic” advantage, insofar as it can reduce 
famine and impoverishment.  These reforms also ofered “cultural” bene-
fits, since they returned Hindus to their  earlier traditions of celibacy and 
sexual restraint and, as he argued elsewhere,  were necessary on moral and 
humanitarian grounds. Consequently, the text’s national Malthusianism 
joins together arguments about economic policies and cultural practices in 
India— about colonial impoverishment and indigenous marriage—to stake 
its claims about reproduction and population.
Just a few years  after the publication of “Over- Population and Marriage 
Customs,”  these connections among marriage, population, and economy 
reappeared in one of the most significant public interventions on Hindu- 
Indian conjugality in the late nineteenth  century, Behramji Malabari’s 
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“Notes on Infant Marriage and Enforced Widowhood” (1884). Malabari, a 
Parsi publicist and reformer residing in Bombay, made a forceful plea to end 
the practice of marrying Hindu girls before puberty and supported the 
remarriage of Hindu “child  widows.” He circulated his “Notes” among Brit-
ish administrators and Western- educated Indians and received numerous 
responses. This marked the beginning of a fraught debate about child 
marriage that would consume public attention during the 1880s and early 
1890s, eventually leading to the Age of Consent Act of 1891, which legislated 
a minimum age of consent of twelve for all girls in British India.
Like Ranade, Malabari insisted that the marriage of girls before puberty 
held grave economic consequences for India. The practice resulted in “a too 
early consummation of the nuptial troth . . .  the birth of sickly  children, the 
necessity of feeding too many mouths, poverty and dependence.”87 Taken 
together,  these individual catastrophes contributed to a national crisis of 
poverty caused by overpopulation: “ Here we are confronted with that grave 
economic prob lem— over- population in poverty. If over- population is felt 
as an evil in advanced and wealthy countries, where natu ral and artificial 
means exist to hold it in check, what must be the efect of over- population 
in a poor and backward country, where the evil is actively stimulated by 
unnatural means?”88  These “unnatural means”— prepuberty marriage— 
produced a rapidly growing population that a country like India was ill 
equipped to  handle.  Because of  these “economic” consequences of Hindu 
conjugality, as I noted in the introduction, Malabari called for the colonial 
state to legislate a minimum age of marriage for girls. A foreign government 
might hesitate to intervene in the cultural or religious practices of its sub-
jects, Malabari conceded, but surely it could not ignore the “economic phase 
of the evil.” Indeed, the low age of marriage threatened both the wealth 
and the governability of the Indian colony: “Taking infant marriage as a 
purely economic question, as a source of over- population and consequent 
disturbances, can the State do nothing to check it?”89 Thus, in Malabari’s 
hands, marriage became a legitimate public question, subject to a foreign 
government’s jurisdiction, precisely  because of its connections to popula-
tion and poverty. However, in contrast to Ranade’s “Over- Population and 
Marriage Customs,” the “Notes” did not ofer a simultaneous critique of both 
colonial impoverishment and prolific reproduction; Malabari indicted 
“infant marriage” while exonerating the policies of free- trade imperialism. 
Following from this argument, the Indian  middle class did not figure as 
the agents of reform. Instead, Malabari’s critique of prepuberty marriage 
prompted new engagements with the state.
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Malabari’s Malthusian analy sis of Indian conjugality remained largely 
unquestioned among his respondents. Neither supporters nor opponents 
disputed his assertion that “infant marriage” increased the population by 
leading to motherhood soon  after puberty or that population growth impov-
erished families and the nation. According to Keshavlal Madhavdas, for 
example, early marriages became customary at a time of “ great prosperity 
in India and abundance of food, so that no one cared for increase in the 
number of  family members.” The custom was ill suited to the less prosper-
ous pre sent, when “the wealth of India is being diverted into several chan-
nels by which it flows abroad.”90  Others identified additional economic 
impacts of “infant marriage.” For Gopalrao Hari Deshmukh, early marriage 
led to universal marriage among Hindus. Echoing Ranade’s suggestion that 
some  people  ought to remain unmarried, Deshmukh lamented that  every 
country required “a number of bachelors who could venture upon enter-
prise, foreign travel, & c.” However, in India, this was impossible since “ every 
man has a  family. Even  little boys are burdened with wives and  children.”91 
The result of  these conjugal practices was a country in which  people  were 
unfit for  either agriculture or trade and lived in conditions of poverty and 
economic stagnation.
Among the best- known respondents to Malabari’s “Notes” was Ranade 
himself. While assuring Malabari of his support, Ranade questioned 
 whether economic considerations alone would provide sufficient motivation 
for changes in marriage customs. He suggested that “mere considerations 
of expediency or eco nom ical calculations of gains or losses can never nerve 
a community to undertake and carry through social reforms” in marriage. 
This is a curious argument, given the contents of “Over- Population and Mar-
riage Customs.” Perhaps disappointed by the failure of his own economic 
arguments to promote change in marriage practices, Ranade seems to be 
rethinking the wisdom of this strategy just a few years  later. Without refuting 
his national Malthusianism, Ranade instead speculates that fears about pov-
erty or the promise of prosperity would not convince  people to change sexual 
customs that mandated prepuberty marriage. Anxiety about overpopulation, 
in short, would not convince anyone to postpone their marriage. Instead, for 
Ranade, “only a religious revival” could ofer the “moral strength” to make 
lasting and fundamental reform in Hindu conjugality.92 He calls for religion, 
rather than economic rationality, to be the basis of reproductive reform.
In immediate terms, Ranade’s forecast was correct. The late nineteenth- 
century  battle over child marriage was fought not over “eco nom ical calcu-
lations,” but in the terms of an emergent Hindu cultural nationalism. Public 
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attention focused less on claims about poverty or overpopulation and more 
on the situation of the child bride, heralded as a symbol of Hindu tradition 
but also of a degradation of that tradition. Two specific cases brought  these 
debates to a head. In 1889, the ten- year- old Phulmoni died  after sexual inter-
course with her adult husband, Hari Mohan Maiti. Maiti’s trial received 
widespread media coverage, propelling the case into the heart of questions 
about the nature of child marriage and its wider implications for Hindu 
society. Equally controversial was the case of Rakhmabai, a former child 
bride who, at age twenty, refused to live with her husband on the grounds 
of personal incompatibility.  Here, too, questions about the “consent” of child 
brides reverberated across wider debates about the nature of Hindu mar-
riage. As Tanika Sarkar demonstrates,  these debates engaged in complex 
negotiations of community and individual rights. Linking the fate of the 
“Hindu wife” to that of a “Hindu nation,” they helped to produce a new cul-
tural nationalist politics in the late nineteenth  century.93
Meanwhile, even as the child marriage debates provoked a distinct cul-
tural nationalism, nationalists also began to delineate “the economy” in new 
ways. A pivotal figure in this emerging economic nationalism was Dada-
bhai Naoroji, who expressly rejected Malthusian thinking about popula-
tion and reproduction in his major work, Poverty and Un- British Rule in 
India (1901). A former mathe matics professor, Naoroji drew upon regimes 
of quantification and mea sure ment in his number- filled analy sis of the 
 causes of Indian poverty, concluding that a “drain of wealth” from India to 
Britain left the colony impoverished. To make this argument, Naoroji had 
to contend with colonial discourses that looked to overpopulation as the 
primary cause of Indian poverty. Claims that India was overpopulated, 
he insisted,  were merely a “favorite excuse” of “Anglo- Indians.”94  Under 
current conditions, he wrote, “it is absurd to talk of over- population— i.e., 
the country’s incapability by its food or other produce, to supply the means 
of support to its  people—if the country is unceasingly and forcibly deprived 
of its means of capital. Let the country keep what it produces, for only then 
can any right judgment be formed  whether it is over- populated or not.”95 
Conditions in India  were thus not the result of “economic laws” of  free trade 
or population growth but of the “pitiless perversion” of  these laws  under 
British rule.96
Naoroji’s rejection of Malthusian analy sis helped to frame the Indian 
economy as a site of critique that stood apart from marriage and sexuality. 
Therefore, for Naoroji, unlike for Ranade or Malabari, the prob lem of pov-
erty could not be addressed by a middle- class intelligent sia that reformed 
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their own marriages, their own bodies, and their “own” peasantry.  There 
was no biopo liti cal solution, in other words, to the economic prob lems posed 
by a colonial drain of wealth.97 Instead, Poverty and Un- British Rule insists 
that “the economy” must be addressed and transformed prior to any con-
sideration of questions about overpopulation and reproduction. Conse-
quently, Naoroji ofers no recuperation of Malthus, repurposed in the 
name of national economic development; the text’s critique of colonial and 
national Malthusianisms, and their attendant reproductive politics, charts 
a dif er ent terrain of strug gle.
Birth Control in an Imperial World
While concerns about Indian famine prompted men like Ranade and Mal-
abari to call for reforms in Indian marriage, and for Naoroji to excoriate a 
colonial drain of wealth, the same conjuncture helped to fuel a campaign 
for birth control led by a  woman, Annie Besant. Her campaign began from 
the familiar Malthusian premise that  human reproduction would increase 
beyond its means of subsistence, but Besant also brought something radi-
cally new to the reproductive politics of the late nineteenth  century. That 
is, she called for control over reproductive capacities not via raising the age 
of marriage or encouraging celibacy but through contraception. Moreover, 
although Besant was based in London, her case for birth control depended 
on India. Arguing that the recent Indian famine provided proof that the 
colony was overpopulated, she recommended contraception as the best rem-
edy to prevent the starvation of many millions of Indians. Controlling 
births, in other words, was the best means to bring the Indian population 
into balance with food and finance. In this way, Besant’s campaign for birth 
control rendered contraception into a reproductive technology that claimed 
to address the economies of impoverishment in an imperial world.
Besant insisted that birth control was the best means to regulate repro-
duction since it enabled the expression of “natu ral desire” while control-
ling its consequences.98 In her trial defense when charged with obscenity 
for publishing Knowlton’s birth control manual, Besant thus argued that 
any attempt to delay marriage or enforce celibacy was bound to fail  because 
it ignored sexual desire. Meanwhile, poor  people, both in Britain and across 
its empire, sufered the most from  these failures, since they lived in condi-
tions where  there was “food enough for two but not enough for twelve.”99 
 Under  these circumstances, Besant called birth control the only ratio-
nal response to poverty. She and her supporters termed this argument a 
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“neo- Malthusian” call for contraception, since it  adopted Malthus’s argu-
ments about population but rejected his ideas about birth control. At her 
trial, Besant built this case meticulously, citing Malthus as well as his utili-
tarian followers, including John Stuart Mill, to make what she termed an 
economic case for reproductive regulation.
Following her acquittal, Besant continued her campaign for birth con-
trol. She and Charles Bradlaugh founded a Malthusian League in July 1877, 
with the goal of spreading “among the  people by lectures, cheap books, leaf-
lets, and all practicable means a knowledge of the law of population, and of 
its practical application.”100 The League’s first members  were drawn from 
the Defence Committee constituted in support of Bradlaugh and Besant 
during their trial, but Besant invited  others to join, especially the “poor, 
above all for whom the strug gle is being fought.”101 While building the Mal-
thusian League, Besant also authored The Law of Population, a text she 
hoped might replace Knowlton’s Fruits of Philosophy. The pamphlet 
explained the mechanism of fertilization and listed several birth control 
techniques, including condoms, withdrawal, and Besant’s most favored 
method, the contraceptive sponge.102 The text appeared with advertisements 
about contraceptive devices, and Besant herself recommended specific types 
of syringes, sponges, and pessaries and provided information about where 
to obtain them. The Law of Population was im mensely successful, selling 
40,000 copies in its first three years.103 By 1891, it had sold 175,000 copies in 
 England, had been reprinted in the United States and Australia, and had 
been translated into German, Dutch, Italian, and French— making it among 
the most widely circulated tracts on contraception in its time.104 Although 
Besant’s text was not an official publication of the Malthusian League, the 
organ ization advertised and distributed it, recommending it especially to 
 those who sought “practical advice” on contraceptive methods.105
Indian famine gave energy and urgency to Besant’s argument that birth 
control would bring reproduction into balance with the economy. In terms 
that would have been familiar to colonial administrators, she wrote that 
British rule had lowered mortality in India, even while Indian reproduc-
tive practices encouraged prolific growth. The result was famine: “It appears 
that our civilization in India, taking away the ordinary natu ral checks to 
population, and introducing no  others in their stead, brings about a famine 
which has already destroyed more than 500,000 in one Presidency alone, 
and has thrown about one- and- a- half million more on charity.”  These cir-
cumstances put India in an untenable bind: “the law of population is ‘an 
irrefragable truth’ and  these  people are starved to death according to 
Ch a p t e r 156
natu ral law; early marriages, large families,  these are the premises; famine 
and disease,  these are the conclusions.”106 Prefiguring the findings of the 
government’s Famine Commission Report, Besant opined that Indian prac-
tices of marriage led inevitably to rapid reproduction and that, in the 
absence of Malthusian “positive” or “preventive” checks, famine was the 
necessary result. Yet whereas colonial administrators and famine com-
missioners had merely lamented this fact or suggested policies of emigra-
tion and agricultural modernization, Besant turned to birth control for a 
solution. Indeed, given Indian conditions, contraception was even more 
impor tant for the Indian colony than for the British metropole. In Besant’s 
terms, “Even our philanthropy [in famine relief] is misjudged and but 
aggravates the evil it seeks to allay. Our rebellion against the teaching of 
Malthus and [John Stuart] Mill is sad enough in its efects at home; in 
India it promises a harvest of two hundred millions in starvelings.”107 In 
other words, for Besant Indian conditions of famine fueled a Malthusian 
campaign for birth control both at “home” in  England and more widely 
across the British Empire and the world.
In making this neo- Malthusian argument, Besant turned away from 
potential alternative frameworks of contraceptive advocacy, namely the sex-
ual radicalism of early Eu ro pean socialist movements and the campaigns 
of Victorian feminists. Besant was familiar with Owenite socialism through 
her work with the National Secular Society and was undoubtedly aware of 
the movement’s call for the collectivization of reproductive  labor and com-
mitments to “the liberation of sexual plea sure from the burdens of procre-
ation.”108 Her defense of sexuality as a “natu ral” and necessary part of  human 
existence for both men and  women gestured to  these Owenite ideals, and 
she retained this argument both in her trial and in The Law of Population. 
Besant was equally aware of the Victorian feminist movement, which, 
though it did not support birth control, developed a power ful critique of 
marital norms.109 She was a vocal advocate for  women’s rights in her own 
personal life and wrote at length about  women’s in equality in marriage. 
Nevertheless, in her contraceptive advocacy, Besant avoided such critiques 
and argued instead that birth control would support  earlier marriage and 
more genuinely monogamous conjugality. Her relentless attention to the 
doctrines of Malthus posited birth control as a scientific response to the eco-
nomic prob lems of empire.
On one level, this neo- Malthusian framework of birth control advocacy 
ofered Besant a way to challenge Victorian assumptions that deemed 
public discussion of sexuality, especially by a  woman, to be obscene. The 
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references to poverty and its alleviation in the Indian colony cloaked her 
support for contraception in more respectable vestments. Birth control was 
now harnessed to a mission of civilizational uplift and imperial responsi-
bility. Moreover, her focus on poor and starving  people situated Besant 
firmly within nineteenth- century humanitarian discourse on hunger, 
which marked starvation as the product of an unjust society.110 As I have 
argued elsewhere, all this may have lent her birth control advocacy an 
aura of respectability and greater ac cep tance at a moment when, in both 
her personal and her po liti cal life, Besant faced accusations of sexual 
immorality and unfit motherhood.111 Yet on another level, the choice to 
link birth control so firmly to famine and Malthusian overpopulation had 
far- reaching implications. Beyond simply energizing a Malthusian world-
view, her argument made birth control a critical component of debate about 
the  causes, consequences, and remedies for poverty. At a moment when 
new imperial axes of in equality  were being crystallized, Besant called 
attention to Indian famine as a critical imperial prob lem and ofered birth 
control as a solution. In other words, she suggested that contraception was 
a necessary feature of strug gle against poverty in the British Empire. If this 
logic sounds startlingly con temporary, this is perhaps  because it is. By the 
mid- twentieth  century, as we  shall see in  later chapters, contraception had 
become a critical component of population control campaigns that claimed 
to target “Third World” poverty. De cades  earlier, by referencing the fam-
ine in India, Besant was among the first to make birth control a tool for 
poverty alleviation, thus articulating a relationship between reproductive 
regulation and economic prosperity that would prove enduring.
Even as India came to figure so prominently in Besant’s case for birth 
control, Indian writers and publicists also became impor tant to the impe-
rial circulation of neo- Malthusian ideas. Their participation helped to vali-
date claims that overpopulation was an Indian prob lem and  shaped the 
contours of an imperial contraceptive advocacy. The Besant- Bradlaugh trial, 
reported extensively in the English- language media in India, ofered one site 
for this circulation of ideas.112 Indian responses to the trial centered on 
Madras, a city profoundly afected by the famine. In the wake of the trial, 
the Philosophic Inquirer, a “weekly Anglo- Tamil Freethought journal” pub-
lished in Madras and edited by Murugesa Mudaliar, contacted the Malthu-
sian League in London to praise the “neo- Malthusian views so steadfastly 
and so bravely held by Mr. Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant.”113 The League’s official 
publication, the Malthusian, responded with its “hearty greeting to our fel-
low labourers and brethren of the new Malthusian faith in Hindostan.”114 
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Mudaliar thereafter joined the League’s international correspondents— 
drawn primarily from Eu ro pean countries and Australia—in circulating neo- 
Malthusian propaganda. He requested copies of the Malthusian League’s 
pamphlets and in 1880 became a vice president of the League, thus occu-
pying an impor tant place in the organ ization’s claim to connect neo- 
Malthusians globally.115
Mudaliar and the Philosophic Inquirer accepted Besant’s insistence on the 
centrality of India in the supposedly global crisis of overpopulation, but the 
journal also charted out the specifics of India’s population prob lem. In a 
striking parallel to Ranade’s and Malabari’s interventions, the journal 
identified child marriage as the central Malthusian issue among Hindus. 
According to an article by the pseudonymous “Veritas,” “ever since the birth 
of the Code of Manu, the system and practice of early marriage is viewed 
by the faith- bound Hindus with a favorable eye.” As a result, “the country 
is deplorably laboring  under the burden of over- population, and the mis-
ery the laboring classes are sufering from is so enormously greater in mag-
nitude that all our attempts to depict them in detail are an utter failure.” 
Even the “ great diminution [of population], owing to the late monstrous 
famine” in Madras and the Deccan had been insufficient to return a bal-
ance between population and resources. Consequently, “Veritas” looked to 
neo- Malthusianism as a solution to the prob lem of Hindu reproduction, 
since “conjugal prudence” would result in fewer  children and a smaller pop-
ulation.116 The Malthusian League, for its part, welcomed this message for 
its importance to the “teeming nations” of India.117
 These nascent connections between neo- Malthusians in Madras and 
London took additional institutional form in 1882 with the founding of the 
Madras Malthusian League, an organ ization whose princi ples  were the 
“same as  those of the Parent League of London.”118 The Madras League was 
established just five years  after its En glish counterpart and a mere four years 
 after the official end of the famine, but  there is  little in the historical rec ord 
attesting to the activities of the organ ization or its found ers, Muthiah Naidu, 
Lakshmi Narasu, and Mooneswamy Naiker.119 Yet the very existence of the 
Madras League, its goal of propagating contraception, and its stated affil-
iation with the Malthusian League in London are significant. Rooted both 
in the historical experience of famine in Madras and the Deccan and in an 
emergent neo- Malthusian discourse, in which India played a critical role, 
the Madras Malthusian League suggests the contours of a reproductive 
politics that connected an Indian economy to Indian sexual practices and 
that moved from the Indian colony to the British metropole and back again.
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Besant herself would eventually move to India, but not as a birth con-
trol activist.  After meeting the occultist and phi los o pher Helena Blavatsky 
in 1890, Besant shifted away from her radical secular politics and became 
a member of the Theosophical Society. In that capacity, she traveled to India, 
where she became president of the organ ization, and lived in Madras, where 
its international headquarters  were located. Active in Indian nationalist pol-
itics, she became a leader of the Home Rule League during World War I 
and was elected president of the Indian National Congress in 1917. Besant’s 
shifting po liti cal and geographic locations changed her reproductive poli-
tics as well, and in 1891, she withdrew The Law of Population from circula-
tion. Writing of her decision in Theosophy and the Law of Population in 
1896, Besant did not completely disavow her  earlier Malthusian concerns 
with poverty, and she acknowledged that birth control might serve as a “pal-
liative” for the poor. However, as a theosophist, she claimed to look away 
from the “material plane” that had been the basis of her support for birth 
control in the 1870s and proposed that control over “sexual instincts” was 
“the task to which humanity should set itself.” Foreshadowing Gandhi’s 
more famous call for brahmacharya, Besant called for “self- restraint within 
marriage” and rejected birth control. Removing reproduction from a ques-
tion about economy, Theosophy and the Law of Population looked instead 
to “spiritual intelligence” to make change.120 Yet, despite Besant’s ultimate 
rejection of birth control, her neo- Malthusian claims about famine, pov-
erty, and contraception continued to resonate throughout the nineteenth 
 century and into the twentieth. As we  shall see in the following chapters, 
some of India’s earliest birth control advocates would draw inspiration from 
Besant, both in her contraceptive advocacy and in her Indian nationalism. 
While Besant herself never brought  these parts of her life together, her suc-
cessors would eventually call for contraception as a means for nationalist 
economic pro gress.
Conclusion
During the last de cades of the nineteenth  century, conditions in India 
prompted a rearticulation of reproduction as an economic question. This 
new economy of reproduction depended, in part, upon a new regime of 
numbers, which quantified the population and made it a target of admin-
istration.  These pro cesses of quantification occurred in the context of fam-
ine, and this, too,  shaped how reproduction entered into public debate. As 
famine seemed to provide empirical proof of Malthusian theories, the 
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colonial state weighed the life of the population against the costs of its sus-
tenance. Within this calibration of life, colonial administrators like Rich-
ard  Temple and Indian reformers like M. G. Ranade represented population 
as an economic cost and suggested that reforming reproductive practice 
to control population growth would bring economic benefit. This was the 
context that enabled Malabari to demand colonial legislation on child 
marriage as an economic question and supported Annie Besant’s conviction 
that birth control could remedy poverty in the British Empire. In short, 
reforming reproductive practices seemed to promise a way to grapple with 
the period’s major crises of subsistence.
Reproduction was economized even as the broad contours of a new eco-
nomic nationalism took shape in late nineteenth- century India. Ranade and 
Naoroji, among  others, made the emergent category of the economy foun-
dational to a national imaginary. In other words, they could imagine India 
as a bounded territorial entity, as a nation- in- the- making, in part through 
demarcating its national economy. This vision of the national economy, as 
Manu Goswami argues, emerged from a critique of colonialism and classi-
cal po liti cal economy, alongside a “naturalization of the interlinked cate-
gories of nation, economy, and territory.”121 Consequently, the question of 
reproduction was not asked and answered in preexisting economic terms. 
Rather, what “the economy” was— what it included and excluded, how it 
mapped onto India as nation and territorial entity— was being worked out 
even as reproduction was economized.  These categories of thought over-
lapped and  were co- constituted.
Ultimately, however, the dominant strands of Indian economic nation-
alism moved away from reproduction, and from Malthusian population 
theories in their critique of colonialism. Ranade himself would keep his 
work in “social reform”— regarding practices of child marriage,  widow 
remarriage, or religious custom— largely distinct from his theories of Indian 
po liti cal economy. His ideas in “Over- Population and Marriage Customs” 
thus did not reappear in his major interventions in the field.122 Organ izations 
like the Madras Malthusian League, which centered reproduction in their 
analy sis of Indian poverty,  were likely short- lived. Malabari’s campaigns 
against infant marriage eventually turned  toward “religion” and “culture” as 
key battlegrounds. Even Besant— perhaps the most committed Malthusian— 
would disavow her own advocacy of both Malthus and birth control as she 
joined the cause of Indian nationalism.
Yet the economizing of reproduction that first emerged in the context of 
famine in the late nineteenth  century would have a long life in colonial and 
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postcolonial India. In par tic u lar, the notion that Indian conjugality con-
tributed to Indian impoverishment endured across the de cades and was 
taken up both by reformers and by defenders of the status quo. As the next 
chapter demonstrates, this idea gained new life during the interwar de cades, 




FERTILIT Y, SOVEREIGNT Y,  
AND THE GLOBAL COLOR LINE
To commemorate its initiatives in maternal and infant 
welfare, the municipal government of Madras held a “City Health and 
Baby Week” in 1930. Exhibits showcased ser vices such as a milk depot and 
health clinics. Public health posters ofered parenting advice alongside more 
general suggestions about clean  water, latrines, refuse disposal, and intesti-
nal parasites.1 Meanwhile, advertisers looked to the Health and Baby Week 
to promote their products. An advertisement for “Rajdosan elixir” pro-
claimed that “Beautiful  Mothers” produced “Beautiful Ofsprings,” and 
the nerve tonic Jeevamrutam ofered to “assist you to fulfill your desire.”2 
The municipal government was keen to use the baby week to document its 
ongoing interventions in pre- and postnatal care for  women and their babies. 
A commemorative volume released for the event noted that eforts had 
begun in 1917, when the city government had hired four midwives and one 
“lady doctor” to help reduce maternal and infant mortality. The program 
expanded through the 1920s, and by 1930 the city’s “Maternity and Child 
Welfare Scheme” ofered registration of ex pec tant  mothers,  free midwifery 
for all  women below a certain income, and  free advice to ex pec tant and 
nursing  mothers. In addition, the program made available health visitors 
to conduct “inspections of babies” in their homes for the first year and pro-
vided  free cow’s milk to “poor infants.” The result, the city claimed, was a 
substantial reduction in both infant and maternal mortality.3 Perhaps in 
recognition of  these municipal eforts, the city sponsored several “best baby” 
competitions during the week, in which infants  were categorized by age, 
race, class, religion, and caste. Visitors to the exhibit could thus enter their 
infants in categories such as “Best Musalman Baby,” “Best Non- Brahmin 
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(Hindu) Baby,” “Best Indian Christian Baby,” “Best Eu ro pean Baby,” and 
 others, who would share the title of “Best Baby of the Whole Show.”4
The Health and Baby Week in Madras resonated with similar events 
across India and beyond.5 As part of public health campaigns, they mod-
eled a reproductive politics that made population “quality” an essential 
determinant of national economic pro gress and po liti cal status. Commen-
tators viewed the Madras week with an eye  toward other countries, noting 
with concern that India had fallen  behind on the world stage. According to 
one observer, baby weeks  were “an impor tant item in the constructive 
nation- building programme designed to enable India to take her rightful 
place in the progressive nations of the world.”6 Indeed, such events  were 
essential, since anyone who “aspire[s] to attain at least the same mea sure of 
national efficiency as is reached in  England, and the other Dominions, and 
claim equality with them, cannot aford to neglect prob lems of health, such 
as afect the health and vitality of our  people.”7 The chief minister of Madras, 
P. Subbaroyan, apparently agreed, drawing a direct connection between 
Madras’s “best babies” and India’s economic goals; in his words, “the pros-
perity of a nation depends on the welfare of its  children,” but in India high 
rates of infant mortality jeopardized this prosperity.8 The promise of the 
Health and Baby Week thus extended beyond the health of the individual 
infant to chart possibilities and goals for the nation’s pro gress.
The Madras Health and Baby Week ofers one glimpse into an emergent 
reproductive politics in interwar India that invested biological reproduc-
tion with new meanings. The concerns about pregnancy,  labor and deliv-
ery, infant health, and “best babies” that fueled the baby week  were one part 
of a broader public debate about how best to reproduce the national body 
politic in order to foster its ge ne tic “fitness” and racial “vitality” during the 
late colonial de cades. The reproducing body thus became implicated in a 
range of claims about the  future of the Indian nation, and its relationship 
to the British Empire and other nations of the world. As I argue in this chap-
ter,  these claims hinged on two sets of questions. The first concerned po liti-
cal sovereignty: Which bodies, and which populations, could rule 
themselves, and which must be subject to the rule of  others? Which bodily 
practices, including reproduction, might make populations fit for self- rule? 
The second set of questions concerned rights to land, migration, and ter-
ritorial possession. In other words, which populations had the right to 
increase and to colonize new territories? Which bodies, and which  peoples, 
 were fit to populate the earth, and which  were supposedly  dying out or fit 
only to remain in place, restricted by a global “color line”? Nationalists and 
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imperialists, eugenicists and neo- Malthusians, public health officials and 
census administrators, Gandhians and  women’s rights activists all turned 
to reproduction to ask and answer  these questions.
They targeted reproduction not only  because of its impact on individu-
als and families but also  because of its supposed implications for the Indian 
nation’s health, prosperity, sovereignty, and geopo liti cal status. To trace this 
imbrication of reproduction with a set of national questions, this chapter 
begins with the publication of Katherine Mayo’s  Mother India (1927), a sen-
sationalist text that attributed India’s po liti cal subjugation to the popula-
tion’s sexual and reproductive practices. I read  Mother India, alongside 
Indian responses to the text, to investigate an entanglement of reproduc-
tion with transnational debates about race, migration, and rights to land. 
While some Indian reformers refuted Mayo and challenged her imperialist 
and racialized analy sis of bodies and land rights globally, by the 1930s 
debates about Indian reproduction began to shift away from  these transna-
tional frames and  settle more firmly within the bound aries of the nation. 
The second part of the chapter thus explores varied attempts to solve the 
supposed prob lems of “Indian” reproduction within the territorial frame-
work of “India” itself. I consider how reproductive reform became a means 
to control the quantity of the national population and the bodily “quality” 
of its citizens. As was the case in the late nineteenth  century, the abolition 
of child marriage and the neo- Malthusian advocacy of birth control became 
key flash points in this pro cess.  These reforms rearticulated reproduction 
along nationalist lines, promising not only the country’s best babies but also 
its best po liti cal  futures.
Reproduction, Migration, and Rights to Land
In 1927, the American journalist Katherine Mayo published the enormously 
controversial book  Mother India. Not one to understate her case, Mayo 
declared that “the  whole pyramid of the Indian’s woes, material and spiri-
tual” rested upon a “rock- bottom physical base. This base is, simply his 
manner of getting into the world and his sex- life thenceforward.” Mayo 
supported this assertion with lurid descriptions of the sufering of child 
wives and  mothers, highlighting especially the dai, or birth attendant, 
whom she described as a “Witch- of- Endor.”9 A critique of Indian repro-
duction was at the heart of  Mother India, and the book condemned how 
Indians married, engaged in heterosexual intimacy, bore their  children, 
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and raised them. Mayo’s book quickly became a media sensation and 
sparked a massive public outcry in India. Thousands of  people attended 
public meetings to voice their opposition to  Mother India, and more than 
fifty books and pamphlets  were published to challenge Mayo’s conclusions. 
Gandhi famously dismissed the book as a “drain inspector’s report,” but 
concerned about the damage it might do to American perceptions of India, 
he sent Sarojini Naidu on a US tour to provide audiences with a dif er ent 
view of Indian society and po liti cal aspirations. The publication of  Mother 
India thus became a notable event in the history of Indian nationalism 
and, as Mrinalini Sinha demonstrates, served to realign social and po liti-
cal spheres during the interwar de cades.10
The controversy over  Mother India was also a remarkable event in the 
Indian and transnational history of reproduction. In par tic u lar, I read the 
debates surrounding the book to map emergent connections between a bio-
politics of reproduction, on the one hand, and a geopolitics of land and 
migration on the other. That is, reproduction became one way to distinguish 
between  those “races” that had the rights to sovereignty and global mobil-
ity and  those whose reproduction rendered them both po liti cally subordi-
nate and geo graph i cally immobile. Thus, although historians of global 
population suggest that a focus on the global geopolitics of land gave way 
to a biopo liti cal concern with bodies and reproduction in the early twenti-
eth  century,11 I read Mayo’s work and its attendant controversies to exam-
ine how a concern with bodies related directly to anx i eties about land and 
migration during the 1920s and 1930s. At least in late colonial India, bio-
politics did not overcome, or remain separate from, an imperial geopoli-
tics; each  shaped the other.
At its core,  Mother India argued that Indians’ sexual and reproductive 
practices rendered their bodies unfit for po liti cal sovereignty. In Mayo’s terms:
Given men who enter the world physical bankrupts out of bankrupt stock, 
rear them through childhood in influences and practices that devour 
their vitality; launch them at the dawn of maturity on an unrestrained 
outpouring of their  whole provision of creative energy in one single 
direction; find them, at the age when the Anglo- Saxon is just coming into 
full glory of manhood, broken- nerved, low- spirited, petulant ancients; 
and need you, while this remains unchanged, seek for other reasons why 
they are poor and sick and  dying and why their hands are too weak, too 
fluttering, to seize or to hold the reins of Government?12
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The passage draws upon eugenic language, which I discuss in more detail 
below, to make po liti cal sovereignty a question of bodily and racial fitness 
to rule, and India emerges as entirely wanting in this regard. Comparing 
Indians to a manly Anglo- Saxon race, Mayo suggests that the former are 
entirely responsible for their own corporeal degeneration, manifest in their 
“weak” and “fluttering” hands that cannot govern. Significantly,  Mother 
India frames this as a prob lem of public health. From her first chapter, Mayo 
alerts her audience that the book  will leave “untouched the realms of reli-
gion, of politics, and of the arts” and instead limit “inquiry to such worka-
day ground as public health and its contributing  factors.”13
This framework had several implications for Mayo’s broader claims about 
sovereignty and governance. Within India, the Montagu- Chelmsford 
Reforms of 1919 had devolved greater, though still  limited, power to Indian 
governing bodies. Public health was among the areas transferred to 
increased Indian control, and it became a key arena for Indian politicians 
to introduce policy and legislation. The Madras Health and Baby Week was 
one example of  these new initiatives. Moreover, as Rahul Nair has argued, 
public health officials played a key role in articulating an interwar “popu-
lation question” that raised alarms about both the “quality” and growing 
quantity of the Indian population and, in some cases, called for birth con-
trol as a necessary reproductive reform.14 Linking population, reproduction, 
and governance, Mayo’s focus on public health thus placed  Mother India at 
the heart of ongoing debates in Indian public life.
Public health was equally central to an emerging transnational sphere 
of governance during the interwar de cades. The League of Nations spear-
headed the collection of vast bodies of health- related data and produced 
reports on birth and death rates, population density, age profiles, maternal 
and infant mortality, epidemic disease, and caloric intake. The organ ization 
of this data facilitated easy comparison across geographic spaces and put 
Indian numbers in conversation with global norms and averages. At the 
same time, a focus on public health was impor tant to discourses of US impe-
rialism, with organ izations like the Rocke fel ler Foundation launching 
campaigns in India to improve public health.15 All of this helped Mayo to 
emphasize the global relevance of Indian conditions. Disease in India, she 
claimed, put the health of the world at risk. In a chapter entitled “The World- 
Menace,” Mayo considers  these risks in some detail to “estimate[e] the 
safety of the United States from infection.” Each epidemic, she claims, would 
produce some “healthy carriers” whose ability to “spread disease lasts from 
one hundred and one days to permanency.” Since “India is scarcely a month 
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removed from New York or San Francisco,” the United States was at risk 
from Indian bodies that might appear healthy but  were in fact carriers of 
contagion.16
Mayo’s argument, as Sinha demonstrates, rested on an anti- immigrant 
sentiment shared by American organ izations like the Asiatic Exclusion 
League.17 In the years preceding  Mother India’s publication, this sentiment 
had been institutionalized in US law. The Supreme Court ruled in 1923 in 
United States v. Bhagat Singh Thind that Indians  were not entitled to US citi-
zenship on the grounds that they did not belong to the white race. A year 
 later, the Immigration Act of 1924 (Johnson- Reed Act) introduced national 
quotas for some countries while ending Asian immigration. Moreover, 
American anti- immigration policies resonated within a wider Anglo- 
American world, in which the British Dominions of Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, and South Africa  imagined themselves as “white men’s coun-
tries” inhabiting lands reserved for a white, Anglo- Saxon race.18 During 
the first de cades of the twentieth  century, this politics was expressed through 
increased restrictions on Asian and African immigration, leading to the 
African American leader W. E. B. DuBois’s prescient declaration in 1900 
that the prob lem of the twentieth  century was “the prob lem of the color 
line.”19
 Mother India’s critique of Indian reproduction aimed to strengthen this 
color line, which divided white from nonwhite populations globally. The 
division was necessary, Mayo argued,  because Indian disease and weakness 
threatened Anglo- Saxon whiteness.  Toward the end of the book, she noted 
that “infant marriage, sexual recklessness and venereal infections”  were so 
prevalent in India that “one is driven to speculate as to how  peoples so liv-
ing and so bred can have continued to exist.” This fantasy about the disap-
pearance of an Indian “race” echoes rhe toric more often used about 
indigenous  peoples by white settlers, who suggested that the former might 
simply die out and clear space for the settler colony to become a white pos-
session. Mayo attributed Indians’ continued existence, despite the circum-
stances of their birth and breeding, to the “virile races of the north”— British 
Anglo- Saxons— who had reduced mortality through controlling war and 
famine.  These imperial eforts, however, had led to unchecked population 
growth, and herein, for Mayo, lay the true danger of Indian reproduction: 
“The prospects it unfolds, of sheer volume of humanity piling up as the 
de cades pass, is staggering. For, deprived of infanticide, of suttee, and of her 
native escape- valves, yet still clinging to early marriage and unlimited prop-
agation,” India’s population was controlled only by disease.20 This made 
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population containment— through continued British colonialism and ongo-
ing immigration restrictions— a central task for global public health. If 
Indian “early marriage and unlimited propagation” threatened to over-
whelm the planet, then the only solution was to restrict Indians to the sub-
continent while maintaining Anglo- Saxon po liti cal control.
Indian commentators rejected  these connections between Mayo’s anti- 
immigration stance and her critique of Indian reproductive practices. Their 
analy sis was likely informed by debates about Indian migration, most 
notably about the movement of indentured laborers to British colonies. 
Although thinkers like M. G. Ranade had promoted  labor migration as a 
remedy for India’s economic prob lems in the 1870s and 1880s, the living 
and working conditions of Indians indentured abroad had drawn increas-
ing nationalist concern in the early de cades of the twentieth  century. Nation-
alists noted the discriminatory legislation against indentured workers, 
alongside exploitative wage rates, in many receiving countries. They 
expressed anxiety about the gender imbalance among  labor mi grants and 
the consequent implications for sexual and  family relations among work-
ers. Prompted in part by Gandhi’s campaigns among such workers in South 
Africa, nationalists lambasted the colonial government for failing to pro-
tect Indians abroad and for acquiescing to their second- class status in other 
British colonies. Their outcry eventually led to the abolition of indenture 
in 1920 and a stated commitment by the Indian government that subsequent 
 labor mi grants be protected from exploitation and receive full equality in 
the receiving country. Despite  these professions, the reception that Indian 
mi grants received abroad was still deeply racialized  after 1920. In South 
Africa, where former indentured laborers  were part of a substantial Indian 
population, they faced an erosion of rights.21 In the Dominion colonies of 
Australia, Canada, and New Zealand, which had not taken indentured 
laborers before, Indians confronted increased restrictions to entry. In sum, 
despite nationalist calls for ensuring the  free migration of Indians outside 
India, the 1920s witnessed the establishment of restrictions that prevented 
movement and  limited rights.
Uma Nehru, who published  Mother India aur uska jawab ( Mother India 
and its reply) in Hindi in 1928, was a perceptive critic of  these race- based 
restrictions. Nehru was active in the Indian  women’s movement and a par-
ticipant in nationalist strug gle.  Mother India aur uska jawab drew from both 
strands of her po liti cal thinking to argue that the foreignness of British rule 
was responsible for India’s social, economic, and po liti cal prob lems. More-
over, Nehru challenged the immigration restrictions that prevented the 
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 free global movement of Indians. In a startling move, she compared caste— 
one topic of Mayo’s critique—to Anglo- American discrimination against 
mi grants. According to Nehru, Indian caste prejudice was confined to “the 
field of social relations as in dining and marriage regulations.”
In the West, however,  these prejudices have been allowed to infect the 
po liti cal realm. In the name of “national pride” and “security,” therefore, 
Western rulers have enacted discriminatory regulations in their nations 
against Asians and other races,  limited their access to work, and are 
further regulating their  free movement. In ancient times, even before the 
advent of history, the Brahmans on the strength of their religious 
superstitions had made a section of their own society into untouchables. 
 Today, in  these modern times, Eu rope is the New Brahman that is 
reducing the rest of the world to untouchables.22
In short, Western anti- immigrant sentiment was a form of caste prejudice. 
Nehru turned the prob lem of Indian reproduction, as posed by Mayo, on 
its head. Rather than asking how to contain a supposedly weak and diseased 
population within India, she suggested that  these practices of containment 
 were themselves the prob lem. “Discriminatory regulations” against Asian 
workers, far from being a necessary response to Asian migration,  were evi-
dence of a po liti cal failing in the British Empire. Thus, Nehru responded to 
Mayo’s critique of Indian reproduction by challenging the divide between 
white and nonwhite that constituted the global color line.
In the years following the publication of  Mother India, even  after the con-
troversy surrounding the book had waned, the politics of reproduction 
remained enmeshed in race and immigration. Understanding  these inter-
sections of biopolitics and geopolitics—of the regulation of reproducing 
bodies and of migrating ones— helps to explain why reproduction remained 
such a fraught public question throughout the 1930s.  These connections 
appear repeatedly in the work of Radhakamal Mukherjee, who was among 
India’s foremost theorists of population during the interwar de cades. 
Mukherjee, a professor of economics and vice chancellor at the University 
of Lucknow, chaired the National Planning Committee’s subcommittee on 
population, which was created in 1937 by the Congress Party and tasked 
with formulating a population policy for in de pen dent India. During this 
period, he also authored two books. His Mi grant Asia (1936) made a case 
for Asian migration across the globe. Two years  later, Mukherjee’s Food 
Planning for Four Hundred Millions (1938), as its title suggests, asked how 
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India might feed its growing population. While the two books tackled dif-
fer ent topics, we may productively read them together— and in conversa-
tion with Mayo and her critics—to trace the imbrications of reproduction 
with migration.
Mukherjee’s Mi grant Asia argued that Indian, Chinese, and Japa nese 
populations  were the ideal colonizers of “tropical lands,” including in Aus-
tralia, East and South Africa, and the Amer i cas. This was due to their bodily 
capacities. With a lower basal metabolism, smaller body surface, and lower 
weight, Mukherjee alleged, the “Asiatic  peoples” required less protein and 
thus needed less land to produce the food for their survival. “With much 
less food and clothing and vari ous physiological adjustments to a warm cli-
mate which are part of his racial make-up, the Asiatic colonist is at a far 
greater economic advantage in the tropical and sub- tropical lands than the 
Eu ro pe an.”23 Although Mukherjee was not writing in explicit response to 
 Mother India, his claims rejected the anti- immigrant sentiment that  shaped 
Mayo’s work and suggested that, in the aftermath of indenture, Indians  were 
not just laborers but could also be colonizers. Mobilizing a language of envi-
ronmental and racial determinism, Mi grant Asia argued that Indians and 
other Asians  were best suited for the economies of colonization and that 
their bodily adaptability to tropical climates gave them superior rights to 
the land, a right that superseded the claims of a “white race.” Thus, while 
anti- immigrant discourses faulted Asian immigrants for undercutting white 
workers by accepting lower wages, Mukherjee argued that this was in fact 
a sign of Asian advantage and a foundation for Asian land rights. From this 
position, Mukherjee launched a critique of racial exclusion policies in  these 
settler colonies. The claims of white settlers in  these places had no basis, he 
insisted, since  those settlers could not make the most efficient and profit-
able use of the land.24
Mukherjee’s attack on Asian exclusion, which may be read as anti- 
imperialist in its challenge to white supremacy, depended upon a profound 
racialization of climate, economy, and  people, whereby the Asian colonists’ 
rights  were rooted in corporal adaptations unique to the race.25 His argu-
ment was also deeply implicated in a settler- colonial logic about indigene-
ity and supposedly “empty” lands. While rejecting the claims of white 
settlers, he retained the argument that “the vast empty spaces of North 
Amer i ca, Australia, and Central and South Africa” could not “long remain 
thinly inhabited or inadequately utilized.”26 Although Mukherjee called for 
a “judicious recognition of the need of native tribes for natu ral expansion, 
and the maintenance of tribal integrity and individual self- respect,” this 
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assumption of emptiness was precisely the rationale that had driven the 
Eu ro pean colonization of Australia and the Amer i cas and underpinned a 
possessive logic that fueled such initiatives as the White Australia cam-
paign.27 Mukherjee’s conception of empty lands, in short, participated in a 
set of discourses that disavowed indigenous rights.
With its turn  toward migration, Mi grant Asia refused to pose reproduc-
tion as a prob lem for the Indian body politic. That is, the management of 
Indian population growth did not call for reproductive regulation within 
the subcontinent but required a global framework of migration that would 
see Indians welcomed everywhere. Consequently, Mukherjee called for a 
“scientific” reordering of population in global terms, proposing that an 
international body such as the League of Nations determine migration pol-
icies for global economic benefit.28 However, soon  after the publication of 
Mi grant Asia, Mukherjee posed the question of population and reproduc-
tion quite diferently in Food Planning for Four Hundred Millions.29  Here, 
he asked how “India,” as a bounded territorial entity, could produce food 
for a growing national population. Mukherjee ofered several solutions for 
the prob lem of national food scarcity, including agricultural reform, indus-
trialization, and— notably— reproductive reform via birth control.
Mukherjee’s case for contraception in Food Planning moved away from 
Mi grant Asia’s emphasis on the superior adaptability of Asians to the trop-
ics and focused instead on the improvement of an Indian “race” within 
national bound aries. In par tic u lar, he outlined the threat that the suppos-
edly prolific reproduction of “inferior social strata” posed to Hindu upper 
castes and classes. Adopting the communal and eugenic ideas circulating 
at the time, and mobilizing the language of diferential fertility, which I dis-
cuss in more detail below, Mukherjee argued that Hindu lower castes and 
Muslims reproduced at vastly higher rates than their Hindu upper- caste 
counter parts. Indian reproduction was thus “dysgenic,” since “the most fer-
tile social strata in India are inferior,” displaying a tremendous gap between 
“fecundity and culture.”30 As long as the “lower social strata” continued to 
reproduce rapidly, they would overtake the more “prudent” members of the 
Hindu upper castes, a category which included, not coincidentally, Mukher-
jee himself. By controlling the reproduction of Muslims and lower castes, 
Mukherjee argued, contraception could improve the “race” while making 
it fit to advance the Indian nation.
Throughout the 1930s, Mukherjee retained this dual focus on migration 
and reproduction, suggesting Indian emigration in some contexts and birth 
control in  others. He understood Indian population growth as at once a 
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global and a national prob lem that required the movement of Asian bodies 
across borders and the regulation of fertility among the “lower strata” within 
India. While historians have tended to highlight  either one or the other 
aspect of his thought, my reading of Mi grant Asia alongside Food Planning 
suggests a crucial point of connection between Mukherjee’s anti- imperialism 
in a transnational context and his reassertion of class and caste hierarchies 
within a national space.31 His anti- imperialist challenge to white settlement 
depended upon his assertion of a class- and caste- based Indian national “fit-
ness” to rule India and to  settle lands abroad. That is, Mukherjee’s critique 
of a global color line depended upon a reassertion of lines of hierarchy 
among castes and classes in India.
However, for many other contributors to the population debates, 
Mukherjee’s dual focus was not sustainable. They increasingly viewed repro-
ductive regulation— especially birth control—as the only  viable solution to 
Indian population prob lems. The Tamil writer T. S. Chokkalingam, for 
example, rejected the argument that Indians could migrate to “less popu-
lated countries,” improve their economic position, and provide resources 
for the national freedom strug gle. Such a goal was impossible when Indi-
ans “in  these countries are treated like animals. . . .  Places like South Africa 
and Amer i ca are white  people’s countries, and they have created laws against 
Indians.”32 Hemmed in by racist immigration laws, Chokkalingam argued, 
Indians had no alternative but to restrict their own numbers via birth con-
trol. Perhaps the strongest rejection of migration as a solution came from 
the statistician P. K. Wattal. Given the global economic depression, he sug-
gested in Population Prob lem in India, Indian migration to Ceylon, Malaya, 
and South Africa had been reduced. Indians  were “not welcome anywhere,” 
and in any case, “dumping,  whether of goods or populations, is equally 
objectionable, and nations have  every right to protect themselves against 
 either.”33
Not all writers  were as explicit about migration as Chokkalingam or Wat-
tal. Nevertheless, across a wide spectrum, a turn  toward reproductive self- 
regulation was premised on the assumption that migration was not a  viable 
option. Controlling birth, in other words, became an appealing solution 
when it became impossible to control land. If Indians  were unwelcome out-
side India and treated “like animals” when they ventured abroad, then a 
national solution appeared to be the only option. Reproductive regulation 
seemed to ofer the preeminent means to turn inward  toward the nation, 
the  family, and the body itself. Controlling individual reproduction in 
order to regulate national population at a moment when imperial power, 
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anti- immigrant sentiment, and a global color line seemed to deny this 
national control: this was the heady promise of reproductive reform in 
interwar India.
Child Marriage and the National Body Politic
Just two years  after the publication of  Mother India, the Child Marriage 
Restraint Act (CMRA) promised a mea sure of reproductive reform in ser-
vice of national goals. Instituting fourteen as the minimum age of marriage 
for all girls in British India, the new law provoked im mense controversy 
about Indian sexuality and reproduction. Proponents and opponents 
debated the moral, religious, corporeal, economic, and public health efects 
of prepuberty marriage and negotiated questions about the age at which 
girls and  women might commence sexual intercourse, become pregnant, 
and deliver babies. Although  these debates  were  shaped by  Mother India’s 
denunciation of Indian reproductive sexuality, eforts to raise the marriage 
age predated the publication of Mayo’s book. During the mid-1920s, sev-
eral Indian legislators introduced bills to raise the existing age of consent 
from twelve, as instituted by the Age of Consent Act of 1891, to thirteen or 
fourteen. Fearful of controversy, the government was generally reluctant to 
support  these bills, but in 1925, public pressure forced the passage of a law 
raising the age of consent to thirteen. This rather negligible change did not 
satisfy reformers, who pressed for an even higher age of consent and a min-
imum age of marriage. In 1927, Harbilas Sarda introduced a bill in the 
Indian Legislative Assembly to establish a minimum marriage age for Hin-
dus at twelve for girls and fourteen for boys. Meanwhile, the government 
appointed the Age of Consent Committee, which,  after investigating con-
ditions across British India, recommended not only a higher age of consent 
but also a  legal minimum age of marriage. Sarda amended his act, now 
called the Child Marriage Restraint Act, to make fourteen the minimum 
marriage age for all girls regardless of their religious affiliation.
In making their case against child marriage, reformers drew upon an 
emerging interwar discourse that linked the bodily and sexual fitness of citi-
zens to the pro gress of the nation as a  whole. Gandhi was a major propo-
nent of such claims; his famous advocacy of celibacy linked sexuality to a 
biomoral and somatic fitness to rule both oneself and the nation. More spe-
cifically, he was a critic of child marriage: “We sing hymns of praise and 
thanks to God when a child is born of a boy  father and a girl  mother! Could 
anything be more dreadful? Do we think that the world is  going to be saved by 
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the countless swarms of such impotent  children endlessly multiplying in 
India and elsewhere?”34 Practices of child marriage, in other words, 
resulted in an excessive number of “impotent  children” who  were ill suited 
to the tasks of national regeneration.
Connecting reproductive practices, bodily vitality, and national vigor, 
Gandhi spoke regularly of his fears that Indian reproduction would pro-
duce a “race of cowardly, emasculated, and spiritless creatures” rather than 
the strong servants the Indian nation needed.35 Harbilas Sarda, as the leg-
islative sponsor of the CMRA, agreed. In his terms, with the elimination of 
child marriage, “ every man,  woman, and child in this country [could] grow 
to his or her full growth and be able to work without shackles for the good 
of the country till we reach the goal we have set for ourselves.”36 Child mar-
riage legislation thus became a means to improve Indian bodies—to enable 
their full growth, to make them virile and efficient—in ser vice to the Indian 
nation. Moreover, it was an action that Indians could take for themselves, 
and a reform that they could institute within their own families and com-
munities. Turning inward  toward their individual bodies, Indians might 
together revitalize the national body politic.
The bodies in question  were, of course, gendered, and the body of 
the girl/woman became a flash point for  these claims about the vitality of the 
nation. The Indian  women’s movement played a critical role in centering 
 women by highlighting the corporeal sufering of young wives and  mothers. 
For instance, the feminist and nationalist Muthulakshmi Reddi, who was a 
leader of the  Women’s Indian Association as well as a physician and legis-
lator, recounted to her colleagues in the Madras Legislative Council the suf-
fering of girls who  were married before puberty.  These included one “child 
wife” who was burned to death  because she would not satisfy her “husband’s 
animal passions” and another girl of ten who was forced to live with her 
forty- year- old husband prior to her menarche. In her medical capacity, 
Reddi had spent many “nights and days with a heavy heart vainly moaning 
over their miserable condition,” and she demanded that her fellow legisla-
tors acknowledge and remedy this pain. If they would not take action to save 
girls like  these, Reddi told council members, they must at least acknowl-
edge the national implications of child marriage practices. “If we want to 
grow into a strong, robust and self- respecting nation, if we want to reach 
our full physical and  mental height, the system of child marriage must go.” 
Reddi’s words echoed aspects of  Mother India and, like Mayo, she described 
the bodily consequences of “blind meaningless custom” in Indian society, 
while hinting at evidence of even worse horrors.37 Yet, unlike Mayo, Reddi 
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ofered a dif er ent set of solutions. Indian reproduction, she argued, could 
be reformed through the eforts of Indians themselves; child marriage leg-
islation was the first step on a path  toward national development and 
pro gress.
The Indian  women’s movement advanced this argument, which centered 
 women in proj ects of national reproductive reform, at multiple levels. Mem-
bers of the  Women’s Indian Association (WIA) and the All India  Women’s 
Conference (AIWC) lobbied legislators and engaged in public debates in 
support of child marriage legislation. The AIWC managed to get one of its 
leaders, Rameshwari Nehru, appointed to the Age of Consent Committee, 
and members including Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay and Muthulakshmi 
Reddi ofered evidence before that committee. Throughout their campaign, 
they connected reproductive reform to nationalist goals and inserted their 
voices—as  women speaking for other  women—in support of raising the age 
of marriage. In a joint memorandum to Sarda, the AIWC and WIA made 
their position clear: “At this psychological moment when Miss Mayo has 
focused the attention of the world on the sex life of India . . .  you men think 
yourselves reformers when you fix the age of 12 as the proper age for girls. 
To make this age  legal against the wishes of the or ga nized, vocal, and pro-
gressive  women  will do more to retard Home Rule than you have at all real-
ized. You  will give the impression that Indian manhood approves of what 
other races in the world consider the sex standard of the degenerate.”38 
India’s claim to po liti cal sovereignty, they argued, required rejecting the “sex 
standard of the degenerate.” Especially in the wake of the  Mother India con-
troversy, India’s hopes for Home Rule hinged on reproductive reforms. 
Moreover, the memo asserts that the “or ga nized, vocal, and progressive 
 women” represented by the AIWC and WIA  were the best positioned to 
determine  these reforms and to instruct “Indian manhood” on the direc-
tions of change, since “we  women ache even more than men do to save the 
 widows and the child- mothers, and we say it can be done.”39
 These claims about reproduction developed with an eye  toward India’s 
status— both as a colony within the British Empire and on the larger world 
stage. Activists crafted a rationale for legislation that made the task of 
national revitalization through reproductive reform central to asserting 
India’s geopo liti cal position. Ultimately, the Age of Consent Committee rec-
ommended a minimum age of marriage on  these grounds, arguing that in 
anticipation of Indian in de pen dence, the country’s status among the nations 
of the world would depend upon reproductive reform: “ There can be no 
doubt that, now that India is soon to take her place in the comity of nations, 
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it is all the more necessary that we should put her domestic afairs in order; 
the ofspring of weaklings are generally physically degenerates and incapa-
ble of sustained physical or  mental exertion.”40 Reforming the nation’s own 
“domestic afairs” by regulating the intimate biopolitics of reproduction 
and sexuality became the precondition for Indian entry into a global 
geopolitics.
Contraception and the National Population
In the immediate aftermath of legislation on child marriage, birth control 
became a new focus of reproductive reform. However, while the campaign 
against child marriage centered on changes to the law, legislative eforts to 
involve the government in birth control met with failure. Attempts at 
municipal, provincial, and central levels to require the state to provide con-
traceptive advice and information  were all voted down.41 The single excep-
tion to this trend was the princely state of Mysore, where the government 
opened three birth control clinics in 1930. Across the rest of India, the cam-
paign for contraception occurred in other venues: in the resolutions passed 
by feminist, eugenic, and medical organ izations; in the creation of private 
birth control clinics; and in the publication of new magazines and journals 
promoting contraceptive methods. In  these varied spaces, contraceptive 
advocates argued that birth control— like marriage reform— ofered a means 
to promote national sovereignty by regulating reproduction and improv-
ing health. In this sense, birth control was a reform internal to the nation 
that would align the bodies of individual citizens to the needs of a national 
body politic. Moreover, as the Indian  women’s movement became a lead-
ing force in support of birth control, activists centered  women and their 
bodies in this national proj ect, promoting contraception as a means for 
 women to contribute to the development of the nation.
 These arguments for birth control developed in the context of economic 
crisis, specifically the global economic depression that began in 1929 and 
intensified during the early 1930s. In India, the depression vastly exacer-
bated economic dislocations that had followed World War I, and among its 
most drastic efects was a collapse of agricultural prices. Although the mas-
sive famines that closed the nineteenth  century did not recur, the specter 
of hunger nevertheless stalked many millions of peasants, and economic 
stagnation continued to characterize  these de cades.42 Some reformers con-
nected their support for birth control directly to this economic crisis. For 
instance, the mover of the AIWC’s first successful resolution on birth 
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control, Vimala Deshpande, argued that the country “cannot aford to feed 
 these unwanted  children, and the world- wide unemployment and economic 
condition cannot be changed without practicing the birth control.”43 A sup-
porter of Deshpande’s resolution, Phulawati Shukla, added that, given 
global economic depression, it would be irresponsible to bring more  children 
into the world “whom we do not have the means to look  after.”44 Drawing 
upon long- standing neo- Malthusian discourse,  these commentators argued 
that economic conditions made birth control an urgent necessity.
Their economic concerns intensified with the publication of the Indian 
census of 1931. The decennial count revealed an increase of more than 
10  percent in the country’s population, to 352 million. Although this rate 
of growth was not unpre ce dented,  either in India or globally, the increase 
in absolute numbers seemed very substantial to con temporary observers, 
especially in comparison to previous de cades.45 The census did not by itself 
spark fears of Indian overpopulation, which, as we have seen, was a long- 
standing Malthusian feature of Indian po liti cal discourse. However, as 
Rahul Nair suggests, it did become a focus for a “population anxiety,” in 
which Indians debated how to feed,  house, and employ the country’s 352 
million while limiting  future growth.46 Birth control became one aspect of 
this debate, as the limitation of numbers seemed to require some mecha-
nism of reproductive regulation. Even the census commissioner, J. H. Hut-
ton, made this connection between census data, population increase, and 
reproduction. Voicing concerns about the “pre sent rate of increase” of the 
Indian population, he warned that “eforts to reduce the rate of infantile 
mortality should be preceded by precautions to reduce the birth- rate.” 
That is, “if the luxury of ‘baby weeks’ be permitted they should at least be 
accompanied by instruction in birth control.”47 Hutton’s argument drew 
upon a building concern among public health officials, who had been raising 
alarms about high rates of maternal and infant mortality in India. Inter-
preting  these rates as evidence of Indian overpopulation,  these officials 
ofered birth control as a means to control the population while also reduc-
ing mortality.48
The “science” of eugenics ofered a power ful ideological framework for 
 these developing connections among birth control, population, and econ-
omy. In India, as elsewhere in the world,  there was an explosion of scien-
tific and public interest in eugenics during the interwar de cades, and it 
became part of the mainstream of research and discourse on race, hered-
ity, population, and reproduction. The term eugenics was first coined by the 
British scientist Sir Francis Galton in the late nineteenth  century. Influenced 
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by Malthusian ideas about population numbers and by his cousin Charles 
Darwin’s arguments about natu ral se lection, Galton saw eugenics as a 
means to manipulate natu ral se lection within the  human species. Eugeni-
cists examined the heritability of vari ous traits and aimed for the con-
scious improvement of bodies, populations, and “races.” Eugenic thinking, 
as Alison Bashford and Philippa Levine argue, always had an “evaluative 
logic at its core,” whereby some  people’s lives— and their reproduction— 
were seen as intrinsically more valuable than  others.49 We can see this logic 
play out in the history of racist eugenic sterilization laws in the United 
States, first instituted in Indiana in 1907, whose models  were  later  adopted 
by the Nazi regime in Germany.
However, as many historians note, during the interwar de cades eugen-
ics was an ideology of both the po liti cal right and the left. Eugenic ratio-
nales  were  adopted by “liberals and leftists,” as Laura Briggs argues for 
Puerto Rico, seeking to improve health, lower infant and maternal mortal-
ity, and  counter the racialism of tropical medicine.50 Similarly, as Sarah 
Hodges demonstrates for India, eugenics “in a poverty- stricken colo-
nial context provide[d] a power ful and enduring template for connecting 
reproductive be hav ior to the task of revitalizing the nation as a  whole.”51 In 
addition to birth control, it could support initiatives in nutrition, sanita-
tion, and health care.  Adopted by feminists, anticolonial nationalists, and 
other reformers, eugenic discourse could signal a vision of modernization 
that sidestepped imperial constraints to call for action among the colo-
nized themselves. Recognizing  these multiple aspects of eugenics— while 
attending to its evaluative logics— helps to explain how and why birth con-
trol supporters drew so heavi ly upon eugenics in making their case for 
contraception.
Within  these po liti cal and ideological contexts, the Indian  women’s 
movement was at the forefront of promoting birth control throughout the 
1930s. The issue was first debated formally at the AIWC’s annual meeting 
in Madras in 1931, when Lakshmibai Rajwade introduced a resolution call-
ing for a committee of “medical  women” to educate “the public to regulate 
the size of their families.” Rajwade had trained as a physician and, like Reddi 
in the case of child marriage, drew upon her medical authority to argue that 
birth control was a mea sure to promote  women’s health. Speaking of the 
country’s high rates of maternal and infant mortality, Rajwade noted 
that the condition of “ mothers is physically and mentally extremely piti-
able.” They  were forced into frequent pregnancies and sufered from the 
loss of their infants. She connected  these prob lems of individual health 
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to the nation’s health and economy, arguing that birth control was neces-
sary due to the “im mense increase in the population of the country and 
having regard to the poverty and low physical standard of the  people.” 
Fi nally, she concluded, birth control was a  matter of national sovereignty: 
“If India is to take her place in the comity of nations she must produce men 
and  women who  will be worthy of that name. We must bring the science of 
eugenics into our practical lives.”52 Birth control would enable this more 
“eugenic” reproduction by reducing maternal and infant mortality, thus 
improving the health of individuals, families, and the nation itself.
Rajwade’s resolution met with strenuous opposition. Her opponents did 
not question the connections she made between  women’s reproduction and 
national health and economy, but they debated the merits of birth control 
in relation to other methods of reproductive regulation. Muthulakshmi 
Reddi led this opposition; she rejected “unnatural methods” to reduce  family 
size and called for spiritual education on the “virtue of self- restraint and 
self- control.”53 Acknowledging the sufering attendant upon “premature” 
pregnancy and motherhood and its national and eugenic implications, 
Reddi ofered Gandhian self- regulation as the solution, calling for married 
 couples to control their sexuality in order to limit their reproduction. Even-
tually, her views carried the day, and Rajwade’s resolution failed.54 Just one 
year  later, however, thanks in part to Rajwade’s intensive lobbying eforts 
with local AIWC branches, the organ ization formally endorsed birth con-
trol; it promoted contraception at each subsequent annual conference 
throughout the de cade.55
Echoing Rajwade’s initial resolution, AIWC activists called for birth con-
trol on multiple grounds. They claimed it would improve  women’s health, 
curb population growth, address economic constraints, and promote 
eugenic improvement. They argued, moreover, that birth control would 
especially benefit poor  women, since “educated and rich”  women  were 
already aware of birth control methods. According to Rameshwari Nehru, 
for instance, the AIWC’s endorsement of birth control would have  little 
impact on its own membership. Rather, “it is the ignorant and poor who 
have no such means at their disposal who are crushed  under the weight of 
frequent births and who need our guidance and advice.”56 The organ ization’s 
first successful resolution on the subject, passed in 1932, brought together 
 these varying reasons: “The Conference feels that on account of the low phy-
sique of  women, high infant mortality and increasing poverty of the coun-
try, married men and  women should be instructed in methods of Birth 
Control in recognized clinics.”57 The resolution thus linked birth control 
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firmly to marriage and implicitly separated contraception from nonmari-
tal sexualities. At the same time, in what Sanjam Ahluwalia terms a “poly-
vocal” advocacy of contraception, the AIWC did not identify a single 
primary reason for birth control but insisted that it could address numer-
ous prob lems si mul ta neously.58
For AIWC activists, therefore, birth control was not solely a  women’s 
issue, linked only to  women’s well- being or autonomy. Rather, through con-
traception, they made  women’s reproduction central to addressing the 
prob lems of the body politic. By linking  women’s health directly to popu-
lation and economy, the AIWC’s polyvocal advocacy of contraception 
inserted birth control into a set of debates about national development. 
Indeed, as Lakshmi Menon— one of the AIWC’s earliest contraceptive 
advocates— claimed, birth control was a necessary remedy in light of the fail-
ure or impossibility of national development by other means. As she noted 
in support of Rajwade’s initial birth control resolution, the population of 
the country was increasing, but the amount of cultivated agricultural land 
had remained stagnant.  Under the constraints of British rule, Indian indus-
tries had not been developed.  There could be no relief for “excess” popula-
tion through colonization, since all land was already occupied. If the world 
was thus closing in on India, and the country’s population was  limited to 
its own borders, Menon suggested, birth control was a “last resort” for the 
nation.59 It could jump- start development when all other ave nues  were 
unavailable to Indians, and it made  women critical to the development 
pro cess. S. N. Ray made this argument even more directly, suggesting that 
other remedies for population and poverty, such as increased production 
or better re distribution of resources, could not address the scale of India’s 
prob lems: “A Population, born in misery and bred in squalor, is not what 
India needs.  Unless  there is a considerable restriction in numbers with her 
pre sent productive capacity it is physically impossible for her to raise a gen-
eration healthy and strong—in mind and body—to be able to work for her 
proper place in the comity of nations.”60 For Ray, birth control would ease 
the sufering of Indian  women subjected to repeated childbirth; perhaps 
even more importantly, it would enable Indians to carve out their “proper 
place” among the nations of the world.
While making birth control a national concern, the AIWC was also  eager 
to forge transnational alliances around the issue. In 1935, the organ ization 
invited the American birth control activist Margaret Sanger to India.61 For 
the AIWC, hosting Sanger would raise the public profile of their contra-
ceptive advocacy. For Sanger, India ofered a new stage for activism at a 
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moment when she was concerned that US interest in birth control was flag-
ging.62 She thus accepted the AIWC’s invitation and would  later publicize 
the organ ization’s resolutions on birth control as a model for other  women’s 
organ izations globally.63 Sanger began her visit to India with an address to 
the AIWC’s annual meeting in Trivandrum, where she described her trip 
as undertaken in a “spirit of atonement” to “undo the false and mischie-
vous impressions created regarding India” by another American  woman, 
Katherine Mayo.64 Thus distancing herself from Mayo, Sanger advanced an 
argument that birth control would benefit  women globally and Indian 
national aspirations specifically.
Like the AIWC, Sanger’s support for birth control was polyvocal. Per-
haps this commonality helped to solidify her alliance with AIWC activists 
and  shaped their common language of contraceptive advocacy. In her 
de cades of activism, Sanger had espoused numerous reasons for contracep-
tion and had been willing to ally with individuals and organ izations from 
a range of po liti cal perspectives. Thus, in line with the growing enthusiasm 
for eugenics during the 1930s, she had established ties with American eugen-
icists and eugenic organ izations to advance her case for contraception.65 
When in India, Sanger embraced eugenic alongside Malthusian concerns 
to advocate birth control.  After her time with the AIWC in Trivandrum, 
Sanger and the British sufragist Edith How- Martyn launched a propaganda 
tour across the country. Perhaps Sanger’s most famous encounter on this 
tour was with Gandhi at his ashram in Wardha. Although she was unsuc-
cessful in persuading Gandhi— who was devoted to marital celibacy—to 
embrace birth control, this meeting raised the profile of contraception, and 
of Sanger herself, in India.66 Her visit, alongside numerous public speeches, 
radio addresses, and private meetings, helped to solidify the connections 
the Indian  women’s movement had been making between birth control 
and India’s population, economy, and global standing. Like the AIWC’s 
resolutions on contraception, Sanger’s Indian tour centered  women’s bod-
ies as key sites of national development.
Although Sanger and the AIWC thus linked birth control to national 
goals, their polyvocal framework of contraceptive advocacy did not 
entirely subsume other feminist voices. Activists sometimes ofered dif-
fer ent reasons for supporting birth control and centered priorities other 
than the health or economic growth of the nation. From within the 
 women’s movement, the most prominent of  these alternative voices came 
from Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay, whose 1952 address to the Inter-
national Committee for Planned Parenthood I discussed in the 
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introduction. A few biographical details of Chattopadhyay’s somewhat 
unorthodox personal life may help to contextualize her contraceptive 
advocacy. Married and then widowed while still a girl, she entered Madras 
University in 1918. Soon thereafter, she took an unusual step for a Brah-
min  widow by marrying Harindranath Chattopadhyay. The Chattopadh-
yay  family, which included the Marxist revolutionary Virendranath 
Chattopadhyay— whose partner Agnes Smedley had connections to 
Sanger— and the nationalist- feminist Sarojini Naidu, was deeply influ-
ential in the young Kamaladevi’s politics. While in Madras, Chattopadh-
yay also came into contact with Annie Besant, who along with Margaret 
Cousins  were impor tant to Chattopadhyay’s involvement in the  women’s 
movement. She became a founding member and the first organ izing sec-
retary of the AIWC in 1927, and in this capacity she testified before the 
Age of Consent Committee. Two years  later, she resigned from her 
AIWC position to devote herself more fully to the nationalist movement 
and eventually helped to establish the Congress Socialists, a group that 
remained within the Indian National Congress, in 1934. Chattopadhyay 
was not active in the AIWC during the mid-1930s, when the organ ization 
passed its resolutions on birth control, but she was a staunch supporter of 
contraception.67
Chattopadhyay argued that birth control could emancipate  women 
from patriarchal control. As she wrote in “ Women’s Movement in India” 
(1939), a “masculine- dominated society always stresses the importance of 
 women as a breeder.” But with contraception, a  woman “freed from the 
penalty of undesired motherhood  will deal a death blow to man’s vested 
interest in her. He can no more chain and enslave her through  children.”68 
Consequently, for Chattopadhyay,  women’s lack of control over their 
own reproductive capacity became a central component of patriarchy, 
and contraception ofered them a tool of re sis tance: “This war which 
 woman is waging  today against man, against society, against nature 
itself, is against her sexual dependence. For as long as  woman cannot con-
trol her own body and escape the sentence that nature seems to have 
decreed upon her, social and economic freedom would be innocuous.”69 
Chattopadhyay’s championing of birth control difers substantially from 
the AIWC’s resolutions, which, as we have seen, highlighted  women’s 
health, more than  women’s liberation. For Chattopadhyay in this passage, 
the promise of birth control did not lie primarily in its ability to foster 
national development, or promote economic or po liti cal pro gress. Rather, 
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contraception promised to attack the very foundations of  women’s 
oppression not only in India but more universally as well.
However, even this forthright antipatriarchal critique did not prevent 
Chattopadhyay from also drawing upon the eugenic and neo- Malthusian 
currents of support for contraception that swirled across Indian public 
discourse. In the same essay, she highlighted the “economic and eugenic” 
reasons for birth control and argued it would lead to a “clean and healthy 
nation.” While critical of the Malthusian claim that a large population was 
the cause of poverty, Chattopadhyay agreed with neo- Malthusians that pop-
ulation increase could add to the “burden of the poor” and that birth con-
trol ofered a remedy.70 Her support for reproductive reform thus combined 
a radical case for  women’s self- emancipation with a range of other ratio-
nales for birth control, and neither argument precluded the other.
Differential Fertility and National Reproduction
The connections that  women like Rajwade and Sanger, and even Chatto-
padhyay, made between birth control and the Indian nation depended 
upon eugenic logics. Proponents of eugenics suggested that Indians— not 
their British colonizers— could best manage their own reproduction and, 
through this, “breed a better India.”71 In other words, their reproductive 
self- governance modeled Indians’ fitness for po liti cal sovereignty, while 
also creating the strong bodies necessary to take control of the nation’s 
 future. However, when connected to a national proj ect, the evaluative 
logics of eugenics also raised fundamental questions about which bodies 
would best reproduce the nation. Whose reproduction might improve the 
racial or ge ne tic fitness of the national body politic, and whose reproduc-
tive sexuality threatened to produce an “overpopulation”? Whose repro-
duction might be encouraged and whose discouraged in the pursuit of 
national modernity or development?  These concerns underpinned the 
eugenic advocacy of birth control in interwar India, both within the  women’s 
movement and among vari ous eugenic organ izations.
In line with the growing global popularity of eugenics, several eugenic 
socie ties  were established in India during the 1920s and 1930s. The earliest 
of  these was the Indian Eugenics Society, founded in Lahore in 1921. It was 
followed by the Sholapur Eugenics Education Society (1929), the Madras 
Neo- Malthusian League (1929), the Eugenic Society of Bombay (1930), and 
the Society for the Study and Promotion of  Family Hygiene (1935). Each of 
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 these groups connected eugenic and neo- Malthusian rationales for birth 
control and aimed to spread its ideas through publications, public meetings, 
and clinics. The leaders of  these organ izations  were men, some of whom 
became prominent in eugenicist circles both in India and abroad. Perhaps 
most notable among them was A. P. Pillay. A regular correspondent of West-
ern eugenicists, Pillay hosted Sanger when she visited Bombay. He served 
as honorary director of the Sholapur Eugenics Education Society and helped 
to establish the Society for the Study and Promotion of  Family Hygiene.72 
He was also the founder and editor of the international scientific journal 
Marriage Hygiene, which aimed to “publish scientific contributions treat-
ing marriage as a social and biological institution.”73 The journal ran arti-
cles by Indian, other Asian, Eu ro pean, and American authors on aspects 
of sexuality, birth control, population, and eugenics. Among Marriage 
Hygiene’s contributors was the statistician P. K. Wattal, who, as I discussed 
above, rejected migration as a solution to population prob lems. Employed 
as an assistant accountant- general in the Bombay government’s Finance 
Department, Wattal advanced an argument about diferential fertility 
among religious groups, which, as I argue in more detail below, became cen-
tral to his call for the eugenic reform of reproduction. Other key partici-
pants in this eugenics discourse included Sir Vepa Ramesam and Sivasami 
Iyer, who  were found ers of the Madras Neo- Malthusian League and sup-
porters of the League’s magazine, the Madras Birth Control Bulletin.
Eugenicist supporters of birth control investigated diferences in fertil-
ity rates along class, caste, and religious lines and expressed anx i eties about 
what  these diferentials might mean for the nation’s  future. This was a chief 
concern for Wattal, for instance. Mining census data to compare fertility 
across social groups and noting correlations between fertility and occupa-
tion, he concluded that “fertility is in inverse ratio to standard of living and 
intellectual development. . . .  The well- to-do have many interests in life and 
more than one outlet for their ner vous energy, but the poor have very few. 
Sex life for the poor means much more than it does for the well- to- do.”74 
This excessive sexuality of the poor, he continued, led to their greater repro-
duction and stood in contrast to the supposedly more controlled sexuality, 
and varied intellectual pursuits, of their wealthier counter parts. Wattal also 
cited the “dignity and worth of life” among vari ous social groups, conclud-
ing that “among aboriginal tribes” such dignity was lowest, even while fer-
tility was high. For Wattal, the implication was clear: the overreproduction 
of the poor threatened to overwhelm the more constrained reproductive 
sexuality of the rich.
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 Others shared Wattal’s concerns about fertility diferentials between rich 
and poor. This was a driving impetus, as I discussed above, of Mukherjee’s 
Mi grant Asia. It was also impor tant to the Madras Neo- Malthusian League’s 
establishment of a birth control clinic in the working- class neighborhood 
of Chintadripet in Madras in 1938. The organ ization had been holding reg-
ular public meetings,  running a small library, and sponsoring publications 
such as the Madras Birth Control Bulletin for some time. However, in 
expanding its eforts to create the clinic, the League aimed to reach the 
“semi- starved and half naked teeming millions of  Mother India.”75 The 
organ izing committee for the clinic, which included Wattal alongside Pil-
lay, enlisted a “male doctor and a lady doctor,” assisted by nurses, to ofer 
 free consultation to “the poor” for three after noons each week.76 This out-
reach was necessary to spread knowledge of birth control beyond the city’s 
elite classes: “It is the illiterate and poor who are not aware of such meth-
ods [for contraception] but it is they who need it most desperately.”77 One 
writer in the Madras Birth Control Bulletin was clear that if only wealthy 
citizens used contraceptives, it would intensify existing fertility diferen-
tials between classes. He thus called upon “statesmen” to ensure that birth 
control was “made available to the class of  people (poor and illiterate) who 
are in more need of it than  others, as other wise it  will prove to be an evil 
rather than a blessing.”78
Alongside class diference, caste became another key axis of eugenic con-
cerns about diferential fertility. In Madras, with its growing anti- caste 
Dravidian politics, the question hinged on Brahmin reproduction and sex-
uality. For instance, according to Murari  S. Krishnamurthi Ayyar, who 
was a medical practitioner and the joint secretary of the Madras Neo- 
Malthusian League, Brahmins naturally had a lower birthrate than other 
castes. His book Population and Birth Control in India attributes this dif-
ference to the impact of their vegetarianism on their sexuality. Amplifying 
this “natu ral” diference was the fact that some upper castes and classes 
already had knowledge of birth control, in contrast to lower castes, whose 
supposedly higher fertility was unconstrained by contraception.79 This 
emphasis on the restrained sexuality of Brahmins— especially of Brahmin 
men like Krishnamurthi Ayyar himself— asserted Brahmin superiority. 
Within the evaluative logics of eugenics, this made Brahmins the most 
appropriate reproducers of the nation.
The eugenic framework of diferential fertility also applied to Hindus 
and Muslims, as a “communalization of demographic issues” made 
Muslim reproduction seem a threat to a supposedly diminishing Hindu 
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community.80 Many of  these claims centered on male bodies, making 
their reproductive sexualities central to assertions of nationhood. 
Krishnamurthi Ayyar, for instance, suggested that Muslims had higher 
birthrates than Brahmin Hindus. One reason, he speculated, may have 
been that Muslim men  were circumcised, making their penises less sen-
sitive and prolonging their ejaculation: “This delay in turn greatly 
increases the chance of the female orgasm. . . .  This favours conception 
as during female orgasm the mouth of the cervix opens and sucks in the 
spermatozoa.”81 For Krishnamurthi Ayyar, this image of orgasmic 
 women and their circumcised male partners paints a threatening pic-
ture, since it underpins the growth of Muslim populations vis- à- vis 
Hindu Brahmins.
Although Wattal did not enter into such physiological or sexual detail, 
he too profered a picture of Muslim reproduction gone awry. In a 1937 lec-
ture to the Madras Rotary Club, reprinted in Marriage Hygiene, Wattal 
claimed to trace the demographic decline of Hindus compared to Muslims 
in Bengal. He argued that, based on census figures, “the rate of increase of 
the Muslim population in Bengal for the last 50 years has been one per cent 
per annum and that of the Hindus less than half of that.” Wattal declined 
to speculate on “ whether an upward trend is a sign of virility and a down-
ward trend one of de cadence. . . .  The framing of a sound population policy 
is, however, an urgent necessity for  every country.”82 Wattal does not specify 
what this policy might be, but he invokes a specter of Muslim demographic 
domination that was a consistent strand in interwar public discourse and 
was sharpened with the creation of separate electorates and the broader 
communalization of Indian politics during  these de cades. As Charu Gupta 
documents,  these Hindu concerns about Muslim population growth 
claimed that Muslim conjugal practices— notably polygamy and the remar-
riage of  widows— placed Muslims at a demographic advantage over Hin-
dus, and even put Hindu  women at risk of the sexual predations of Muslim 
men.83 In this gendered and communalized sexual discourse, upper- 
caste Hindu men, who  were  imagined as vegetarian and sexually 
restrained,  were beleaguered by the supposedly uncontrolled reproduction 
of the nation’s “ others.” Eugenic ideas could thus serve to elevate the repro-
duction of upper- caste Hindus as essential to national reproduction, while 
si mul ta neously disavowing the nation’s “ others” as dangerous reproducers. 
The result was a contraceptive politics that linked birth control to the 
national population while incorporating only some bodies as appropriate 
to reproduce the nation.
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Birth Control and Self- Emancipation
Across  these currents of debate about eugenics, neo- Malthusianism, and the 
nation’s diferential fertility, one 1930 editorial in the Tamil newspaper Kuti 
Aracu ofered a starkly dif er ent vision for birth control. Its author was E. V. 
Ramasami, a sociopo liti cal radical and leader of the anticaste Self Re spect 
movement. Known as Periyar among his followers, Ramasami was a major 
figure in Tamil public life and a long- standing supporter of birth control. 
However, when a birth control resolution was brought before the Madras 
Legislative Assembly in 1930 and the issue became a subject of public debate 
across the presidency, Ramasami was keen to distinguish himself from 
other supporters of contraception, especially the Brahmin leadership of the 
Madras Neo- Malthusian League: “The reasons given by us for birth con-
trol, and the reasons given by  others, are dif er ent. We say birth control is 
necessary for  women’s freedom and in de pen dence.  Others give reasons like 
the good of  women’s health, the energy of the  children, the country’s pov-
erty, or to prevent the fragmentation of  family property. Many Westerners 
give the same reasons. But our view is dif er ent. If having  children comes 
in the way of  women’s personal freedom, then we say that  women should 
stop having  children altogether. Having many  children also prevents men 
from living  free and in de pen dent lives.”84 Ramasami rejects neo- Malthusian 
and eugenic arguments in  favor of birth control and casts aside maternal 
and child health as primary reasons for his support of contraception. Refus-
ing to valorize reproduction or motherhood, he encourages  women to 
cease reproducing altogether if it interferes with “personal freedom,” and 
suggests that birth control may liberate men as well.85 Economic concerns— 
the “country’s poverty”— are similarly cast aside in a bid for contraception 
as a technology of emancipation.
Ramasami’s broad rejection of the dominant frameworks of birth 
control advocacy was in line with his position on reproductive reform, 
especially regarding marriage. Beginning in the 1920s, the Self Re spect 
movement had pioneered a new form of wedding ceremony that rejected 
the trappings of caste Hindu marriage, and Ramasami himself had been 
central in promoting  these weddings, and their associated anticaste poli-
tics. At the Self Re spect annual conference in May 1931, several months 
before Rajwade’s unsuccessful attempt to gain AIWC support for birth con-
trol, the movement passed a resolution declaring that childbearing was an 
obstacle to  women’s freedom and that contraception was impor tant for their 
liberation.86  Women leaders in the movement, such as S. Nilavati, agreed, 
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noting that since “it is  women who experience the benefits and difficulties 
that come with having  children,” they should be the ones to control repro-
duction.87 Similarly, Indrani Balasubramaniam called for decisions about 
birth control to be made by  women and not by the male- dominated Madras 
Legislative Council: “Who bears the  children? Is it men? Or  women? If the 
men who are opposed to birth control ever experienced the sufering of 
giving birth, they would never speak as they do.”88 For  these activists, con-
traception ofered a tool for  women’s self- emancipation, rather than for 
individual or national self- governance.
Consequently, they centered oppression and social change to make their 
case, arguing that contraception was a vehicle of re sis tance against class and 
gender inequalities. For instance, Self Re spect writer T. D. Gopal noted that 
Tamil- Indian society had failed working- class  mothers and their  children. 
“What is the reply of  these  women,” he asked, “to a society which treats 
them merely as ‘child- manufacturing machines’ and treats their  children 
in an unjust manner?”  These  children  were not given a proper education, 
shelter, or food, and their  mothers  were “deprived of a natu ral environ-
ment to care for their  children.” Perhaps, then, Gopal speculates,  women 
 will “say that they  won’t reproduce  unless society stops maltreating their 
 children. . . .  Why  can’t  women make a vast, collective wish and tell the 
society that they  won’t bear  children  until the wishes of a girl child in the 
poorest of families are fulfilled at once?”89 Thus, in contrast to upper- caste 
eugenic and neo- Malthusian discourse, Gopal does not imagine poor and 
lower- caste  women to be less desirable reproducers. Nor does he suggest 
that poverty was caused by bearing “too many”  children, or that the chil-
dren of the poor  were less eugenically fit. Rather, he calls for poor  women 
to control their reproductive capacity as a mode of revaluing their own 
 labor— and their own  children— under conditions of caste and class oppres-
sion. By allowing  women to refuse childbirth in a society that so fundamen-
tally undermined their gendered reproductive  labor, birth control became 
a tool for poor  women to craft their own liberation.
However, despite  these sweeping claims about the emancipatory pros-
pects of birth control, the Self Re spect movement did not entirely jettison 
eugenic or neo- Malthusian frameworks in its contraceptive advocacy. The 
Self Re spect newspaper, Kuti Aracu, regularly featured articles addressing 
the growth of the Indian population and the prob lems of poverty, especially 
in the context of economic depression. Birth control advocates, including 
Ramasami himself on occasion, emphasized that contraception could 
improve the “quality” and health of the population while controlling its 
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increase: “In our country, the population is growing daily. Many  people have 
no employment, and no means to live, and yet they go on having more and 
more  children. They sufer without the strength to care for, or educate,  these 
 children.”90  These claims  were in line with mainstream eugenic and neo- 
Malthusian population anx i eties, even while they disavowed concerns of 
diferential fertility. In this sense, the movement’s insistence that birth con-
trol was a technology of self- emancipation did not entirely displace other 
rationales for contraception. We find instead that eugenic visions for 
improving the race existed alongside calls for poor and lower- caste  women 
to use birth control to challenge patriarchal control over their bodies and 
 labor.91 Therefore, what distinguished Self Re spect contraceptive advocacy 
was not its adherence to, or rejection of, eugenics and neo- Malthusianism 
but its refusal to link reproductive “fitness” to caste or class. In this regard, 
Self Re spect discourse resonated with the anticaste politics of B. R. Ambed-
kar, who, as Shailaja Paik argues, centered reproductive  labor in a materialist 
assessment of birth control.92
The Self Re spect movement’s reproductive politics, however, did not 
circulate beyond its Tamil audience. Although Ramasami and other Self 
Re spect leaders  were critical of child marriage, their campaigns for marriage 
reform did not engage with the  women’s movement on the issue. Self Re spect 
writers debated Mayo’s  Mother India and reported on Sanger’s visit to India, 
but this interest was not reciprocated.93 The  limited reach of Self Re spect dis-
course thus forces us to consider which ideas about reproduction traveled— 
that is, became nationally or even transnationally relevant— and which stayed 
in place. The divide was, in part, linguistic: Self Re spect publications  were 
almost entirely in Tamil and did not move across national and transnational 
networks that  were dominated by En glish. Moreover, through the interwar 
de cades, claims about the eugenic reproduction of the nation gained po liti-
cal purchase and became a shared language of scientific research, public 
health eforts, international conferences, and transnational  women’s activ-
ism. This was emphatically not the case for the self- emancipatory politics 
of Self Re spect, whose birth control advocacy did not claim to reproduce 
the nation, and whose caste critiques undermined upper- caste eugenic and 
neo- Malthusian claims about the fit and unfit reproducers of modern India.
Conclusion
As we have seen, reproduction became a national proj ect in interwar India. 
Reformers  imagined power ful connections between individual bodies and 
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the body politic, arguing that changes to reproductive practice would pro-
mote national pro gress. Public health events like baby weeks, legislative 
eforts to end child marriage, and campaigns to support birth control all 
made reproductive politics central to eforts to reform bodies while assert-
ing India’s po liti cal status on a global stage. Connecting reproductive self- 
regulation to national sovereignty, reformers insisted that changes in how 
Indians married and engaged in sexual relations would promote national-
ist claims for po liti cal in de pen dence, while challenging the racial politics 
of imperialism, migration restrictions, and a global color line. This was a 
politics, in short, that was both about bodies and about land. Biopo liti cal 
regulation of the reproducing body was meant to produce geopo liti cal shifts 
in India’s relation with the world, supporting claims to sovereignty within 
the nation and the rights to mobility across the globe.
At the same time, concerns about diferential fertility— and its supposed 
connections to caste, class, and religious affiliation— also  shaped the con-
tours of debate and demarcated between “fit” and “unfit” reproducers. 
Reproductive regulation thus did not apply to all Indians equally, but 
targeted some  people’s reproduction as “dysgenic” or as an excess that 
produced overpopulation. As economic crisis in the 1930s propelled  these 
concerns about reproductive practice, the impetus to regulate population 
became increasingly urgent.  These concerns would eventually become the 
foundation for the postcolonial state’s investment in population control pro-
grams, as we  shall see in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3
FEMINISM, NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT,  
AND TRANSNATIONAL  FAMILY PL ANNING
 After 1947, Dhanvanthi Rama Rau was one of many  leaders 
of the Indian  women’s movement who  were reevaluating their work in 
light of the po liti cal changes heralded by in de pen dence. Rama Rau had 
served as president of the All India  Women’s Conference (AIWC) from 
1946 to 1947, shepherding the organ ization through the transitions and 
traumas of the partition. She then accompanied her husband, a diplomat, 
to Japan and the United States, where the  couple joined the ranks of repre-
sentatives of the newly in de pen dent Indian state. Returning to her home in 
Bombay, Rama Rau reconnected with her AIWC colleagues, but as she 
writes in her memoir, she was unsure of how best to direct her energies. 
She then met a “welfare worker” who introduced her to two “tenement 
families.” Rama Rau professed herself shocked by the poverty and poor 
health of both parents and  children. “[W]hen I thought over  these glimpses 
of slum life,” she recounts, “it became perfectly clear to me that, however 
much our social workers tried to improve conditions, nothing could be 
accomplished while unlimited numbers of  children continued to be born 
in crowded  houses where expansion was impossible.”1
In Rama Rau’s retelling, this realization provoked her lifelong commit-
ment to controlling India’s population: “I knew then that I had found a new 
purpose in life.  There was no question in my mind that I should work for 
 family planning single- mindedly and intensively. The limiting of our pop-
ulation was a fundamental and pivotal necessity if we  were to make the 
gigantic task of social and economic improvement successful.”2 She founded 
the  Family Planning Association of India (FPAI) in 1949, and it soon became 
the country’s largest nongovernmental organ ization in the field of population 
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control. Three years  later, she helped to create the International Planned 
Parenthood Federation (IPPF) and served as its president from 1963 to 1971.3 
In both the national and transnational arenas, Rama Rau established her-
self as a central figure in the drive to control population through reproduc-
tive regulation.
Rama Rau’s trajectory, from her involvement in the Indian  women’s 
movement to her founding of India’s premier  family planning organ ization 
to her leadership of a transnational population control network, suggests 
impor tant connections between feminism and  family planning during 
India’s transition to in de pen dence. Rama Rau herself represented this tra-
jectory as seamless. She invoked sympathy and support for  women as her 
motivation  behind  family planning; her encounter with the sufering 
 mothers of Bombay tenements thus sparked her drive to create the FPAI. 
At the same time, Rama Rau linked  family planning to population control 
in the ser vice of national development, arguing that easing  women’s suf-
fering via birth control was a foundational step in India’s social and eco-
nomic pro gress  after in de pen dence.  These national commitments, moreover, 
always developed with an eye  toward transnational networks, and Rama 
Rau was an  eager collaborator with an emerging global population estab-
lishment. In creating  these connections, Rama Rau was not alone. During 
the transition to in de pen dence, activists in the  women’s movement  were 
central to making  family planning a key component of national, as well as 
 women’s, development.
This chapter explores the transitional de cade, from the early 1940s, when 
the  women’s movement positioned birth control as a vehicle for economic 
and social development in in de pen dent India, to the early 1950s, when the 
ideological and institutional foundations of India’s population control pol-
icies  were put into place. Traversing in de pen dence in 1947, this was a period 
when hopes about in de pen dent India’s  future grappled with the tragedies 
of the partition and the lofty promises of anticolonial strug gle confronted 
the realities of profound in equality. During this de cade, new state institu-
tions and ideologies developed in tandem with a rising concern that popu-
lation growth was outpacing India’s food supply. Increasingly,  women’s 
reproduction was targeted as a core reason for this imbalance between pop-
ulation and food, and  family planners began to argue that reproductive 
regulation could be a tool of national development. Globally,  these years also 
saw the end of World War II and the beginnings of decolonization. Among 
Western powers, concern about the growing demographic footprint of 
Asian, African, and Latin American countries sparked organ izations like 
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the IPPF to call for global population control to avert a supposedly world-
wide crisis. As it had in the past, India seemed to be at the epicenter of global 
population concerns, and Indian  family planners like Rama Rau contrib-
uted to a transnational movement to control population. Their eforts also 
pushed the in de pen dent Indian government to include population control 
within its overall drive for state- led development planning. In 1952, India 
became the world’s first state to establish a program of population control, 
thus vindicating the aspirations of the FPAI, which had been founded just 
three short years before.
Feminists had an impor tant, but often overlooked, role to play in this 
transformation of  family planning into a pillar of India’s development 
regime. I use the term feminist broadly  here, to include activists, organ-
izations, and ideas aligned with the Indian  women’s movement. In terms 
of personnel, the networks created by the leading  women’s organ ization 
of the colonial era— the All India  Women’s Conference— provided some of 
India’s first postcolonial  family planners. In addition to Rama Rau herself, 
a number of AIWC members helped to create and staf the FPAI, and a few 
came to occupy impor tant roles in the state’s health and social welfare pro-
grams, where they  shaped the country’s emergent  family planning eforts 
in the early 1950s. The AIWC’s institutional networks extended beyond 
national borders as well. The organ ization’s connections with Margaret 
Sanger had influenced the AIWC’s campaign for birth control in the 1930s, 
as we have seen.  These connections  were reinvigorated in 1952, when, as I 
described in the introduction, Sanger and Rama Rau collaborated to host 
the International Committee for Planned Parenthood conference in Bom-
bay, a transnational efort that also boosted the FPAI’s commitment to mak-
ing birth control a vital component of national development.
Beyond specific individuals and their networks of allegiance, my atten-
tion to feminists and  family planning also analyzes the framework of ideas 
that linked claims about  women’s rights to emergent regimes of population 
control. As we have seen, the AIWC’s first resolutions in  favor of birth con-
trol in the 1930s ofered multiple reasons why contraception benefited 
 women— including eugenic and neo- Malthusian concerns about popula-
tion, interventions in maternal and infant health, and  women’s sexual and 
reproductive  labor within families. This chapter suggests that during the 
transition to in de pen dence,  these multiple rationales for birth control began 
to coalesce around the  women’s movement’s commitment to national devel-
opment.  Family planning supported national development planning, AIWC 
members claimed,  because access to birth control would improve  women’s 
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health by reducing their childbearing and foster economic growth by con-
trolling the population.  Family planning via birth control could thus bring 
development to  women and the nation. In efect, this approach to  family 
planning centered the postcolonial nation- state as an agent of  women’s 
emancipation, while si mul ta neously linking feminist politics to the agenda 
of state- led development. This chapter maps  these transitions through a 
close look at how  family planning became such an impor tant component 
of feminist activity.
Attention to  these intersections between feminism and  family planning 
during the 1940s and 1950s challenges three historiographic assumptions. 
First, that activists in the  women’s movement  were simply co- opted by the 
state in the aftermath of in de pen dence.4 Second, that the impetus to control 
population via  family planning was driven exclusively by men as techno-
cratic experts.5 And third, that the first postin de pen dence de cade was, at 
most, just a prehistory to the rise of state- led population control in the 
1960s and 1970s.6 While it is true that many feminist activists turned to 
the postin de pen dence state as a site for their politics— and thus turned 
away from movement- building outside the state— they did not set aside their 
own agendas to accept already existing state policies. Rather, as the campaign 
for  family planning suggests, feminists actively helped to make reproduc-
tion the terrain for state interventions into  women’s bodies and lives.7 Over-
looking this role leads to the assumption that population control was 
entirely a male- led enterprise, with its agenda and implementation set exclu-
sively by male demographers, development experts, and bureaucrats. As 
we  shall see,  women both inside and outside state institutions worked 
alongside— and sometimes at odds with— male policy- makers to determine 
what “ family planning” was and how it was linked to state- led development. 
Moreover, they often did so as  women, claiming  family planning as a gen-
dered space that connected  women to development proj ects. Fi nally, 
although the 1960s and 1970s witnessed the vast expansion of population 
control, as discussed in the next chapter, we cannot understand this expan-
sion without attention to the ideological and institutional assumptions 
that made “ family planning” so central to imagining and implementing 
“development” in the context of in de pen dence.
To map this history, the chapter turns first to the years immediately 
before 1947, when the  women’s movement established its commitments to 
planning for national development.  These commitments took further insti-
tutional shape in 1949, with the creation of the FPAI. Building upon its 
links to the  women’s movement, the FPAI also mobilized transnational 
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networks and helped to make India central to forging a global campaign 
around the question of population. The last section of the chapter investigates 
the terms by which  family planning was folded into a pro cess of state- led 
national planning with the First Five Year Plan in 1952. As I argue,  family 
planning ofered a means to bridge a series of tensions within the planning 
pro cess by claiming to alleviate poverty without tackling structures of 
in equality and by promoting  women’s development while leaving the ques-
tion of patriarchy unanswered.
Ultimately, the  women’s movement’s commitment to  family planning 
advanced a population control agenda that would have  little interest in 
challenging the structures and ideologies of  women’s oppression. Instead, 
middle- class  women  family planners targeted the bodies and sexualities of 
poor and working- class  women in the ser vice of postcolonial development. 
Consequently, in suggesting that feminist thinking influenced an Indian 
development regime during the first postcolonial de cade, I do not imply that 
“development” was therefore emancipatory or gender egalitarian. Rather, 
this chapter asks how a range of  family planning policies that had so  little 
interest in challenging gender, caste, and class inequalities became justified 
in the name of poor and lower- caste  women’s advancement. To answer this 
question, I do not claim to uncover  family planners’ individual intent or 
motivations, although I highlight their claims about intent whenever it 
becomes vis i ble in the historical archive.8 More than intent, this chapter 
considers the far- reaching impact of discourses and actions that connected 
claims about  women’s needs and rights so firmly to a top- down model of 
 family planning. Historians must grapple with this impact if we are to 
understand  either feminism or the politics of  family planning during the 
transitional de cade of in de pen dence.
Planning Families for  Women and the Nation
A de cade or so before in de pen dence, and anticipating the end of colonial 
rule, several prominent leaders of the  women’s movement plunged into 
planning for national development.  Under the leadership of Lakshmibai 
Rajwade, who had introduced the AIWC’s first resolution on birth control 
in 1931, they joined the Congress Party’s National Planning Committee to 
produce a report titled  Woman’s Role in the Planned Economy (WRPE). The 
WRPE report gave prominent mention to birth control, arguing that con-
traception would not only improve Indian  women’s lives but also contrib-
ute to the nation’s development by controlling population, reducing food 
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scarcity, and alleviating poverty. Consequently, the authors argued,  family 
planning was a critical vehicle to bring  women into the state’s development 
mandate. They called for the state to ensure  women’s access to  family plan-
ning ser vices; at the same time, they called upon  women to take responsi-
bility for limiting their families in ser vice to the nation. Their arguments 
became the foundation for the  women’s movement’s commitment to repro-
ductive regulation as a component of national planning for  women.
The WRPE was one of a series of reports produced by vari ous subcom-
mittees of the National Planning Committee, which the Congress Party 
established in 1938  under the chairmanship of Jawaharlal Nehru to create 
a program of India’s planned development with a view  toward in de pen-
dence. The subcommittee on  women, which produced the WRPE report, 
included in addition to Rajwade many leading figures of the  women’s 
movement, such as Aruna Asaf Ali, Vijayalakshmi Pandit, Rameshwari 
Nehru, Hansa Mehta, Sarojini Naidu, Durgabai Joshi, Begum Shareefah 
Hamid Ali, and Muthulakshmi Reddi.9 Their report broke radical ground, 
stepping away from the largely middle- class- centered agenda of the colonial- 
era  women’s movement, as Maitrayee Chaudhuri demonstrates, by focusing 
on  women as workers and by bringing  women’s  labor firmly into consider-
ation as part of the national economy. At the same time, however, the 
WRPE foreclosed the more revolutionary implications of its own analy sis, 
reverting instead to an emphasis on bourgeois rights of property owner-
ship and citizenship. Chaudhuri traces this contradiction to a realignment 
between the Congress Party and Indian business interests, which led the 
NPC overall to ofer a radical class analy sis while dismissing the possibil-
ity of its realization.10
We see similar contradictions between a deep- rooted analy sis and  limited 
conclusions in the WRPE’s discussion of families, sexualities, and contra-
ception. The report develops a thorough critique of familial patriarchies but 
appears to ignore the implications of this critique in its recommendations 
for birth control. For instance, the authors condemn joint families for their 
oppression of  women: “The pre sent position of  woman in the Joint Hindu 
 Family system is incompatible with her emancipation or her  free develop-
ment as an individual . . .  her position is considered only in virtue of her 
relationship to man, as wife,  mother or  daughter.”11 Alongside this rejection 
of the joint  family, the report challenges norms about  women’s responsi-
bilities as  mothers: “We would like to displace the picture so deeply 
impressed upon the racial imagination of man striding forward to conquer 
new worlds,  woman following wearily  behind with a baby in her arms. The 
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picture which we now envisage is that of man and  woman, comrades of the 
road,  going forward together, the child joyously shared by both.”12 This pas-
sage positions reproduction— and in par tic u lar the work of social repro-
duction—as a burdensome form of  labor that has hindered  women’s ability 
to “conquer new worlds.” The WRPE imagines a new division of  labor 
whereby parenting is a shared task, which would enable  women’s fuller par-
ticipation in the life and work of the nation. This potentially radical chal-
lenge to the gendering of domestic and reproductive  labor could ofer the 
ideological grounds for linking birth control to the WRPE’s calls for gen-
der equality. Freed from the reproductive  labors of constant childbearing 
and child- rearing,  women as workers could take a new place alongside men 
as “comrades of the road” in building the nation.
However, the WRPE disregards this antipatriarchal critique in its chap-
ter titled “Birth Control or Limitation of the  Family.” Without reference to 
their  earlier analy sis of  women’s reproductive  labor or subordination within 
families, the authors use neo- Malthusian ideas to argue that limiting the 
number of  children would “help to relieve the  people of poverty, unemploy-
ment, malnutrition, and other miseries due to over population.” Therefore, 
 family limitation is in the interests of “the  children, the parents as well as 
the nation.” The report also adopts a “eugenic point of view” to add that “the 
Indian stock is definitely deteriorating.” To remedy this racial degeneration, 
the WRPE calls for “the right kinds of persons [to] marry,” to properly space 
their  children, and to limit their  children to suit their  family income. The 
report concludes  these goals “can be achieved if men and  women have suf-
ficient knowledge of the methods of birth control.”13
The WRPE’s argument that reproduction is responsible for poverty and 
racial decline turns away from the report’s own concern with patriarchy 
and gender in equality. Contraception is not ofered as a means to tackle 
 women’s subordination within patriarchal families, nor their  limited access 
to the  labor force— both prob lems the WRPE had already identified. Indeed, 
the chapter on birth control does not even pose in equality and oppression— 
whether of gender, caste, or class—as prob lems for national development to 
address. Instead, population growth becomes the core development obsta-
cle to national development, and the WRPE makes birth control a tech-
nological means to overcome it. In other words, although the authors of 
the WRPE mobilized feminist rhe toric to argue that  women had a role in 
national development, they sidelined this argument when bringing birth con-
trol into the purview of the national state. The po liti cal impetus for challeng-
ing  women’s oppression, so prominent in the report’s analy sis of  women’s 
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role in the planned economy, thus faded away in the WRPE’s recommen-
dation for  family planning.
As a result, despite all its feminist leanings, the  women’s subcommittee 
did not difer very much in its birth control recommendations from other 
subcommittees of the National Planning Committee that addressed the 
question. The subcommittee on population, chaired by Radhakamal 
Mukherjee, similarly lamented the “dysgenic” practices of the Indian pop-
ulation and its excessive increase.14 The subcommittee on health called 
attention to “too many and too frequent births” which added to the “pre-
vailing poverty.”15 All three reports—on  women, population, and health— 
focused on birth control as a tool for improving population “quality” and 
reducing its quantity. Not even the WRPE’s call to reor ga nize gendered 
reproductive  labor could bring contraception out of this framework, 
whereby “ family planning” would serve to align  women’s reproduction with 
the needs of national economic development.
Throughout the de cade, AIWC leaders strengthened this alignment 
through their contraceptive advocacy. This move helped to legitimize pop-
ulation control as a vital component of development for both  women and 
the nation. Consider, for example, the AIWC presidential address by Hansa 
Mehta in 1946:
 Woman  shall have a right to limit her  family. It is the  woman who has to 
sufer bearing  children, looking  after them and bringing them up in a 
civilized way. The right to decide the  family should therefore belong to 
her.  Woman should be conscious of this right which she must learn to 
exercise for her own good, for the good of the  family and for the good of 
the country. India is over- populated and its population is  going up while 
her resources are  limited.  Unless something is done to check this upward 
curve of the population, poverty, starvation and all the evils that follow in 
their train  will be our lot.16
In Mehta’s terms, birth control is a  woman’s right  because of her responsi-
bilities  toward her  children;  women’s reproductive  labor is thus at the cen-
ter of her analy sis of contraception. However, Mehta also harnesses this 
 labor to the ser vice of the nation, and specifically to national prob lems of 
overpopulation.  Women’s rights to birth control are thus of national ben-
efit, since they can bring into balance the relationship between resources 
and population within India. The cause of expanding  women’s rights, and 
of easing their reproductive burdens, is thus perfectly aligned with national 
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population policies. Mehta leaves  little room for  these dual interests to 
diverge, since she insists that  women must exercise their reproductive rights 
for the “good of the  family and for the good of the country.”
A few months  after Mehta’s address, the AIWC pursued  these connec-
tions between  women’s rights to contraception and the nation’s need for 
population control still further. The organ ization’s “Indian  Woman’s Char-
ter of Rights and Duties” was drafted in anticipation of in de pen dence and 
aimed to secure for  women their rights within the national state. The char-
ter contained a specific provision for birth control: “ Woman  shall have a 
right to limit her  family. It  will be the duty of the state to provide the nec-
essary knowledge to married  women who desire to have it for health and 
economic reasons only through recognized hospitals or maternity homes.”17 
As in Mehta’s address, the AIWC document frames “ family limitation” as 
a component of  women’s rights. But in contrast to Mehta’s emphasis on 
 women’s exercising  these rights for familial and national benefit, the char-
ter introduces the state as the guarantor of  women’s contraceptive rights via 
a system of “hospitals” and “maternity homes.” Moreover, when turning the 
focus from  women onto the state, the charter narrows the reasons for state 
intervention in birth control. The government’s responsibilities are  limited 
to “married  women,” who are assumed to need contraception for “health 
and economic reasons.”
At the first AIWC national conference  after in de pen dence and partition, 
the organ ization’s president, Anasuyabai Kale, cemented this move by 
calling for the state to make birth control a centerpiece of development 
proj ects geared  toward  women. Speaking to conference members in Decem-
ber 1947, Kale noted the range of issues facing the country. The economy 
had been in turmoil due to partition and the influx of refugees, and indus-
trialization was a key priority to raise living standards. Within this con-
text, Kale invited “the attention of the Government to one more impor tant 
prob lem which cuts at the very root of all and that is the alarming increase 
of population . . .  until we regulate this abnormal increase by artificial means 
the economy of the  whole country  will collapse.”18 In par tic u lar, she added, the 
population was out of balance with the food available. Domestic produc-
tion of food grains was insufficient to meet the demands of India’s growing 
population, and longer- term plans to increase agricultural production 
would take time. Meanwhile, the government’s strug gle to meet food needs 
reduced the capital available for industrialization, and thus “the question 
of population” threatened to upend even the best- laid national development 
goals. Fi nally, India’s high maternal and infant mortality rates decreased 
Ch a p t e r 3100
the “vitality” of the population, and thus became another block to devel-
opment. In Kale’s terms, birth control would at once improve  women and 
 children’s health, increase the country’s food security, and promote indus-
trial development. This combined benefit to both  women and the nation 
was the basis of Kale’s appeal to the state.
Similarly, Begum Shareefah Hamid Ali, an AIWC leader and member 
of the National Planning Committee’s subcommittee on  women, invited 
attention to this imbalance among food, population, and resources. She 
exhorted the readers of the AIWC magazine Roshni to support national 
development goals by becoming ambassadors for reproductive regulation. 
“For Heaven’s sake teach your  daughters, your neighbours, and  every 
 woman in her home the urgent necessity of controlling our population. We 
simply cannot survive if we go on increasing at the rate we have been 
increasing in the last twenty years. No  enemy need come and attack our 
country—we  shall be dead through sheer starvation!”19 Neither Hamid 
Ali nor Kale mentions  women’s “rights” to contraception; they do not 
even address the arguments the AIWC had previously invoked, of  women 
protecting their own health or controlling their own reproductive  labor. 
Instead, birth control becomes an aspect of  women’s responsibility to the 
nation. The Indian state serves as a necessary partner in this pro cess, as 
 women leaders like Hamid Ali and Kale made controlling reproduction a 
 matter for state- led development.
This turn  toward the state suggests the faith that Indian feminists had 
in the postin de pen dence regime’s interest and ability to foster social 
change— including changes for  women. In this transitional moment of 
decolonization, when the nation- state was still in formation, many AIWC 
 women argued that obtaining state power and turning it in the direction 
of  women’s development would represent the culmination of the colonial- 
era feminist strug gle. This faith in the state was not unique to feminists but 
widely shared across the po liti cal spectrum. Arguably, however, this reli-
ance on the state disregarded its caste and class composition, and the resul-
tant limitations on fundamental social or economic transformation, as 
Maitrayee Chaudhuri suggests.20 Indeed, the AIWC  women who would 
occupy positions of state power and influence  after in de pen dence shared 
in this caste and class privilege— which enabled their entrance into the insti-
tutions that created the  family planning bureaucracy. I consider the results 
of  these alliances and aspirations in the next section, on the institutional-
ization of  family planning.
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 Family Planning as National Social Ser vice
 After in de pen dence and partition,  women’s activists mobilized to bring 
 family planning to the state’s attention. The most impor tant initiative in this 
direction came from the  Family Planning Association of India (FPAI). The 
FPAI drew from the ideological and institutional legacies of colonial- era 
feminism, most notably through its connection to the AIWC. But the organ-
ization also marked its diferences from the  women’s movement’s cam-
paigns for contraception by actively involving men and by claiming the 
authority of scientific and technical expertise. As a result, I argue, the FPAI 
linked the language of Indian feminism with emerging demographic sci-
ence to mark  family planning as a form of social ser vice aligned with 
national development goals.
According to its founding members, the FPAI was created  because of 
growing interest in  family planning within both the  women’s movement 
and the scientific community. As Avabai Wadia, who would become the 
FPAI’s second president, recounts, the question of  family planning was first 
raised to her by Elfriede Vembu, a social worker in Bombay. Vembu 
approached Wadia, who was serving as the editor of the AIWC magazine 
Roshni, for assistance in publicizing birth control among  women. Wadia was 
interested in helping, especially since the time seemed right. The Bombay 
Municipal Corporation had recently de cided to introduce  family planning 
ser vices at two of its maternity centers, while the Bhagini Samaj, a Bombay 
 women’s organ ization, had begun a birth control clinic. Roshni could sup-
port  these eforts, but Wadia was concerned that the English- language mag-
azine was not the best way to reach out to the “underprivileged and largely 
illiterate  mothers” who  were, in her view, the target for birth control. In line 
with AIWC frameworks of contraceptive advocacy, Wadia assumed that 
members of the organ ization themselves did not need contraceptive advice, 
perhaps  because they already had access to the information they required 
or  because they  were not responsible for the prob lem of “overpopulation.” 
Instead, she  imagined another target in the “illiterate  mothers” who could 
not read Roshni.21
In Wadia’s telling, her concern for such  women had been sparked by 
Lakshmibai Rajwade. She was deeply afected when reading a speech by 
Rajwade, “who said that Indian  women  were fated to a life that ‘oscillated 
between gestation and lactation  until death wound up the sorry tale.’ ” 
Wadia’s turn to  family planning was prompted by a desire to  free  women 
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from “the trap of biological compulsion and of the societal pressures for 
frequent childbearing.” To this end, and in hopes of reaching  women in 
need, Wadia recalls in her memoir, “We got together a group of experienced 
social workers and medical prac ti tion ers, both men and  women, and formed 
the  Family Planning Committee, which soon became the  Family Planning 
Association of India.”22 Wadia’s is one of several origin stories told about 
the FPAI. Rama Rau puts forward a slightly dif er ent version, marking her 
visit to the Bombay tenements as a key moment, as we saw above. Across 
 these varied accounts, however,  there is a common theme: both Wadia and 
Rama Rau represent birth control as a ser vice ofered to poor  women by 
their more privileged or elite “ sisters.” This was a model of ser vice with long 
genealogies in the colonial- era  women’s movement, as well as in Gandhian 
ideals of citizenship.23 Wadia, Rama Rau, and their FPAI allies repurposed 
this ideal into the FPAI’s support for postcolonial  family planning.
Rama Rau and Wadia drew upon their AIWC networks to staf the new 
FPAI.  These AIWC members included Mithan J. Lam, who served as presi-
dent of the AIWC and vice president of the FPAI and even used her desk in 
the AIWC offices to conduct her  family planning work.24 Wadia recalls that 
all three  women worked well together as a team for the FPAI. They “ were 
on the same wavelength. All three of us had Theosophical Society influences 
 behind us and believed in giving social ser vice. We worked together in 
the AIWC and continued to have many discussions and shared jokes 
together. . . .  We knew each other’s families.”25 Other AIWC members 
who  were involved included M. S. H. Jhabvala and Vaidehi Char as joint 
honorary trea sur ers of the FPAI. Additional  women members included 
Elfriede Vembu, the social worker who had approached Wadia at Roshni, 
and Sushila Gore, a medical doctor.26
While drawing from  these AIWC networks, Rama Rau also aimed to 
expand the FPAI’s leadership. She argued that “it was impor tant to have men 
on the new committee” whose scientific and medical expertise would lend 
authority to the FPAI’s activities. The scientific “experts” who helped to 
found the FPAI included several prominent men— physicians, demogra-
phers, and birth control advocates. Among the organ ization’s joint direc-
tors  were the Bombay gynecologist V.  N. Shirodkar and the renowned 
eugenicist and sexologist, A. P. Pillay, whom I discussed in chapter 2.27 The 
executive committee included R. D. Karve, a longtime birth control advo-
cate, social reformer, eugenicist, and former professor of mathe matics.28 In 
this way, the FPAI claimed a scientific agenda at a moment when, globally 
and in India, medical science and technocratic expertise reigned supreme. 
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Bringing together experiences and networks from the  women’s movement 
with this scientific expertise, the FPAI aimed to provide information about 
 family planning as a form of social ser vice for poor  women.
Consequently, one of the new organ ization’s first initiatives was to estab-
lish a birth control clinic in Bombay. This clinic, the  Family Welfare Cen-
ter (Kutumb Sudhar Kendra), purposefully targeted the inhabitants of the 
city’s “slums.” According to Rama Rau, “many of the slum dwellers in our 
neighborhood came to visit our doctor for medical help of all sorts.  Here 
we began to educate them in the simplest, least- threatening terms about the 
need for controlling the size of their families.”29 Given the technologies of 
the time, the clinic likely focused on distributing pessaries or contracep-
tive sponges to  women. Eventually, some FPAI branches also experimented 
with using pads soaked in oil.30 By introducing its patients to birth control 
methods, the clinic aimed at once to improve  women’s health, alleviate their 
poverty, and reduce the “drudgery” of their reproductive  labor. In Wadia’s 
terms, the  Family Welfare Center thus continued a proj ect of ser vice to 
impoverished  women that the AIWC had initiated over a de cade  earlier, 
both in the organ ization’s support for birth control and in its outreach 
eforts on  women’s health.31 But significantly, it did so within the scientific 
space of the clinic— thus linking the  women’s movement’s legacies of “ser-
vice” to an agenda of scientifically managed modernization. This allowed 
the FPAI to position its birth control advocacy as a scientific approach to 
 women’s welfare.
While cultivating the targets for its birth control advice among the “slum 
dwellers” of Bombay, the FPAI also aimed to mobilize another constituency 
to support  family planning.  These  were the social workers, medical profes-
sionals, and scientists, alongside a variety of volunteers, who the organ-
ization hoped would build a public interest in birth control as a vehicle for 
national development. To that end, the FPAI or ga nized in de pen dent India’s 
first national conference on the subject in December 1951.32 The two- day 
session was attended by 110 individuals, “experts” in the field alongside 
ordinary citizens. The goal, in Rama Rau’s terms, was both to promote inter-
est in  family planning and to “establish a scientific and practical course of 
action” to enable the education of “illiterate men and  women on the desir-
ability of smaller families.”33 As in the case of the clinic, through the con-
ference, the FPAI positioned  family planning as a form of social ser vice that 
experts and middle- class volunteers could provide on a scientific basis to 
lower- caste and lower- class recipients. This bifurcation between the middle- 
class agents of ser vice and their subaltern targets was apparent in the 
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structure of the conference itself. It invited medical and social scientific 
studies of contraceptive use while advancing demographic and other ratio-
nales for  family planning. The conference’s  imagined audiences  were thus 
not  those who might need or want access to birth control but rather  those 
whose scientific and voluntary commitments would bring  family planning 
to the “illiterate men and  women” who might visit a clinic or be targeted 
for outreach. The conference in 1951 thus provided a platform for the FPAI 
to cultivate middle- class interest in its programs and highlight its scientific 
credentials— all while making the case that  family planning was a form of 
social ser vice that required state support.
While organ izing and promoting the national conference, the FPAI was 
si mul ta neously lobbying the state.  After in de pen dence, the government had 
embarked upon a planning pro cess that built upon the Congress Party’s 
 earlier initiative with the National Planning Committee.  Under Jawaharlal 
Nehru, a new entity, the National Planning Commission (NPC), was estab-
lished and tasked with producing a Five Year Plan for economic develop-
ment. Keen to engage the NPC and bring  family planning into the First Five 
Year Plan, the FPAI called upon Wadia to draft a memo presenting the 
organ ization’s views. Wadia aimed to “express our ideas about the need for 
 family planning—to promote the health of  mothers and  children, and also 
as a means by which population growth could be slowed— and to outline 
some of the ways in which this could be done.”34 This resulting FPAI docu-
ment, “The Growth of Population in Relation to the Growth of Economic 
Development,” outlined a program of propaganda, clinics, training, field 
studies, and research. It insisted that voluntary organ izations operate along-
side the state in order to “prepar[e] the minds of the  people for the practice 
of  family spacing and limitation.”35
The planning commissioners  were apparently willing to consider  these 
ideas, which resonated both with the Congress Party’s  earlier planning exer-
cises and with a growing national and transnational interest in population 
control as a component of planned development. The NPC invited Rama 
Rau and Wadia to sit on its Advisory Health Panel and Advisory Social 
Welfare Panel, respectively.36 The FPAI would subsequently develop a close 
alliance with the Indian state, and perhaps we might mark this moment— 
when Rama Rau and Wadia formally joined the planning process—as one 
step  toward developing  these ties between the FPAI’s “voluntary” work in 
 family planning and the government’s emerging commitment to state- led 
population control. In par tic u lar, Rama Rau seemed ideally positioned to 
forge  these connections. In addition to her credentials with the  women’s 
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movement, she had access to government circles through her husband, a 
diplomat and chair of the Reserve Bank of India from 1949 to 1957. Mobi-
lizing  these networks, she set her sights on making “ family planning” not 
only an ele ment of social ser vice within the  women’s movement, as it had 
been, but also an official arm of the postcolonial state. As we  will see below, 
she met with considerable success when the First Five Year Plan allocated 
state funds to a  family planning program in 1951. But first, let us turn to 
another set of ideas and networks that  shaped  family planning’s emergence 
as a component of planned development. That was the growing transna-
tional movement for population control.
 Family Planning and Transnational Development Regimes
Building upon their early initiatives within an Indian national context, FPAI 
leaders also began to mobilize transnational networks in support of their 
 family planning agenda. To do so, Rama Rau, Wadia, and their allies drew 
from the  women’s movement’s existing connections, which had been forged 
during the AIWC’s campaign for birth control in the 1930s. The FPAI took 
a major step in furthering  these connections when it hosted the conference 
of the International Committee for Planned Parenthood (ICPP) in Bombay 
in 1952. As noted in the introduction, Rama Rau agreed to host the confer-
ence at the invitation of Margaret Sanger, and it became the first interna-
tional gathering of its kind to be held in in de pen dent India. Its outcome was 
equally momentous; on the last day of the conference, delegates voted to cre-
ate the International Planned Parenthood Federation (IPPF). Within this 
chapter’s history of feminism and  family planning in India, the Bombay 
conference marks a watershed moment for at least three reasons. First, it 
linked Dhanvanthi Rama Rau closely to Margaret Sanger and helped both 
 women argue that population control was a continuation of a long- standing 
history of feminist support for contraception. Second, the conference helped 
to sideline alternative visions of  family planning to put forward a neo- 
Malthusian agenda that insisted contraception was necessary for popula-
tion control, and ultimately for modernization and economic development 
in the “Third World.” This agenda would come to govern  family planning 
programs both in India and abroad in the de cades to come. Third, the Bom-
bay conference connected Indians more closely to an emerging network of 
population controllers who had hitherto been mostly American and West-
ern Eu ro pean but who had wider aspirations. In so  doing, it also made India 
a critical site for shaping policies on population and reproduction that 
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extended beyond national borders. That is, India was not simply the ground 
upon which a global population control agenda was enacted. Rather, India’s 
specific historical conditions and the eforts of Indian  family planners 
helped to shape what “global” population control would look like. India 
would help define the course of the movement worldwide.
Margaret Sanger may not have had all  these outcomes in mind when she 
wrote to Rama Rau in 1951 asking the FPAI to host the conference. But in 
retrospect, it is clear that Sanger captured a moment when, both globally 
and in India, growing concern about world population was reshaping the 
politics of reproduction. Fears about global population increase— and espe-
cially the growing portion of that increase taking place in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin Amer i ca— were prompted in part by the specter of food scarcity, made 
real during World War II and its aftermath.  These fears spurred not only 
agricultural research but also a renewed search for means to control popu-
lation growth on a worldwide scale. Americans and Western Eu ro pe ans 
 were especially disturbed by signs of diferential fertility between their 
countries and the rest of the world. In the wake of decolonization, some  were 
alarmed by a  future that would be dominated demographically by Asians 
and Africans, and we can see in their writings during the 1940s and 1950s 
the precursors to what  later became a full- blown panic about a global “pop-
ulation explosion.”37  These fears  were fueled by the geopolitics of the Cold 
War. A large and growing population in places like India raised questions 
about  whether poverty could be alleviated and living standards raised 
quickly enough to avert sociopo liti cal unrest. For some worried Americans, 
the Communist revolution in China had already shown this possibility, and 
India seemed to be the next battlefield in a global war against population. 
In response to  these varied fears and aspirations, Americans took a leading 
role in creating new organ izations to support population control transna-
tionally, many of which took a keen interest in India as a site for research, 
funding, and policy- making. The most prominent of  these organ izations, 
the Population Council, was founded in 1951, just one year before Sanger 
and Rama Rau’s Bombay conference.
An additional, potentially less US- centered ave nue for transnational net-
working on population was the growing field of international health, in 
the form of the World Health Organ ization (WHO), a UN agency founded 
in 1948. For a brief period at its inception, vari ous member states and observ-
ers aimed to involve the WHO in birth control as a global health issue.38 
In 1951, the Indian government sought WHO support for a study of the 
rhythm method as a technology of  family planning. This study proved to 
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be short- lived, and the WHO soon turned away from birth control research. 
Nevertheless, when Rama Rau and Sanger began their collaboration for the 
Bombay conference, the WHO remained another potential site for advanc-
ing their goals and was part of the broader transnational network that 
both  women tapped into and helped to build.
Sanger came to this collaboration with some experience in India, since 
she had worked closely with the AIWC, traveled extensively across the coun-
try in support of birth control in 1935 and 1936, and met with Gandhi on 
the subject, as we saw in chapter 2. Turning to India again more than a 
de cade  later, Sanger professed herself to be impressed by Indian  family plan-
ning eforts. She wrote to Rama Rau of her interest in the FPAI’s proposed 
national conference and was hopeful that the organ ization might expand 
its work by bringing the International Committee for Planned Parenthood to 
India in the following year. The ICPP had held a previous international 
conference, at Cheltenham in  England in 1948, where, coincidentally, Wadia 
had been in attendance.39 Sanger was  eager to continue  these eforts in Bom-
bay. Rama Rau agreed to Sanger’s proposal but also sought to dampen the 
latter’s expectations: “You realize that this is the first time that an All India 
Conference on this topic has been arranged, and we are still not sure what 
the attendance  will be, or how much interest  will be aroused in the coun-
try.” Nevertheless, Rama Rau proposed that the Planned Parenthood con-
ference be held soon  after two other international conferences in India, on 
social work and on child welfare. She was hopeful the conferences might 
share common delegates and thus help to bolster numbers.40 And although 
the FPAI was a new organ ization, Rama Rau assured Sanger that they could 
expect the support and cooperation of the more established AIWC.41 Con-
sequently, from the very outset of conference planning, Rama Rau linked 
the FPAI ideologically and institutionally both to the  women’s movement 
and to emerging ideas about social ser vice and social welfare.
For Rama Rau and the FPAI, the collaboration with Sanger brought sev-
eral benefits, namely opportunities for technical training and funding 
from Eu ro pean and American sources. Key financial support for the con-
ference came from Ellen Watamull, an American associate of Margaret 
Sanger’s whose husband was Indian. Along with providing five thousand 
dollars  toward conference expenses,42 Watamull sent six models of the 
female pelvis, a donation that Elfriede Vembu noted was in immediate 
demand for birth control education.43 Meanwhile, A. P. Pillay requested that 
Sanger bring contraceptive supplies with her during her voyage to Bom-
bay, specifically dyes for pessaries, which he hoped could subsequently be 
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produced more cheaply in India.44 During the conference itself, the FPAI 
arranged for visiting medical professionals to train Indian doctors in con-
traceptive methods; the organ ization paid  women daily to come to the Bom-
bay clinic, where they served as patients for the doctors demonstrating and 
learning new techniques.45 More generally, the conference allowed Indian 
 family planners— most of whom had few opportunities to travel abroad—
to join transnational conversations about contraceptive technologies and 
global population control.
 These benefits did not flow only in one direction. Sanger’s global aspira-
tions received a po liti cal and ideological boost from her alliance with the 
FPAI. As she wrote to Rama Rau, Sanger hoped to create a permanent world 
organ ization devoted to  family planning. She was concerned, however, that 
“global” population control was perceived as an exclusively Western con-
cern and tainted by association with racism, imperialism, and Cold War 
politics. Indeed, as Wadia  later recalled,  these associations had disturbed 
her when she first encountered the birth control movement in the 1930s, 
and they had resurfaced at the 1948 Cheltenham conference.46 Sanger hoped 
that taking the conference outside of the US and Eu rope and holding it in 
India might push back against such criticisms and could bolster the new 
organ ization’s global legitimacy and credentials. Perhaps it was this logic 
that led Sanger to make a unilateral decision, bypassing the ICPP, to hold 
the conference in Bombay.47 Rama Rau agreed that meeting in Bombay 
would bring in Asian countries “much more  wholeheartedly than you  will 
be able to draw them in” if in Eu rope.48 India, in this sense, served as a gate-
way to Asia and a link to the “global.”
Beyond recognizing the po liti cal expediency of holding the conference 
outside the West, Sanger must have seen an ideological resonance between 
her vision for the global birth control movement and events that  were 
unfolding in India. The ICPP was operating amid a jostling mix of ideas 
about the meaning and purposes of  family planning. Some members of the 
organ ization espoused eugenic ideals as a primary motivation for their 
 family planning work; the ICPP was in fact  housed within the premises of 
the Eugenics Society in London.  Others highlighted sex education, in par-
tic u lar the importance of addressing sexuality apart from reproduction, as 
a key mission for  family planners. Some  were primarily interested in the 
mechanisms of contraception and its dissemination via clinics.49 However, 
Sanger argued that a truly global movement for “planned parenthood” 
needed to demonstrate the relationship between population control and 
economic development, especially in the newly decolonizing world. The 
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FPAI was already making such connections in India, and Sanger was  eager 
to take the global movement in  these Indian directions. Holding the con-
ference in Bombay could make a power ful statement about what kinds of 
activities and agendas the new world organ ization on planned parenthood 
might pursue.
Sanger and Rama Rau advanced this agenda while sidelining alternative 
visions of the Planned Parenthood movement. In par tic u lar, Sanger was 
determined to deemphasize sex education, and in this maneuver, she went 
directly against the Dutch del e ga tion’s position. The two Dutch represen-
tatives to the ICPP, Dr. Conrad Van Emde Boas and Dr. A. Storm,  were 
insistent that the conference be held in Sweden, as the ICPP had previously 
agreed, rather than in India. They called for a program with “more stress 
on the cultural aspects of the sexual prob lem than on the neo- Malthusian 
ones.”50 They  were skeptical of the motives of population controllers and 
wary of associating birth control exclusively with neo- Malthusian fears 
about the dangers of population growth. Sanger was dismissive of  these 
claims, writing to Rama Rau that “the Dutch representatives have been trou-
ble makers on the Committee always. They both have a Marxian attitude 
about Population. They want the Committee to interest itself only in Sex 
Education.”51 Hosting the conference in India, Sanger implied, would move 
Planned Parenthood away from  these “Marxian attitudes” that challenged 
the growing dominance of neo- Malthusianism in the global population 
movement. Instead, Indian interest in (over)population, and the FPAI’s own 
neo- Malthusian perspectives, would anchor the new world organ ization.
The conference opened in Bombay in November 1952 and was attended 
by 487 delegates and observers from fourteen countries. This did not include 
the Dutch del e ga tion, which boycotted the conference. Rama Rau chaired 
the local organ izing committee, and she was joined by Mithan Lam and 
Wadia. Other FPAI members, notably A. P. Pillay and V. N. Shirodkar,  were 
involved in the local arrangements as well. Indian attendees included sev-
eral individuals who would  later become leaders in India’s  family planning 
bureaucracy and in the Health Ministry.52 The conference itself was inau-
gurated by the vice president, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. For any observer 
at the opening ceremonies witnessing the series of prominent politicians, 
scientists, and policy- makers, perhaps “ family planning” seemed like a 
global movement whose time had come. In her statement opening the vol-
ume of conference proceedings, Rama Rau capitalized on this moment. She 
expressed hope that the conference would focus attention in India “on this 
very vital question of population control at a time when impor tant plans 
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for the development of the country  were being initiated for the raising 
of the standards of living of the  people.” Having thus bound population 
firmly to the cause of national development, Rama Rau reminded her read-
ers that the government of India had just recently made  family planning 
one of its health priorities in the First Five Year Plan. The moment was thus 
right, she insisted, to bring the “ whole of this impor tant question to public 
discussion.”53 And indeed, the conference did so. An entire section of the 
proceedings was devoted to “population prob lems.” Even more importantly, 
neo- Malthusian concern about the impact of population growth on eco-
nomic development provided the context— and the po liti cal urgency— 
behind many of the papers presented. Sanger and Rama Rau’s careful 
engineering of the agenda seemed to have succeeded in shaping a global 
movement for  family planning around the questions of population and 
development.54
Nevertheless,  there remained voices of dissent in Bombay. Conference 
delegates encountered one such voice at the very outset, when Kamaladevi 
Chattopadhyay greeted the attendees in her welcoming address. Chattopadh-
yay brought a power ful set of credentials to her position as chair of the 
Bombay conference’s reception committee. As discussed in the last chap-
ter, during the 1930s Chattopadhyay had been a forceful advocate of birth 
control, which she linked to a broader critique of patriarchal structures of 
 family and sexuality. Her address to the delegates in Bombay did not return 
to this  earlier antipatriarchal critique but ofered an anti- imperialist and 
antiracist vision for a global  family planning movement, as I noted in the 
introduction. Chattopadhyay challenged two foundational assumptions of 
the conference organizers: the notion that  family planning was primarily a 
component of national planning and the neo- Malthusian premise  behind 
the idea of Indian “overpopulation.”
In the face of the demographers, doctors, and other “experts” in popu-
lation control who  were among the conference delegates, Chattopadhyay 
insisted that decisions about sexuality and childbearing could never be sub-
ject to top- down planning. Moreover, she reminded her audience that 
“planning is a means to an end, not an end in itself”; the end was “the fulfill-
ment of  human beings.” Aiming to disentangle birth control from develop-
ment planning goals, Chattopadhyay suggested that “planned parenthood” 
was relevant to all states and socie ties— not just  those of the colonized or 
postcolonial world. Consequently, she refused to “accept any theories as to 
why  there should be a planned  family,  whether economic or health, or any 
other reason  because life is  really much larger than any single purpose.” At 
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the core of her position, she added, was the “inherent right of parents to 
determine for themselves the size of their families.”55 Chattopadhyay’s 
address walked back from her previous insistence that the primary pur-
pose of birth control was to overthrow patriarchal controls over  women’s 
sexuality, and she instead privileged the “ family” as locus of agency and 
decision- making. Yet, from her prominent position in the conference, Chat-
topadhyay’s focus on the welfare of the “individual  family” challenged the 
growing assumption that “ family planning” was entirely subservient to an 
economic development regime.
Moreover, Chattopadhyay’s vision for  family planning rejected a neo- 
Malthusian framework and turned instead  toward a geopolitics of land, 
food, and migration. The prob lem was not that some countries  were over-
populated, she suggested, but that land was not equally available to all 
 people. Chattopadhyay thus indicted countries “in Africa”—an implicit ref-
erence to the white settler colonies in South Africa and Rhodesia— that 
allowed a small minority to hold all resources and forced the majority of 
the population into small territories. Chattopadhyay also reminded her 
audience that some countries had plenty of land available—an implicit ref-
erence to the United States, Canada, and Australia— but had closed their 
doors to immigrants.56 Such racist policies concerning land and migration, 
she argued,  were a key part of the global “population prob lem,” and she 
called upon conference delegates to include it in their discussions. Chatto-
padhyay’s critique of a global color line and her insistence on understand-
ing land in relation to population should remind us of an  earlier strand of 
population discourse, advanced by Radhakamal Mukherjee, among  others, 
that did not privilege reproduction as the primary solution to the prob lem 
of population. It hearkened back to a geopolitics that understood popula-
tion as a transnational question that was not  limited to the national bound-
aries of any single state. Her avowedly anti- imperialist and antiracist analy sis 
thus refused to territorialize “overpopulation” as a prob lem for the in de-
pen dent Indian nation to confront via reproductive regulation. Instead, she 
challenged the assumption that “population” would have to be contained 
within the existing borders of nation- states—an assumption that under-
pinned the ICPP’s international agenda.
 There is no rec ord of how Chattopadhyay’s speech was received, but she 
may have found a sympathetic ear among at least some of the delegates. 
Among them was likely Sripati Chandrasekhar, a conference attendee who 
would go on to become the minister of health and  family planning in 1967. 
Two years  after the Bombay conference, Chandrasekhar published an analy sis 
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of the geopolitics of population, titled Hungry  People and Empty Lands: An 
Essay on Population Prob lems and International Tensions.57 Echoing Chat-
topadhyay, Chandrasekhar critiqued race- based immigration laws and 
challenged a global color line that prevented “hungry  people” from accessing 
the resources of so- called “empty” lands. He thus linked the freedom from 
hunger to a freedom of global mobility and argued that the con temporary 
distribution of world population was neither necessary nor inevitable but 
the product of imperial rule. At the same time, like Mukherjee before him, 
Chandrasekhar relied upon imperial discourses about the supposed emp-
tiness of land populated by indigenous  people. This claim to “emptiness,” 
in turn, became the basis of his calls to overturn imperialist immigration 
law to solve prob lems of population in Asia. At least in 1954, when Hungry 
 People and Empty Lands was published, Chandrasekhar’s geopolitics of land 
and migration turned away from reproductive regulation. In this sense, he 
shared with Chattopadhyay a suspicion of population control. Yet by 1967, 
as health minister, Chandrasekhar would join— even lead— the population 
control bandwagon, turning away from his  earlier critique of migration 
policies while becoming a forceful advocate of increasingly intensive means 
of reproductive control.
Chandrasekhar’s personal turn away from the geopolitics of migration 
 toward an intensified regulation of reproduction mapped the trajectories 
of  family planning both in India and globally. Challenges to racial immi-
gration policies, alongside calls for individual choices in  family planning, 
gave way during the late 1950s and 1960s to a quest to reduce Indian fertil-
ity rates to meet centrally planned development targets. In this sense, Sanger 
and Rama Rau’s vision for the Bombay conference, whereby birth control 
would become a global concern precisely through its connection to popu-
lation control, became the dominant discursive and policy framework. 
Rama Rau and Sanger solidified this vision on the last day of the confer-
ence, when delegates passed a resolution to create the International Planned 
Parenthood Federation.58 The delegates determined, further, that the new 
Federation would comprise vari ous national organ izations—of which the 
FPAI was one—as members. The IPPF was thus a transnational network, 
operating across national borders. At the same time, it reterritorialized 
global population as a series of national prob lems and routed its personnel 
and finances through organ izations that operated within the bound aries of 
the nation- state. Meanwhile, the Indian government took up the challenge 
issued at Bombay and began to develop a state- directed program of popu-
lation control, to which we turn next.
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 Family Planning as Population Control
The government of India’s First Five Year Plan, which was announced in 
1951 and commenced in 1952, allocated funds for a  family planning pro-
gram. In many ways, the Plan’s vision of  family planning aligned with the 
FPAI’s agenda as it had developed since 1949 and with the goals of an inter-
national movement as laid out during the Bombay conference. The Plan 
document asserted that population growth was a critical  factor in India’s 
economic development and recommended that the state conduct research 
on contraceptive methods, provide its citizens with access to birth control, 
and encourage them to plan their families. To this end, it situated  family 
planning ser vices within the government’s Ministry of Health and allocated 
an initial bud get of 6.5 million rupees. While this was a small proportion 
of the 178 million rupees provided in the health bud get overall, the incor-
poration of  family planning into India’s national planning pro cess was a 
momentous step within India, and also transnationally.59  After de cades of 
debate within Indian nationalism about the  causes of Indian poverty and 
the role of Gandhian sexual continence in shaping a national citizenry, the 
Plan document came down firmly on the side of  those who linked regulat-
ing reproductive sexuality to alleviating poverty.
However, when  family planning became a component of national plan-
ning, it also became enmeshed in the latter’s tensions and contradictions. 
Specifically, the call for birth control grappled between a stated commit-
ment to universal health, welfare, and democ ratization on the one hand and 
the exigencies of a top- down and antidemo cratic drive to control popula-
tion growth on the other. As we have seen already, both  these trajectories— 
birth control as a vehicle for liberation and for an intensified and intimate 
biopo liti cal regulation— had been pre sent within the  women’s movement, 
and within broader reproductive politics, for de cades. When  family plan-
ning became a vehicle for national planning,  these contradictions mapped 
onto a broader tension within Indian nationalism itself.
The National Planning Commission de cided to support  family planning 
in a context of some public pressure and lobbying. As we have seen, the FPAI 
took a leading role in mobilizing public opinion in  favor of birth control 
and calling for its inclusion in the First Five Year Plan.  These arguments 
likely found some support on the NPC, including from Durgabai Deshmukh, 
who was the only  woman member of the commission and an AIWC mem-
ber. At the same time, the planning commissioners  were also concerned 
with food and famine. Increasing agricultural production was a central goal 
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in the First Plan, and the NPC apportioned state resources accordingly. This 
focus on food was prompted by concerns that India’s population would out-
pace the country’s food supply and stymie the nation’s development. While 
 these fears had a long history, as we have seen throughout this book, they 
also had a more recent context in the horrors of the Bengal famine in 1943. 
The famine— widely understood to have been a human- made calamity due 
to British war time policies— was the first on its scale since the turn of the 
twentieth  century. For observers of the widespread starvation in 1943, 
including the AIWC del e ga tion sent to Bengal to report back to the wider 
membership, experiences with famine relief  shaped understandings of food 
crises and population in India.60 As Rama Rau, a member of that del e ga tion, 
 later recounted, witnessing the famine further fueled her commitments to 
make reproductive control an aspect of planned development.61 Meanwhile, 
continuing food shortages and widespread food rationing kept the question 
of hunger at the forefront of public debate.62
In the midst of  these concerns and pressures, the census of 1951, the first 
conducted since partition, documented that the country’s population had 
increased by nearly 45 million  people, to 360 million, in the course of a 
de cade.63 This increase, according to census commissioner R. A. Gopala-
swami, was due to the conjuncture of a falling death rate with ongoing 
high birthrates. Although rates of maternal and infant mortality remained 
high— India’s  were among the highest in the world— the number of births 
still outpaced the number of deaths, leading to significant population 
growth. As Gopalaswami suggested in more polemical terms, “improvident 
maternity,” which he defined as births occurring to  women with three or 
more  children, was among the  causes of India’s population increase.64 This 
widely circulated phrase, which was repeated across media and policy cir-
cles, helped to shape a growing consensus among Indian elites that  women’s 
childbearing was to blame for population increase and, in turn, for hunger 
and food scarcity. Targeting the birthrate, and the  women whose supposed 
“improvidence” was its cause, seemed to ofer a solution to India’s (over)
population. The NPC apparently agreed.
When the NPC brought population control into its purview, reproduc-
tive regulation became part of, and furthered, a set of tensions and contra-
dictions within the planning pro cess itself. Broadly speaking, state- directed 
planning negotiated the gap between goals that  were transformational in 
their stated aims but  limited in their policy implementation, which focused 
only on the formal sectors of the economy.65 The rhe toric of socioeconomic 
transformation grew out of the history of Indian nationalism itself, more 
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specifically from debates about the  causes of Indian poverty and “underde-
velopment.” Economic nationalists like Dadabhai Naoroji had long argued 
that the British “drain of wealth” was the chief cause of Indian poverty, and 
this critique of colonial economic policy helped to produce India as a space 
of nationalist governance. Confronting rising popu lar pressures for trans-
formational change, leaders like Nehru drew from this legacy when they 
insisted that a national government— not an imperial one— was best posi-
tioned to bring economic development to its  people. They ofered develop-
ment as an anticolonial answer to the prob lems of empire, and during the 
1930s, the Congress Party staked its legitimacy, in part, upon this promise 
to foster development.66  After in de pen dence, planned development came to 
ofer a rationale for the new, in de pen dent, demo cratic state. Planning both 
represented a reason for the state’s existence and marked its responsi-
bilities  toward its citizens. This insistence that state- led development could 
fulfill the promises of anticolonial strug gle thus underpinned the transfor-
mational rhe toric of postcolonial planning.
Even as the postin de pen dence state remained wedded to  these rhe torics 
of transformation, which Maitrayee Chaudhuri identifies as both socialist 
and feminist, it was “constitutive of social classes whose interests ran  counter 
to  these stated aims.”67 In other words, the state’s upper- caste and upper- 
class composition starkly  limited the kind of transformation that the NPC 
would pursue. Confronting popu lar pressures for change without disavow-
ing elite interests, the Congress regime was forced to negotiate both “elite 
desires for power as well as popu lar desires for emancipation.” This was a 
reflection, as Pranav Jani reminds us, of the “heterogeneous” character of 
Indian anticolonial nationalism during the transitional period around in de-
pen dence.68 Consequently, during the 1940s and 1950s, the state’s planning 
pro cess gestured  toward a vision of demo cratizing development while also 
solidifying its alliance with capital and business interests.  These tensions 
played out within and outside the Congress Party in debates about the pur-
poses and goals of state planning, which  were also debates about the prior-
ity of cap i tal ist economic growth versus any form of demo cratic social 
transformation.69 Ultimately, the planning pro cess negotiated a “twin prob-
lem,” which Partha Chatterjee identifies as the need to secure both the 
accumulation of capital and the po liti cal legitimation of its social costs.70
A program of state- directed  family planning that was aligned with the 
national planning pro cess was perfectly positioned to negotiate this tension. 
 Family planning aimed to address poverty, a central goal of postin de pen-
dence planned development. However, such a program avoided discussion 
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of in equality, thus sidestepping any need to confront elite interests within 
the planning pro cess. Rather than tackling systematic inequalities of land 
owner ship, the disenfranchisement of Dalit and Adivasi populations, or 
the gendered hierarchies within  house holds, it understood reproduction 
as the cause of the prob lem and the site of its solution. Consequently, 
 family planning became a program of poverty alleviation that left hierar-
chies of class, caste, and gender almost entirely unchallenged. This, indeed, 
was the promise of population control in postcolonial India. It was also 
the promise of Indian population planning within a Cold War context. 
Divorced from geopo liti cal critiques of racist immigration policies and 
calls for the freer migration of  people across the globe, an “Indian” program 
of  family planning implicitly promised to contain “India’s” growing popu-
lation within its territorial bound aries. Kamaladevi Chattopadhyay’s anti- 
imperialist reading of world population, which she voiced at the Bombay 
conference, thus dis appeared from its nationalist framing within the First 
Five Year Plan.
 These negotiations between elite and popu lar interests, and between 
globally anti- imperialist and more narrowly nation- bound readings of pop-
ulation, played out in the emerging institutions of  family planning and 
their relationship to the or ga nized  women’s movement. For instance, the 
caste- class composition of the state  shaped  women’s access to the levers of 
state power and to the planning pro cess itself. The largely middle- and 
upper- class members of the or ga nized  women’s movement, as we have seen, 
 were able to transition into positions within the state bureaucracy and to 
bring their case for  family planning directly to the NPC’s attention. This 
included not only Rama Rau and Wadia, but also NPC member Durgabai 
Deshmukh and in de pen dent India’s first minister of health, Rajkumari 
Amrit Kaur. The planning pro cess potentially amplified their voices, since 
the composition and structure of the NPC and its vari ous advisory boards 
elevated the recommendations of bureaucratic and technocratic “experts” 
at the expense of ordinary citizens in charting the directions of social and 
economic change. Meanwhile, Wadia and Rama Rau’s repeated insistence 
that “voluntary organ izations” must play an essential role in bringing  family 
planning to ordinary  people further solidified the mediating role of the 
FPAI, the AIWC, and their cadre of middle- class  women volunteers. Within 
this institutional framework, the stage was set for the NPC to pioneer a 
top- down approach to  family planning that would mobilize the nation’s 
elites— including its elite  women—to provide a “ser vice” to its subalterns 
by bringing them technologies of birth control. As we know, this claim to 
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serve impoverished  women had been a pillar of the AIWC’s contraceptive 
advocacy during the 1930s. By the 1950s, this motivation became folded 
into the state’s development agenda and made  family planning a compo-
nent of social ser vice and social welfare. I discuss the po liti cal implications 
of this model of middle- class ser vice further in the next chapter.
For now, I focus on  family planning’s promise to alleviate poverty 
without addressing in equality. This claim rested upon long- standing 
neo- Malthusian foundations, which tended to blame poverty on the over-
reproduction of the poor. However, by the mid- twentieth  century,  family 
planners also began to situate their arguments within a new intellectual 
paradigm: the theory of the demographic transition. Beginning in the late 
1940s, the first generation of American academic demographers, most 
notably Kingsley Davis and Frank Notestein, outlined a sequence of steps 
that all socie ties would ostensibly take on a common road to moderniza-
tion. At first, industrializing socie ties would reduce their death rates while 
birthrates remained high; this would lead to population growth. However, 
as a society reached “socioeconomic maturity,”  people’s values would shift 
 toward limiting their families, and birthrates would eventually fall, lead-
ing to a stabilization of the population. All modernizing socie ties would 
pass through this moment of demographic transition. From a population 
control perspective, the question was how quickly such a transition would 
occur within any given society. However, academic demographers noted a 
prob lem when applying theories of demographic transition to the former 
colonies. They argued that unlike in Eu rope, where falling death rates had 
led to concurrent declines in birthrates, in Asia and Africa death rates 
had fallen well in advance of the socioeconomic changes that would lead to 
lower fertility. Therefore, countries like India  were stuck in a position of 
lower death rates but ongoing high birthrates, leading to rapid population 
growth. Further, they theorized that in the “Third World,” unlike in the 
Eu ro pean and American past, population growth and its associated prob-
lems would prevent the “modernization” necessary for shifting social atti-
tudes  toward childbearing.71
Therefore, in the eyes of demographic transition theorists, India was 
mired in a demographic trap. Its death rates had fallen far in advance of 
social attitudes that would limit birthrates; at the same time, its burgeon-
ing population would prevent the economic development that might prompt 
 people to limit the size of their families. In response to this perceived 
prob lem, scholars who applied demographic transition theory to explain 
a transition  after the fact in Eu rope made the theoretical apparatus 
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prescriptive in India, as in other parts of Asia and Africa. As Karl Ittmann 
argues, the result was “an emphasis on increasing access to contraception 
rather than waiting for social change to generate fertility decline.”72 Birth 
control, in short, was the spark necessary to produce a demographic tran-
sition outside of Eu rope and the United States. Demographic transition 
theory thus ofered a new promise. The countries of Asia and Africa could 
modernize their economies by regulating how their populations reproduced. 
They could circumvent the prob lems of poverty and in equality— produced 
in part by their “stalled transition” to low birthrates—by convincing  people 
to limit their childbearing by using contraception.
The NPC latched onto this promise of a “demographic progression to 
modernity.”73 The First Plan document noted an imbalance between fall-
ing death rates and ongoing high birthrates, thus situating India within an 
early, pretransition phase of demographic development. However, the plan-
ners noted, any attempt to rebalance birth and death rates would confront 
a further prob lem. Birthrates might come down “as a result of improvements 
in the standards of living,” such that a wealthier population might produce 
fewer  children. Yet “such improvements are not likely to materialize if  there 
is a concurrent increase of population.” For the planning commissioners, 
this was India’s demographic trap in a nutshell: a vicious cycle encouraged 
poor  people to have many  children, which in turn led to their further impov-
erishment, which again increased their fertility. State- led population plan-
ning could extricate India from this demographic quagmire. This was a 
necessary component of the development process—or, in the Plan’s terms, 
“Population control can be achieved only by the reduction of the birth rate 
to the extent necessary to stabilize population at a level consistent with the 
requirements of national economy.”74 In this way, the First Plan made pop-
ulation a manipulable component of its economic plans; stabilizing popu-
lation growth through state- led planning would enable the government to 
reach its development goals.
The NPC situated its quest to stabilize population within the state’s pro-
grams for health. Planning for health, like the pro cess of planned develop-
ment overall, negotiated multiple and competing claims during this 
transitional period. Within the transformational rhe torics of state- led plan-
ning, health was represented as a basic  human right. Long denied by the 
colonial state, it became the responsibility of the postin de pen dence regime. 
With the creation of the WHO, health could also serve as a site of interna-
tionalist aspiration, a universal  human right that set the  peoples of the 
formerly colonized world on equal footing with their former colonizers. 
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Yet, as Sunil Amrith reminds us,  these universalist and rights- based rhe-
torics of health existed si mul ta neously with state planners’ drive for health 
interventions that would improve the Indian “race” and make it more effi-
cient and governable. This approach to health meshed with long- standing 
elite concerns about racial and caste purity and degeneration and prom-
ised to contain the supposed threat of lower- caste reproduction. Conse-
quently, state intervention in health stemmed at once “from an egalitarian 
commitment to welfare, and a far- from- egalitarian fear of the rising num-
bers of the lower castes.”75
 Family planning again served to bridge the gap. It promised to improve 
the health of impoverished  mothers and their  children and also to contain 
and regulate their reproduction. This was the ground upon which health 
expenditures for  family planning became a critical component of economic 
development: “[Stabilization of population] can be secured only by the real-
ization of the need for  family limitation on a wide scale by the  people. The 
main appeal for  family planning is based on considerations of the health 
and welfare of the  family.  Family limitation or spacing of the  children is 
necessary and desirable in order to secure better health for the  mother and 
better care and upbringing of the  children. Mea sures directed to this end 
should, therefore, form part of the public health programme.”76 The goal 
 here is economic development via stabilizing population growth. However, 
its appeal is health. That is, the  people of India would not simply come to a 
“realization of the need for  family limitation” based on the state’s develop-
ment goals. Instead, they would become more governable— more willing to 
submit themselves to the state’s development regime— when they saw its 
health benefits.  Family planning was thus a component of the universaliz-
ing drive for health as a basic  human right; it could serve the goals of improving 
the welfare of  children,  mothers, and their families. At the same time, it 
was also a means to promote the hegemonic claims of state- led planning; 
it could persuade the “ people” of the legitimacy of development and, by 
extension, of the state itself.
The NPC’s rhe torics of  family planning as a component of  women’s and 
 children’s health precisely echoed a long- standing argument of the  women’s 
movement. From Rajwade’s first birth control resolution in the AIWC to 
the WRPE report to Rama Rau’s claims that the sufering  women of the 
Bombay tenements had inspired the creation of the FPAI, feminist  women 
had promoted health as a critical rationale for birth control. In this, they 
joined  women like Margaret Sanger— and even Annie Besant before her— 
who emphasized  mothers’ corporeal sufering and declining health to argue 
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that birth control was a  woman’s right. In fact, as we have seen,  women’s 
movements  were impor tant in making health a priority within dominant 
neo- Malthusian and eugenicist frameworks of contraceptive advocacy. They 
had also negotiated this health right as a component of development, thus 
merging its egalitarian and inegalitarian aspects, well before Indian in de-
pen dence. The First Five Year Plan  adopted and intensified this language.
Even while situating its  family planning bud get within  these transfor-
mational rhe torics of health, the NPC was far from certain about how such 
funding should be used. The allocation called for collecting information 
about public attitudes  toward fertility regulation, as well as conducting field 
experiments on the efectiveness of  family planning programs. But it did 
not specify which methods of fertility regulation would be studied. The gov-
ernment turned, first, to the rhythm method, preferred by minister of 
health Rajkumari Amrit Kaur. Amrit Kaur was a member of the princely 
 family of Kapurthala in Punjab whose  father had converted from Sikhism 
to Catholicism. A close associate of Gandhi’s as a well as a former president 
of the AIWC, she brought to the Health Ministry a Gandhian commitment 
to public health alongside an interest in promoting “mea sures for  family 
limitation so as to make some adjustment between the number of  people 
and the resources that are available to them.”77 Perhaps she believed that 
the rhythm method could meet all  these needs, especially since it was the 
only method that Gandhi had eventually endorsed— albeit with reluctance— 
during his discussions with Margaret Sanger.
Alongside  others in the government, Amrit Kaur likely shared the view 
that rhythm was a culturally appropriate form in India  because it could 
draw upon existing sexual norms about periodic abstinence within hetero-
sexual marriage.78 Moreover, it would cost nothing, another impor tant 
 factor in the drive to find an appropriate contraceptive method that was 
accessible to all  people. Taken together,  these apparent benefits propelled 
the rhythm method to the forefront of the government’s initial foray into 
 family planning. In 1951, the same year the draft Five Year Plan was first 
announced, the government invited the WHO to conduct a pi lot proj ect on 
the rhythm method in India.79 This initiative situated  family planning and 
population control firmly within the field of international public health and 
thus aligned with the Plan’s broader organ ization and vision.
The WHO sent Dr. Abraham Stone, a physician and medical researcher 
who headed the Margaret Sanger Research Bureau in New York. Stone was 
directed to center his investigations on rhythm, and alongside a small team 
of investigators, he pi loted studies in one urban area (in Lodi in Delhi), and 
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in one rural one (in Ramnagaram in the state of Mysore). Stone had already 
been studying the rhythm method in New York, and in India he and his 
team devised a way that  women could keep track of “safe” and “unsafe” days 
for sexual intercourse by using a string of beads of dif er ent colors and 
shapes.80 They would move one bead each day to keep track of their men-
strual cycles. Stone’s team tried several designs in order to make the bead 
necklace workable, eventually incorporating a safety catch to avoid any con-
fusion about which direction to move the beads. Other barriers, however, 
proved more difficult to overcome. Reports soon surfaced that some  women 
and men believed that simply owning or wearing the necklace had contra-
ceptive efects;  others believed that the beads  violated their privacy, since it 
marked their menstrual cycle in public.81  Couples soon began to drop out 
of the study, and it eventually ended with  little success.82 This marked the 
end of the WHO’s investigations in India since, in 1952, opposition from 
several member states led the organ ization to withdraw from the field of 
 family planning.83
The Indian government’s short- lived experiment with the rhythm 
method should remind us that during the early 1950s, despite the state’s 
rapid movement  toward population control, the course of its planning pro-
gram had still not taken shape. Multiple ideas about the directions of  family 
planning, and its relationship to contraceptive technology and reproduc-
tive sexuality,  were still in contestation. In the case of the WHO study, this 
contest pitted Amrit Kaur against her former colleagues and associates in 
the AIWC and in the FPAI. Although she seemed committed to the rhythm 
method, the AIWC denounced Stone’s study as a waste of state funds, and 
its members ofered to use the money themselves in order to conduct more 
useful studies of contraceptive methods.84 Dhanvanthi Rama Rau was 
suspicious about the efectiveness of rhythm, especially among India’s 
largely illiterate population. When Stone stayed with her in Bombay in 
1951, she took the opportunity to express her frustrations directly: “I also 
told him that a number of us felt that he would be undermining the work 
we had been  doing” by seeming to advocate a “Safe Period theory in prefer-
ence to contraceptives.”85 Other FPAI members, notably A. P. Pillay and 
R. D. Karve, challenged rhythm’s efectiveness and the ability of ordinary 
 women to calculate their safe days properly.86 Meanwhile, the FPAI and its 
vari ous branches continued to seek other methods, including the contra-
ceptive sponges designed by Marie Stopes.87 Challenging Amrit Kaur and 
the Indian government’s endorsement, therefore, a growing network of 
AIWC and FPAI members did not believe that the rhythm method aligned 
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with the goal of bringing scientific expertise to the dissemination of  family 
planning.88 This divide was vis i ble at the international conference in Bom-
bay, which Amrit Kaur— despite her position as health minister and stated 
commitment to controlling population— refused to support.89
However, the Indian government would soon move  toward other tech-
nologies of birth control. Longer lasting was the First Five Year Plan’s trans-
formational rhe toric, which linked  family planning to maternal and infant 
welfare and to a vision of universal public health and demo cratizing devel-
opment more broadly. Alongside this set of rhetorical claims, as we have 
seen, reproductive regulation claimed to address poverty without challeng-
ing existing inequalities. This too, was a legacy of the First Plan’s vision of 
 family planning within its national development regime.
Conclusion
Looking back from the mid-1950s, just a few years  after the creation of the 
FPAI, Dhanvanthi Rama Rau and her colleagues in the organ ization may 
well have found reason for satisfaction. The FPAI was a growing organ-
ization that had begun to expand from its Bombay headquarters to other 
parts of the country, all the while working closely with the Indian govern-
ment. Meanwhile, via the First Five Year Plan, the government had  adopted 
the princi ple that population control was a vehicle for national development 
and had targeted contraception as a means to control population growth. 
Moreover,  family planners in India  were increasingly connected to a trans-
national population establishment, and the FPAI had become a constitu-
ent member of the IPPF. Within this transnational arena, the broad 
frameworks of neo- Malthusianism and the more specific analy sis of demo-
graphic transition theorists helped to link birth control to economic devel-
opment and modernization in the “Third World.” India was not merely a 
site to enact  these ideologies but was crucial to shaping the directions of the 
global movement. Rama Rau’s vision from the tenements of Bombay—in 
which she insisted that contraception was necessary to save both  women 
and the nation— seemed on the verge of fulfillment.
As we have seen, the or ga nized  women’s movement helped to shape the 
direction of  these momentous events. During the transitional years sur-
rounding in de pen dence, the AIWC’s institutional networks served to 
recruit and or ga nize the first generation of  women  family planners and 
connected Indian eforts to an emergent transnational population control 
movement. Feminist legacies  were impor tant to the discourses and rationales 
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of  family planning as well. Rama Rau and the FPAI drew upon the AIWC’s 
long- standing argument that  family planning was a  women’s issue. In the 
aftermath of in de pen dence, both the FPAI and the AIWC suggested that 
 family planning could serve as a national response to the “ women’s ques-
tion” by linking  women’s development to the nation. Recognizing a 
growing concern about population among Indian development planners, 
FPAI and AIWC leaders successfully linked  family planning to population 
control, and argued that  family planning centered primarily on  women. 
Rama Rau and the FPAI’s connection to Sanger helped to advance  these 
claims in transnational contexts as well.
The success of feminist  women’s eforts depended upon alliances with 
many  others— from demographers to eugenicists, physicians to planners— 
who pushed for population control as a vehicle for national (and “Third 
World”) development. The result, as some historians suggest, brought 
together “strange bedfellows” in both national and transnational campaigns 
for  family planning.90 Yet perhaps  these links  were not entirely strange, 
given the  women’s movement’s power ful commitment to India’s emerging 
development regime. While drawing upon their feminist credentials and 
highlighting the centrality of  women, Rama Rau, Wadia, Deshmukh, 
Rajwade, and other  family planners nevertheless advanced an agenda that 
was less interested in addressing gender in equality than in bringing  women’s 
reproduction into the purview of state- led development. By positioning 
 women in this way,  family planners helped to advance the promise of state- 
led  family planning to alleviate poverty without grappling with inequali-
ties of gender, class, or caste. Indeed, feminism’s connection to  family 
planning rested less upon its claim to challenge patriarchy or  women’s sub-
ordination than its claim to bring poor  women’s reproductive lives more 
firmly into the embrace of the development state.
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Chapter 4
REGUL ATING REPRODUCTION IN THE ERA OF  
THE PL ANETARY “POPUL ATION BOMB”
For two days in June  1960, S.  K. Khan visited villages in 
Naini Tal to spread the message of  family planning. As an honorary  family 
planning education leader, Khan had been appointed by the Indian gov-
ernment to “mobilize public opinion and form a network of voluntary 
groups” to support state population control eforts.1 With  these goals in 
mind and accompanied by a “Lady Social Worker,” she visited ten  houses 
in the village of Mahomedpur, where she “spoke to the  women and told 
them what  Family Planning was.” Khan had hoped to reach a wider audi-
ence of  women, but “it was not pos si ble to hold a meeting  there as the rumour 
had been spread that the  Family Planning  people would give injections and 
stop  children being born completely.  There was a certain amount of antag-
onism in this village, and I had to explain to the  women what we stood 
for.”2 Stymied by  these obstacles, the honorary  family planning education 
leader left Mahomedpur, presumably disappointed by the prospects for 
 family planning in the village.
Khan’s experience with the  women of Mahomedpur represents one of 
many such encounters between the messengers of  family planning and their 
intended targets. Their message— what Khan and her colleagues “stood 
for”— linked reproductive regulation to national development. The targets 
of this message  were often  women, and like in Khan’s Mahomedpur ven-
tures, they  were  imagined to be ignorant of contraceptive technologies and 
unwilling to regulate their fertility. The discourses of  family planning rep-
resented their reproduction as a threat to the nation and aimed to contain 
their fertility to defuse an explosion of population growth. Thus, the  women 
of Mahomedpur, like their counter parts across India,  were tasked with 
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regulating their bodies and reproductive capacities to align with the 
demographic goals of the postcolonial state.  Family planners expected 
 women to accept a range of interventions to meet  these goals: attending pub-
lic meetings and being lectured by strangers on the virtues of birth control, 
visiting clinics and subjecting their bodies to new contraceptive technolo-
gies, and ultimately limiting their childbearing to two or three  children.
 Family planners understood their targets as reproductive subjects whose 
primary contribution to state- led development was limiting their fertility. 
They separated biological reproduction from other aspects of  women’s lives 
and made it the point of  women’s entry into development programs. Within 
the field of health specifically,  family planning programs delinked contra-
ception from maternal and child health and funded the former at the 
expense of the latter.  These priorities  shaped day- to- day interactions, such 
as Khan’s meetings in Mahomedpur. Like her colleagues, Khan encountered 
 women solely in order to discourage their reproduction, with  little regard 
for the circumstances or needs that might prompt them to bear  children. 
With no mandate to support their strug gles to raise the  children they already 
had, or to address any other aspect of  women’s lives,  family planners like 
Khan simply explained that they “stood for” contraception as a means to 
serve national development goals.
While the  women of Mahomedpur thus encountered the state’s devel-
opment agenda through their reproductive bodies,  women like Khan dem-
onstrated their commitment to development diferently. By claiming to 
bring the message of  family planning to impoverished rural and urban 
 women, middle- class  family planners like Khan became mediators between 
the state’s development goals and its intended targets. Yet, as the Mahomedpur 
 women’s unwillingness to attend a public meeting suggests, this mediation 
was far from smooth.  Women sometimes ignored, refused, or reinterpreted 
the  family planner’s message. They ascribed dif er ent meanings to their 
reproductive lives— meanings that did not hinge on the supposed threat 
posed by their bodies or by the explosive growth of population. In par tic u-
lar,  women who did not fit within the bound aries of normative citizenship, 
which was marked as upper caste, Hindu, and  middle class, found their 
reproduction to be doubly or triply stigmatized. Their encounters with 
 family planners negotiated this stigma while ofering alternative under-
standings of their bodies, families, and lives.
This chapter investigates a history of reproductive politics during an era 
of increasing anxiety about population from the 1950s to the 1970s. I begin 
in 1952, with the Indian government’s official embrace of  family planning 
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in the First Five Year Plan. Successive Five Year Plans increased the fund-
ing for  family planning while vastly expanding its ambitions. A growing 
number of workers, both volunteer and paid, took on the task of spreading 
contraceptives to the masses. Numerical targets for contraceptive use, along-
side financial incentives for  family planning “acceptors” and “motivators,” 
became the hallmarks of India’s emergent  family planning bureaucracy. By 
the 1960s, crises of development, failures in food production, and concerns 
about national security had all combined to make “overpopulation” a site 
of heightened anxiety. Growing fears of a “population bomb,” with its epi-
center in South Asia, haunted the public imagination in both India and the 
West. Within India, this fueled the targeting of lower- caste, lower- class, and 
Adivasi  women in desperate attempts to curtail their reproduction. In the 
West, racialized discourses marked black and brown  women’s bodies as 
responsible for global overpopulation. This urgency continued into the 
1970s, when it was punctuated by the Emergency, a period from 1975 to 1977 
when the mechanisms of parliamentary democracy  were suspended by 
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The Emergency remains the most widely 
known and infamous chapter in India’s  family planning history, in part 
 because it marked a temporary shift  toward men’s bodies as the grounds 
for fighting a war on population. However, although it is often assumed to 
be a historical aberration3— both in Indian democracy and in  family 
planning— the Emergency also represented a culmination of the logic of 
reproductive regulation that had taken shape across the postin de pen dence 
de cades. This chapter thus situates the turn to men during the Emergency 
in relation to the logics and institutions that had long connected  women’s 
reproduction to population and economy.
India’s scaled-up ambitions for  family planning during this era depended, 
in part, upon new contraceptive technologies that enabled more absolute 
control over reproduction. The methods available in the 1950s  were largely 
the same as  those of  earlier de cades. Even in 1960, when Khan visited 
Mahomedpur, she would have spoken of contraceptive foams, jellies, and 
sponges, and possibly pessaries or diaphragms for  women who could visit 
a physician. Just a few years  later, the birth control pill, the intrauterine con-
traceptive device (IUD or IUCD), and the widespread use of surgical ster-
ilization had changed the contraceptive landscape, both in India and 
globally. While  these new technologies could enable  people to control their 
own fertility more efectively than ever before, they also opened the door to 
more intensive modes of reproductive regulation by population controllers. 
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As we  shall see, they also helped to position  women’s bodies as the figura-
tive fuse of the “population bomb.”
Consequently, while visits like Khan’s to Mahomedpur aimed to teach 
 women about contraception, their goals  were also broader. As  women’s 
reproductive bodies became a site to enact development plans, the history 
of reproduction became thoroughly implicated in the history of postcolo-
nial development. Contraceptive technologies  were the means to make this 
link, quite literally connecting individual bodies to development goals. This 
chapter traces  these close intersections between birth control and the inti-
mate regulation of bodies, and between the fears of a “population explo-
sion” and the emphasis on reproduction in India’s development regime. I 
begin with the institutionalization of  family planning during the 1950s and 
early 1960s. Although this period is sometimes overlooked in histories that 
focus on the more aggressive population control campaigns of  later de cades, 
the  earlier years  were central in bringing middle- class  women—as  family 
planners— into the state’s development agenda, and in situating poor and 
working- class  women as their targets. This targeting would intensify in the 
 later 1960s, as Western funders and Indian government priorities aligned 
to make population control a focal point of Indian development, and 
 women’s bodies became the grounds to enact this development agenda. The 
chapter concludes with the intersection of surgical sterilization with states 
of emergency in the 1970s, examining the changing assumptions— about 
both gender and development— that underpinned reproductive politics in 
this era.
Targeting  Women for  Family Planning
The First Five Year Plan centered its implementation of  family planning on 
 women. It called for middle- class  women volunteers to meet  family plan-
ning goals and situated subaltern  women as their targets.4 Following middle- 
class assumptions about  women’s dependent roles in both  family and 
economy, the planning commissioners largely ignored peasant and working- 
class  women as producers and mentioned them primarily as recipients of 
social welfare. Si mul ta neously, the document distanced the state from such 
welfare activities, noting that “the main burden of or ga nized activities for 
the welfare of  women is to a large extent borne by voluntary agencies” rather 
than by central or state governments directly.5  Family planning, alongside 
maternal and child health more broadly, thus came to occupy a space 
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between state control and the work of voluntary actors and organ izations. 
As I argue, this approach opened up a new field of national activity for 
middle- class  women, who claimed it was their right and responsibility to 
bring contraceptive information and technology to their needier “ sisters.” 
Through their work in  family planning, they argued,  women volunteers 
could bring the promise of development to poor and working- class  women 
and si mul ta neously solidify their own position as dutiful citizens of the new 
nation. To make this claim to citizenship and development, middle- class 
 family planners depended upon subaltern  women to receive their welfare 
ser vices. However, as their accounts reveal,  family planners who visited vil-
lages, or ga nized public meetings, or ran birth control clinics often encoun-
tered  women who questioned, ignored, or refused their ser vices; sometimes, 
 women asked for entirely dif er ent means of welfare support for themselves 
and their families. The result was a sometimes tense negotiation between 
the middle- class  family planners who claimed to serve both  women and the 
nation and the subaltern  women who rejected that ser vice.
The institutional structure of  family planning, which combined state 
direction with  women’s voluntary work, was prompted in part by the eforts 
of Durgabai Deshmukh. A former AIWC president and activist in the free-
dom strug gle, Deshmukh was the only  woman member of the NPC that 
drafted the First Five Year Plan. Appointed to the commission  after much 
of its work had already been completed, Deshmukh soon recognized that 
the commissioners had allocated no bud get for “social welfare,” which she 
defined as “ser vices intended for individuals and groups in need of special 
attention,” including  women.6 To remedy this, Deshmukh lobbied the other 
commissioners— including her  future husband, C. D. Deshmukh—to cre-
ate the Central Social Welfare Board (CSWB), a largely autonomous body 
tasked with coordinating collaboration between the state and nongovern-
mental or voluntary organ izations. The government approved the creation 
of the CSWB in 1953, with Deshmukh at its head and a bud get of 40 mil-
lion rupees, including 6 million devoted to  family planning.7 By the Sec-
ond Five Year Plan (1956 to 1961), a focus on  women as targets of social 
welfare was further entrenched, as activities supporting  women  were located 
entirely  under the CSWB. Health was among  these “welfare” activities, and 
 here the focus was on “ family planning and other supporting programmes 
for raising the standard of health of the  people.”8
Deshmukh encouraged  women’s organ izations to take up  family plan-
ning and channeled most of the CSWB’s initial  family planning bud get to 
 these groups.9 In an address to the AIWC, she noted that “ women workers 
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have been invited” by the government to propose mea sures for  family 
planning and called upon the organ ization to prioritize its eforts in this 
direction. AIWC leadership evidently agreed, determining that they should 
“focus on collaborating with the Planning Commission,” including on 
 family planning.10  These commitments prompted a spurt of activity centered 
on birth control clinics and propaganda, which figured the middle- class 
 woman volunteer as a mediator between the state’s population control goals 
and its  women targets. For example, in Bombay, AIWC members supported 
the FPAI’s newly established birth control clinic. One of the AIWC’s vol-
unteer workers, Shanta Navkal, spoke to meetings in the “poor areas” of 
greater Bombay to encourage  people to adopt contraceptive methods.11 
Many other branches similarly did “outreach” work on birth control. 
According to the AIWC’s Annual Report for 1953, for instance, the Mysore 
branch sent one  woman volunteer to address  women’s gatherings in Ban-
galore, Bhadravathi, and the Kolar Gold Fields on  family planning. The 
Madras branch conducted outreach work in the city while collaborating 
with the city corporation to start  family planning clinics in hospitals. In 
Delhi, the AIWC worked to include three  family planning clinics in munic-
ipal health centers and ofered advice on birth spacing and on preventing 
 children on medical and “eco nom ical grounds.” According to the South 
Madhya Pradesh branch, eight “lady doctors” had opened  family planning 
clinics “at the instance of the branch,” while in the Madhya Bharat branch 
another doctor had attended trainings at the Planned Parenthood confer-
ence in Bombay.12 The FPAI was even more active in  these clinical and pro-
paganda eforts. As Avabai Wadia reported in 1959, the FPAI had opened 
twenty- two branches across India, many of which supported clinics and 
held “educational meetings” to promote contraceptive use. The organ ization 
also expanded its Bombay clinic to include several branches and opened a 
supplies department to send contraceptives to “welfare clinics” around the 
country.13 While  these eforts  were on a small scale, they testify to the impor-
tance of middle- class  women workers in staffing the new  family planning 
regime, and in marking it as a domain for  women volunteers.
Among  these volunteers  were the honorary  family planning education 
leaders, who  were appointed by the state to support outreach and voluntary 
eforts in  family planning. The government drew upon organ izations like 
the FPAI and AIWC to select  these voluntary workers, who  were tasked with 
spreading information about birth control. Among them was Padmini Sen-
gupta, a writer and CSWB member, who lamented that “constant breeding 
and care of  children make  women unfit to become intelligent members of 
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an active society.”14 She reported to the AIWC about her activities in West 
Bengal in 1959. Sengupta met with jute- mill workers and sweepers in the 
“slum of Barrackpore”; she also appointed a number of  women  family plan-
ning educators to continue outreach proj ects.15 Her colleague K. Meenakshi 
Amma, honorary  family planning education leader for Kerala, reported 
that in April 1960 she held group meetings at Kozhencherry, Kummannoor, 
and Kottayam. She also visited fifty  houses, formed a voluntary corps for 
 family planning at a social welfare center in Kummannoor, addressed a 
meeting of  women’s organ izations, and inaugurated a  family planning camp 
of three hundred  women and one hundred men.16 Similarly, Prem Lata 
Gupta of Andhra Pradesh addressed numerous meetings in Hyderabad 
and in rural areas.17 Other volunteer workers, including  women who  were 
not officially appointed  family planning education leaders, engaged in 
similar tasks. For instance, Krishna Agarwal of the AIWC worked in the 
Indore region. Since her husband was a doctor, Agarwal claimed she had 
a greater “connection with the  people.” In a pi lot proj ect with the FPAI, she 
worked with four clinics in a “slum area” inhabited by five hundred mill 
families; she also addressed a meeting of Ayurvedic medical prac ti tion ers 
about the “Need of  Family Planning and Psychological Efects of It on a 
Family.”18
 These accounts do not represent volunteer  family planning workers as 
requiring specific training or expertise. Instead, literacy and an understand-
ing of the purposes and mechanisms of birth control  were the implicit 
qualifications. Perhaps most impor tant, as Agarwal suggests, was the abil-
ity to forge a “connection” to the targets of  family planning— figured  here 
 either as rural populations or as the working- class inhabitants of urban 
“slum” neighborhoods. As such, volunteer  family planning work opened up 
a potentially vast terrain of activity for literate middle- class  women, who 
 were assumed to be familiar with birth control in their own lives and to have 
the requisite understanding of national development goals and population 
policy. Moreover,  these middle- class  women— with their ostensible connec-
tion to their poorer  sisters— could bridge the gap between the state’s devel-
opment agenda and the ordinary  women whose childbearing decisions 
would shape the timing and extent of a modernizing demographic transi-
tion. Thus, while elite  women with connections to government like Dhan-
vanthi Rama Rau and Deshmukh engaged with  family planning at the level 
of policy,  there  were many more educated, literate  women— often the wives 
and  daughters of doctors,  lawyers, professors, and  others— who made the 
case for birth control in homes and neighborhoods.
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Eventually, as the scope and goals of the  family planning bureaucracy 
became more ambitious, paid workers began to join the volunteers. For 
instance, the FPAI reported that while “voluntary members” continued 
 family planning outreach, in 1961 the organ ization hired a full- time “trained 
social worker, Mrs. Pramila Thakore, BA.” Thakore was tasked to conduct 
an “educational programme of meetings, lectures, film shows,  etc. for audi-
ences drawn mainly from the lower income groups.” In her first year in her 
position, Thakore ran 349 meetings with a total attendance of more than 
73,000  people, both in the city of Bombay and in the outskirts and rural 
areas, using the FPAI’s mobile unit.19 Alongside social workers like Thakore, 
the “lady doctor” was another critical paid worker in the  family planning 
bureaucracy. Both the government and private organ izations lamented the 
scarcity of  women medical prac ti tion ers and sought them to staf clinics.20
 Whether volunteer or paid,  family planning workers claimed a gendered 
sphere of activity. So long as subaltern  women  were the targets of reproduc-
tive regulation, literate, middle- class  woman volunteers and paid social 
workers and doctors  were essential mediators between  these  women and the 
state. Thus, according to Prem Lata Gupta, who was then president of the 
Andhra Pradesh branch of the FPAI,  women’s voluntary ser vice would 
bridge the gap between the goals of national development— which required 
the “control of population”— and the “welfare of the individual and the 
 family [in which]  women can and have to play the most vital and intimate 
role.”21  Women volunteers could explain to other  women the benefits and 
methods of  family limitation, thus “educating them properly” into appro-
priate reproductive roles. AIWC members insisted that  these eforts to 
spread the message of  family planning ultimately benefited poor  women 
and, indeed, “would usher in a new age for the  women of India. . . .  Instead 
of merely slaving in the name of  family, love, wifehood and motherhood, 
 women gain better health, self re spect and leisure.”22
Yet, as  women volunteers reminded themselves, poor  women could never 
gain  these benefits through their own eforts but required the gendered ser-
vice of middle- class  family planners. As Dr.  Aleyamma George of the 
AIWC argued:
Honestly speaking the educated and well- to-do class need not require any 
advice at all. . . .  But it is in the slum areas among the poorer classes that 
this message has to be spread. We have seen  women with  bitter tears 
coming to us and talking to us about their miserable lives. They are not 
able to give proper clothing for their  children. . . .  It [ family planning] is 
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 really an uplift of the population. We are trying to bring them to a certain 
standard which is not the animal standard, if I may be excused such a 
word.23
George’s comments demarcate two groups of  women:  those whose duty is 
to serve by ofering  family planning advice and  those in need of social wel-
fare mea sures to control their reproduction. This focus on ser vice had a long 
history in the Indian  women’s movement, which was deeply influenced by 
Gandhian thought. It enabled Indian feminists to argue that their move-
ment was not solely a middle- class proj ect, even though most activists came 
from middle- class backgrounds. Rather, through a commitment to serving 
poor  women, the  women’s movement advanced its claim to represent all 
Indian  women—an argument first made during the during the interwar 
years.24 Moreover, as Emily Rook- Koepsel has shown, this appeal to ser vice 
had broad resonance in Indian society, where diferences of caste, religion, 
class, and gender posed apparent barriers to claims of national unity and 
connection.25  Family planning, by linking the volunteer worker to her tar-
get of ser vice, claimed to surmount  these barriers.
However, Gandhian ideals of ser vice required not only a volunteer to 
provide ser vice but also a needy target who would receive and accept that 
ser vice.26 A few  family planners emphasized this grateful receipt of ser vices, 
as in the case of an AIWC worker in Belgaum, who claimed that “village 
 women  were very keen to know the methods and also they demanded the 
means for  Family Planning.”27 Yet many other AIWC and FPAI workers 
reported a tremendous gap between the  family planner and the intended 
recipients of her message. Consider for example the eforts of Visakha Dixit, 
the AIWC’s member in charge of  family planning in Madhya Pradesh, who 
convened a meeting of village  women in Sanver, in Indore District, to 
explain the “importance of  family planning.” About eighty  women attended, 
and Dixit “had personal talks with them about their health prob lems.” How-
ever, she concluded glumly, “ there was very  little response to  family plan-
ning. Mostly the  women seemed to be against it.”28
Dixit’s AIWC colleague in West Bengal, Aroti Dutt, confronted addi-
tional difficulties when working in the Darjeeling District. She was unable 
to arrange any large meetings due to bad weather and was reduced to speak-
ing only to smaller groups of  women. Moreover, as a native Bengali speaker, 
Dutt found it difficult to communicate with her targeted audience. She wrote 
that it was “impor tant to know the local language Nepali to be able to speak 
to the  women directly,” and she de cided to learn the language before visiting 
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Darjeeling again in six months.29 Both Dutt and Dixit voice an anxiety that 
the targets of their ser vice are uninterested in what they have to ofer and 
may even be actively opposed. Representing  family planning as a form of 
“ser vice” to such unwilling and uninterested  women became a deeply prob-
lematic exercise, and  family planners’ reports reveal a tense negotiation, 
justifying their eforts while grappling with  limited and inadequate results.
On occasion, some  family planning workers expressed frustration with 
the intended recipients of their ser vices. This was especially the case when 
the targets  were marked as religiously dif er ent and “other” from the  family 
planner herself. Thus, for instance, Meenakshi Amma reported on her visit 
to fifty  houses in two “backward wards” of Mulanthara and Kummannoor: 
“The Muslim section of the population, I found, could not be convinced 
about the necessity of birth control, though they are in most urgent need 
of it. In one of the  houses, the owner Alipillai, aged fifty and  father of four-
teen healthy  children ranging from 23 years to ten months, wanted to know 
 whether the Central Government would give him any aid or grant for bring-
ing up and educating them.”30 Meenakshi Amma does not recount her 
response to Alipillai’s query, and its inclusion in her report was perhaps 
meant to suggest its impossibility—or even absurdity— rather than to dis-
cuss his request for state support. Moreover, her emphasis that Alipillai was 
part of the “Muslim section of the population” draws upon communal dis-
course about the diferential fertility of Muslims and Hindus and the sup-
posed national dangers posed by Muslim reproduction. Her mentioning 
Alipillai’s fourteen  children further fuels Hindu anx i eties about Muslim 
population growth. At the same time, her comments mark the vast difer-
ence between the  family planner as a rational, implicitly Hindu, normative 
citizen in ser vice to the state, and the nation’s problematic “ others,” who 
perversely refuse such ser vice despite its ostensible personal and national 
benefits.
However, most  family planners’ reports did not emphasize religious or 
caste diferences in such explicit ways. They  were more guarded in their lan-
guage, leaving the diferences and hierarchies between the provider and 
recipient of ser vice implicit when referencing the “slum  women” or “back-
ward” areas in which they served. On rare occasions, they spoke about the 
class diferences that made it difficult for middle- class  women to gain the 
trust of poor  women, especially on  matters of sexuality and reproduction. 
The  family planner from Belgaum, for instance, acknowledged that the 
“villa gers . . .  at first felt shy” but eventually discussed the subject with her. 
 Because they  were “not ready” to attend government dispensaries and 
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hospitals, she herself began to carry and distribute contraceptives.31 The 
most direct recognition of the limitations in the  family planner’s mediation 
came from Hem Sanwal, a physician and  family planning education leader 
in Uttar Pradesh. Based on work in the village of Gomet in Aligarh Dis-
trict, Sanwal argued, “If we depend on . . .  the trained highly educated social 
workers mostly coming from urban areas and not feeling one with the vil-
lage and village  women, who are not even available in sufficient number to 
cover all the village population, we still remain very far from solving any 
population prob lem and would be depriving  those who earnestly desire to 
adopt  family planning methods.”32 Sanwal places some blame on the “highly 
educated social workers” who do not feel unity with the village  women they 
supposedly serve. Taken further, her statement implicitly questions the 
very model of ser vice that figures the middle- class  family planner as the 
provider of social welfare mea sures to lower- class  women.
This divide between the middle- class  family planner and her subaltern 
targets of ser vice highlights a “bifurcation of the female subject” that Asha 
Nadkarni locates in the aftermath of Indian in de pen dence. In Nadkarni’s 
terms, even as “bourgeois rights for  women [ were] written into the Indian 
Constitution,” working- class  women  were “forgotten as productive subjects, 
[and] targeted instead  under the purview of education, maternal and child 
health, and  family planning.”33  Family planners represented themselves as 
 legal and juridical citizen- subjects within this bifurcated regime, becom-
ing the beneficiaries of new  legal rights for  women alongside new opportu-
nities for higher education and professionalization.  Family planning ofered 
middle- class  women a terrain to assert their authority and professionalism 
as volunteers, social workers, and doctors who could spread the message of 
 family planning. To enact this new citizenship and ser vice, however, they 
needed poor, less educated urban and rural  women.  These  women would 
encounter the state not through their  legal and juridical rights as citizens 
but through their reproductive capacity. Within a bifurcated regime, their 
ability to reproduce—to make live, to limit fertility, to preserve life— 
rendered them the quin tes sen tial biopo liti cal subjects, whose citizenship 
became attached exclusively to their bodily capacities and sexual be hav iors. 
Consequently, the middle- class  family planner’s ability to represent herself 
as a dutiful citizen- supporter of national pro gress depended upon her repre-
sen ta tion of subaltern  women as reproductive subjects, whose entrance 
into economic and po liti cal life depended upon the regulation of fertility.
However, some  women who  were targeted by  these development pro-
grams rejected this focus on their reproduction and challenged  family 
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planners’ assumption that limiting childbearing was a necessary step on the 
path to modernizing pro gress.  These critiques remain a rare presence in the 
archives, which  were devoted to documenting the eforts of the  family plan-
ner and took  little interest in noting how ordinary  women received  these 
eforts. Indeed, the voices of targeted  women appear only in fragmented 
form in archival texts, typically when a report’s author recounts the diffi-
culties she faced in convincing  women to adopt birth control. Moreover, 
 women’s voices almost always enter in the aggregate; reports note only that 
 women of a par tic u lar village, or of a specific caste or religious group, ques-
tioned or rejected the  family planner’s message. Thus, without assuming 
that  these texts reveal  women’s full experiences with  family planning, I ask 
how the fragments of  women’s responses that appear in the archives dis-
rupt  family planners’ attempts to connect reproduction with development. 
That is, while  family planning workers aimed to highlight subaltern  women’s 
biological reproductivity as a site of intervention, their reports are inter-
rupted by alternative claims that make vis i ble other aspects of  women’s 
lives and other entry points into a development regime.  Women who  were 
targeted for  family planning did not represent themselves solely as repro-
ductive subjects, and their concerns about reproduction  were often at odds 
with the anx i eties of the  family planner.
Some  women questioned the need to limit their childbearing, and thus 
challenged the basis of a development logic that made fertility reduction 
essential to economic growth. Dhanvanthi Rama Rau reported on  these 
challenges when describing her attempts to persuade “village  women” to 
adopt contraception; they refused, arguing that  children  were necessary in 
 every  house hold  because they could tend the fields and help with domestic 
work. Moreover, they insisted,  children  were an absolute necessity to their 
parents in old age.34  These claims resonate with the findings of many femi-
nist critics of population control, who have since shown that the economic 
value of  children within agrarian  house holds was a crucial  factor in driv-
ing families’ childbearing decisions. Since  children in  these  house holds 
produced more than they consumed from an early age, and since adult 
 children provided the only available form of care and support for the el derly, 
large families  were a rational choice for many agrarian  house holds. In some 
cases, they  were foundational to the  house hold’s survival.35 Rama Rau her-
self seemed somewhat persuaded by  these  women’s “reasoned and thought-
ful” comments. She admits that her “only answer to  these arguments was 
that spacing  children would result in healthier  mothers and  children, and 
such large families would no longer be necessary.”36 Yet  these assertions 
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about an  imagined  future of healthy  mothers and small families, as even 
Rama Rau acknowledged, had  limited bearing on  women’s choices in the 
pre sent, where they confronted high rates of child mortality and an absence 
of social welfare supports for the el derly.
In urban contexts as well,  family planners  were confounded by  women 
who rejected the connection between large families and poverty. For 
instance, Visalakshi Narayanswamy, a  family planning worker in Tamil 
Nadu, reported on three days spent in Madurai, where she led a disappoint-
ingly small meeting of “only” a dozen  people in an industrial workers’ 
neighborhood.  There, one  woman “proudly declared that she was not in 
favour of  Family Planning, as all the members of her  family  were working 
and earning enough to maintain a  whole  family.”37 The unnamed  woman’s 
comments turned the economic logic of  family planning on its head: if 
 family planning was meant to limit the number of  children to suit a  family’s 
bud get, then a sufficiently large income would eliminate the need to cur-
tail reproduction. The suggestion  here is that the  family’s earning capaci-
ties transcended the need for reproductive control. If  family planning  were 
solely a requirement for the “poor,” the Madurai worker refused this label 
and asserted her right to have as many  children as she desired.
Many of the voices that emerge through  these rec ords suggest a profound 
valuing of  children that disrupts the rhe toric of  family planning as a tech-
nology of economic development. We find traces of this in the reports of 
“rumors” that  family planning would render  people completely unable to 
conceive. Such rumors halted S. K. Khan’s eforts in Mahomedpur, dis-
cussed above. Similarly, researchers conducting a study of  family planning 
in Bombay found that “some men and  women  were prejudiced against the 
social workers as they thought them to be the agents for stopping  children 
from coming into the world and thereby  going against God’s wish.”38  Family 
planners dismissed  these “rumors” as examples of ignorance and supersti-
tion; in the words of one report from Kerala,  people who  were most in need 
of fertility limitation had “peculiar notions about  children given to them 
by the grace of Allah.”39 Such “peculiar” beliefs prevented the spread of the 
supposedly more rational claims of the  family planner. Yet, read against the 
grain, perhaps the per sis tence of rumors that  family planning workers had 
the power to prevent childbearing entirely suggests the importance accorded 
to  children, and an accompanying concern about infertility. Rather than 
viewing the rumors as ignorance or irrationality, I read them alongside the 
challenges that rural  women posed to Rama Rau. If  children  were absolutely 
essential to the well- being of their parents and  house holds, then limiting 
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or curtailing childbirth may have appeared to be the less “rational” outcome. 
The prob lem was not too many  children—as  family planning programs 
maintained— but rather their absence.
Consequently, visitors to clinics and attendees at public meetings often 
asked about fertility prob lems. According to Prem Lata Gupta, for instance, 
 family planning meetings sometimes attracted “ women who do not have 
 children” who “ask if  there is medicine for this also, and are directed to 
the Hyderabad  Family Welfare Center.” Indeed, she advised, “it appeals 
more to our  women if you speak to them of a  Family Welfare Programme 
and not merely about  Family Planning.”40 Gupta was not alone in this obser-
vation; despite  family planning workers’ commitments to teaching  women 
how to limit their  children,  women themselves called for assistance in 
increasing their fertility or supporting the  children they already had. Thus, 
a study of  family planning programs in Bombay concluded that  people  were 
uninterested in  family planning on its own and would not attend clinics. 
However,  family planners got around this prob lem by ofering milk to 
 children; many  mothers came to the clinic for the milk, and then  family 
planning workers tried to “motivate” them to adopt birth control. A children’s 
health clinic was also an inducement, since the study’s authors concluded, 
apparently without irony, that “ women are more interested in talking to 
 people who help their child.” Similarly, a “sterility clinic” had helped to 
“eradicate the idea that  family planning merely means the prevention of 
births.”41
Within  these texts, programs to feed  children, provide health care, and 
treat infertility appear merely as inducements to persuade  women to regu-
late their reproduction.  These priorities reflected the government’s organ-
ization of its own  family planning programs, which privileged contraception 
and sterilization over expenditures for maternal and child health or nutri-
tion. Yet, even while biological reproduction and its control remained the 
official focus of  family planning,  women themselves broadened their con-
cerns about “reproduction” far beyond  these categories. As we have seen, 
they sought the means to combat infertility and to promote the survival, 
health, and welfare of their existing  children. They challenged the notion 
that fewer  children equaled greater prosperity and valued  children for their 
economic and emotional support within families. Among the most power-
ful of  these challenges  were comments that Hem Sanwal reported from the 
village of Gomet in Aligarh District: “The  women of this village . . .  expressed 
their desire to have a school for their girls so that in times to come their lot 
would be better than that of their  mothers.”42 The  women’s desires gesture 
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 toward a reproductive  future that exceeds the more circumscribed horizons 
of  family planning discourse.  Women’s call for the resources to educate their 
 daughters ofers a vision of their reproductive responsibilities, of mother-
hood and parenting, and of development, that sets aside the demographic 
rationalities of the state. It refuses the  family planner’s claim that  women’s 
fertility determines their  futures. It also refuses to stake claim to national 
development through reproductive regulation;  women’s childbearing does 
not determine their entrance into economic or po liti cal life. The call for a 
girls’ school instead envisions a  future in which the  daughters of Gomet are 
not only reproductive subjects.
Sacrificing  Women in a “War” on Population
A building sense of crisis— namely continued population growth, shortfalls 
in food, and national security concerns— fueled India’s population control 
programs during the 1960s. In the face of  these crises, Indian planners 
increased their eforts to regulate reproduction, and  women’s bodies became 
the terrain to enact planned development. The government introduced 
numerical targets of contraceptive “acceptors” that individual states  were 
pushed to achieve. It also began to use incentives, typically cash payments, 
to induce ac cep tance of sterilization or long- acting contraception. The 
growing urgency of Indian  family planning aligned with rising fears in the 
West, especially in the United States, about a “population bomb” that threat-
ened planetary survival. Panic about “explosive” population growth in 
Asian, Latin American, and African countries targeted poor  women’s repro-
duction as the source of global crisis. In India, this severed even the tenuous, 
bifurcated citizenship claims that had marked poor  women’s relationship 
to the state  after in de pen dence. Subaltern  women  were no longer repre-
sented as potential citizens responsible for controlling their reproduction 
in ser vice of the nation, nor even as the recipients of social welfare. Instead, 
the rhe toric of the population bomb positioned  women’s bodies themselves 
as bombs to be defused.  These changes in  family planning programs also 
changed the nature of the historical archive. The more individualized 
reports of  family planners that I examined in the previous section, which 
recounted the experiences of volunteers and paid workers, gave way to an 
emphasis on demonstrating aggregate results. The focus turned away 
from the potential connections— however tense— forged between the  family 
planner and her targets, and  toward documenting the “births averted” 
through contraceptive use.
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I trace  these changes to cracks in India’s development regime that began 
to emerge in the 1960s. The Third Five Year Plan (1961–65) and subsequent 
annual plans (1966–69) grappled with the limitations of economic growth. 
Though industrial and agricultural production had increased during the 
first two Plans, the NPC raised concerns that production had not kept pace 
with need, had not met rising expectations, and was not sufficient for a 
growing population. Perhaps disillusioned by the unfulfilled promises of 
in de pen dence— Nehru’s “tryst with destiny”— ordinary  people expressed 
frustration with the slow pace of change. Some turned to the ballot box, and 
in 1967, voters in Tamil Nadu handed the Congress Party its first statewide 
defeat in the two de cades since in de pen dence. In that same year, peasants 
and Adivasis in Naxalbari, West Bengal,  rose in open rebellion against the 
government, launching an insurrection that would soon spread across dis-
tricts in several states. This mood of rebellion seemed to echo far beyond 
India’s borders, as popu lar dissatisfaction with the status quo upended pol-
itics around the world in the late 1960s. In this context, population growth 
came to be blamed for the failures and slow pace of economic development.
Population anx i eties gained focus and momentum once again  after a 
decennial census. The census of 1961 documented a population increase of 
21  percent over the de cade since 1951, a higher rate than demographers had 
predicted. Meanwhile, an increasing body of evidence suggested that Indian 
 family planning eforts had not succeeded in controlling population. One 
notable and highly publicized failure was the Harvard- directed Khanna 
study. With the support of substantial funding and numerous personnel, 
the Khanna study had begun in 1953 with the goal of educating villa gers in 
Punjab about  family planning and providing them with contraceptive meth-
ods. By 1960, when the study concluded, it was apparent that the targeted 
villa gers— who had been meeting regularly with study personnel for years— 
remained unconvinced, uninterested, or actively opposed to curtailing 
their reproduction.43  These failures raised questions about what kind of 
 family planning program might be efective in curbing population growth. 
If a program as well funded and intensive as the Khanna study was unsuc-
cessful, in other words, what options might Indian  family planners have?
Two wars on India’s borders heightened  these population anx i eties. 
India’s defeat in the Sino- Indian War of 1962 raised questions about the 
nation’s security, the preparedness of its military, and the “quality” of its 
soldiers. Anx i eties about security increased in 1965, when India and Paki-
stan fought a war that began in Kashmir and soon extended to the border 
areas of Punjab. The rhe toric of militarization that accompanied  these 
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conflicts transformed the language of  family planning as well. Government 
officials proclaimed that, as part of strengthening the nation, population 
control eforts must be put on a “war footing.” For instance, Lieutenant Col-
o nel B. L. Raina of the Army Medical Corps— who, as head of the Central 
 Family Planning Board, coordinated the government’s  family planning 
programs— regularly invoked the language of battlefield casualties in the 
“war” on population. Speaking at a 1966 seminar at AIWC headquarters, 
he argued, “If the programme of  family planning is to be implemented on 
war footing— which has become the cry of the day—we  will have to accept 
the risks and wastages.”44 Though Raina did not specify who would bear 
 these risks and whose lives might be rendered “wastage,” it was impover-
ished  women whose bodies  were targeted by  these intensified population 
control campaigns. Sushila Nayar, an AIWC member and a Gandhian who 
served as minister for health and  family planning from 1962 to 1967, simi-
larly made the bodies of poor  women the site for war time sacrifice. As she 
argued before an assembly of scientists and  family planners, “If [this] is a 
programme on war footing an occasional casualty should not scare you 
away. We accept that. At the same time if we can avoid that casualty we 
would like to do so.”45
In Nayar’s and Raina’s terms,  women’s bodies might need to be sacri-
ficed to win the war against population growth.  Women appear  here less 
as the reproductive subjects of development than as soldiers within a mili-
tarized  family planning regime. Perhaps not coincidentally, the border state 
of Punjab, at the frontier of military conflict with Pakistan, soon became a 
center of the “war” on population as well. Among the most striking juxta-
positions of this twinned conflict was a report from the Bharatiya Gra-
meen Mahila Sangh, an organ ization that ofered civil defense training for 
 women in border states alongside a hundred “ Family Planning Orientation 
Camps” that aimed to “motivate”  women to use IUDs or be sterilized.46
Adding to  these anx i eties was a crisis in food production.47 Consecutive 
years of monsoon failure during the mid-1960s led to food shortfalls and 
raised the prospect of starvation for millions of  people. The Indian govern-
ment looked internationally for food aid. The United States ofered support 
but linked its provision of food to Indian commitments to population con-
trol.48 The explicit connections made by Americans between food aid and 
reproductive regulation reshaped the discourses of  family planning. In 
Nayar’s terms, India’s dependence on food shipments from abroad meant 
that population control was no longer solely a question of national economic 
development, as  family planners had been arguing since the 1940s. It was 
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now also a  matter of national “self- respect”: “It is very humiliating to have 
to ask for aid of any kind, and when the giver is reluctant or shows hesita-
tion it makes the aid all the more humiliating and galling. As a self- 
respecting nation it is absolutely necessary for us to be self- reliant and to 
be able to do away with this type of assistance and situations which make 
us feel small or humiliated in any way. . . .  It is our duty to decrease repro-
duction to make the nation self- respecting and self- reliant.”49 For Nayar, 
 women’s war time sacrifice— via regulating reproduction— was critical to 
this drive  toward national self- reliance. Indeed, she suggested, it was 
 women’s responsibility to make their bodies available via IUD insertions 
and sterilizations.  Women’s fertility thus became both cause and solution 
for India’s myriad failures of development— from wars to the “humiliating” 
request for international aid.
This repre sen ta tion of Indian  women’s bodies as war time targets to be 
sacrificed for national need aligned with transnational repre sen ta tions of a 
planetary population “explosion” caused by the reproduction of  women in 
the “Third World.” Population control discourses in the West  adopted the 
imagery of a literal explosion to argue that  family planning was an urgent 
priority to combat a dangerous population emergency. For example, one 
striking image of the “population bomb” published in the United States in 
1960 shows an exploding earth whose overcrowded inhabitants are, quite 
literally, falling of the planet (figure 4.1).50 As it had in the past, India served 
as a case study for  these Western repre sen ta tions of (over)population. Com-
mentators suggested that the country’s current- day conditions presaged 
how the entire world would look if nothing was done. American author 
Paul R. Ehrlich’s best- selling book The Population Bomb (1968) encapsulated 
 these fears in its famous opening scene, which described the author’s visit 
“one stinking hot night” to a crowded Delhi street full of “ people,  people, 
 people,  people” in a “scene [of] hellish aspect.”51 As Matthew Connelly 
argues, Ehrlich’s imagery fueled American concern about population 
growth in India and si mul ta neously played upon American anx i eties about 
domestic crime, contagion, and migration, without explic itly naming  these 
 factors.52 The discourse of a worldwide population explosion thus contrib-
uted to a racial politics that was at once localized and globalized; it drew 
upon fears of population growth in the “Third World” alongside poverty 
and racial anx i eties in the “First World.”
Feminist critics of population control have made vis i ble the antiwomen 
under pinnings of this discourse and have challenged the neo- Malthusian 
assumptions that blame reproduction, rather than unequal distribution of 
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resources, for poverty and hunger. They have shown, moreover, that black 
and brown  women— Asian, Latin American, African, and racial minorities 
in the US— were the ones blamed for bringing the world to the brink of a 
supposed population explosion and targeted for the most invasive methods 
of reproductive regulation.53 This politics of blame was often explicit in pop-
ulation control imagery, as in a set of images produced by the IPPF. Among 
 these was “A Child’s Reproach,” in which an impoverished, brown- skinned 
child gazes balefully at the viewer. Another shows an “Unplanned  Family,” 
composed of a dark- skinned  mother and three  children. Meanwhile, the 
“planned families”  were depicted as white, including two in images titled 
“Reverence for Life” and “Wanted,” both showing a white  mother caress-
ing a white infant.54 This imagery suggested that the “unplanned” repro-
duction of brown bodies threatened the supposedly “planned” reproduction 
of white populations. It mobilized a claim about diferential fertility whereby 
the supposed overreproduction of Asians, Africans, and Latin Americans 
threatened to displace their white American and Eu ro pean counter parts. 
figure 4.1. This striking 
image shows an exploding 
earth whose inhabitants 
are falling of the over-
crowded planet. Courtesy of 
Rocke fel ler Archive Center.
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Such a politics hearkened back  toward debates about eugenics, migration 
restrictions, and a global color line, discussed in chapter 2. It also gestured 
forward,  toward a  future of American imperial hegemony that seemed 
threatened by decolonization and the rise of a “Third World.”
 These gendered, classed, and racialized anx i eties of the “population 
bomb” provided the context for increasingly intensive campaigns to curb 
global population growth, and India emerged as a key test case. Foreign 
donors poured into India, bringing demographers and other social scien-
tists with their own sprawling bureaucracies and networks for population 
control. Private US funds—in large mea sure from the Ford Foundation— 
had provided support for Indian  family planning programs beginning in 
the 1950s. By the last years of that de cade, Ford officials  were working closely 
with the Indian government, often joining planning meetings at the Cen-
tral  Family Planning Board and the Health Ministry. Ford funds also 
launched pi lot proj ects and paid for con sul tants whose ideas  were widely 
 adopted by government programs.55 Eventually, the Ford Foundation was 
joined by the US government itself. In 1966, in the wake of the Indo- Pakistan 
War and the US president’s insistence that food aid be tied to population 
control, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
replaced Ford as the largest foreign donor to India’s  family planning pro-
grams. Even at the height of USAID and Ford support, foreign funds  were 
never more than 10  percent of India’s total health bud get, but as Mohan Rao 
argues,  these funders exercised disproportionate influence on the shape of 
 family planning campaigns.56 Although the fears of brown bodies obviously 
held  little resonance in an Indian context, racialized fears of diferential fer-
tility aligned with long- standing Indian elite anx i eties about the overre-
production of poor, lower- caste, and Muslim populations.
 These national and transnational anx i eties about population growth  were 
apparent in the Indian government’s Third Five Year Plan (1961–65).  Family 
planning policy moved away from an  earlier focus on clinics and  toward 
an extension approach that aimed to “motivate”  people to use birth con-
trol. The program’s ambitious goal was to reduce the birthrate from forty 
per thousand to just twenty- five per thousand by 1973. The twin crises of 
war and monsoon failure led to the temporary abandonment of Five Year 
Plans in  favor of annual plans for the years 1966 through 1969. In each year, 
 family planning expenditures continued to increase. Increased funds 
prompted a huge expansion of the  family planning bureaucracy, but, as in 
the past, this expansion was not linked to health care overall but more nar-
rowly to  family planning. Thus, for instance, Primary Health Centers— which 
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 were meant to be the rural population’s first point of contact for health care— 
received more resources, but  these  were required to be spent on  family 
planning, not on other ser vices, including maternal and child health. In 
1966, following a UN recommendation, the Directorate of  Family Plan-
ning was relieved of responsibilities for maternal and child health and 
nutrition so that field- workers could focus solely on birth control.57
The expansion of  family planning at the expense of health care and the 
continued underfunding of health ser vices became a deep and enduring fea-
ture of India’s population control regime.  These imbalances in funding 
reflected at a policy level what we have seen rhetorically in claims about the 
population explosion;  women’s reproduction was held responsible for cri-
sis, and their bodies  were targets to be sacrificed in an attempt to defuse 
the population “bomb.” Yet even as population control intensified, critiques 
of  these policies also began to emerge. Notably, the landmark  Towards 
Equality: Report of the Committee on the Status of  Women in India (1974), 
which was commissioned by the government and authored by prominent 
 women academics, questioned the state’s focus on population control at the 
expense of maternal and child health and refused to make reproductive reg-
ulation an impor tant feature of their investigation.58  These early reserva-
tions  were an impor tant precursor for the more robust feminist critiques 
of population control that would develop in  later de cades.
Contexts for population anx i eties also began to shift as the global “Green 
Revolution” changed the long- standing equation between population and 
food. For a  century of Indian history, as we have seen, concerns about pop-
ulation had been directly linked to fears of food shortfall and famine. 
However, with the Green Revolution, new, scientifically developed hybrid 
va ri e ties of wheat and rice vastly increased crop yields and transformed 
agriculture. The first hybrid wheat seeds arrived in India in 1963, and the 
government encouraged imports of hybrid seeds during the food crisis of 
1965 to 1967. The results  were dramatic. Within five years, Indian wheat har-
vests had increased by 150  percent and rice by over 30   percent. Quelling 
some of Health Minister Sushila Nayar’s fears about national “self- respect” 
and “self- sufficiency,” the country’s reliance on food imports decreased rap-
idly, and by the late 1970s, Indian farmers had planted the world’s largest 
area of high- yield crops.59 This dramatic increase in food production sug-
gested that perhaps the earth could feed a larger population than had been 
 imagined before. However, although Green Revolution technology increased 
the amount of food grown, it did not solve the prob lem of hunger, which, 
as we have seen, was rooted not only in agrarian production but also in the 
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unequal distribution of land and resources. In fact, the Green Revolution 
exacerbated  these inequalities, both regionally within India and between 
wealthier and poorer farmers. In retrospect, the Green Revolution also 
incurred tremendous environmental costs. Neither hybrid seed nor associated 
social and economic changes would be a panacea for Indian development.
Perhaps most surprisingly for a history of reproduction, however, the 
Green Revolution’s vastly increased crop yields did not overturn the Mal-
thusian premise that underpinned population control programs. Despite an 
occasional claim that “development was the best contraceptive,” the chang-
ing balance between food and population did not lead planners to question 
the need to regulate reproduction. The system of targets and incentives 
seemed to continue unchanged, and  women’s fertility remained the site of 
intervention. Indeed, as I discuss  later in the chapter, during the period of 
Emergency rule (1975–77) some of the Indian government’s most draconian 
population controls developed concurrently with the greatest gains of the 
Green Revolution.
“This  simple device can and  will change the history of world”:  
IUDs and Strug gles to Control the Uterus
By the 1960s, a growing consensus within the transnational population 
establishment determined that the planetary “population bomb” could not 
be defused by existing contraceptive technologies alone. Contraceptives in 
use during the 1950s and early 1960s  were largely barrier methods (such as 
pessaries or condoms) or spermicides (such as vaginal foam tablets). They 
required  couples to make a conscious and repeated choice during each sex-
ual encounter.  Family planners dreamed of something dif er ent: a birth 
control method that was highly efective, did not require continuous 
decision- making by  couples, and was inexpensive and  simple enough to be 
used widely across the “Third World.” The birth control pill was a landmark 
new contraceptive technology that seemed to meet some of  these needs. 
“The pill” was a hormonal rather than a barrier method, and it worked by 
inhibiting ovulation and thickening cervical mucus, preventing fertiliza-
tion from taking place. Approved for the US market in 1960, the pill proved 
highly efective in preventing pregnancy and promised an entirely new par-
adigm for birth control. However, it did not fully meet the requirements 
envisioned for large- scale population control  because taking the pill was a 
daily decision made by individual  women. As two Indian  family planning 
con sul tants noted, “In India the lack of general motivation makes it 
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hazardous to entrust the pill to our  women at this stage.” Thus, while “the 
decision to take ‘The Pill’ is left to the individual user in most developed 
Western Socie ties,” such individual decision- making was neither pos si ble 
nor desirable in an Indian context.60 Moreover, the high cost of the pill dis-
couraged its widespread adoption by government- funded programs.
The intrauterine contraceptive device (IUD or IUCD) seemed to over-
come  these limitations of the birth control pill. The device is a loop or ring 
inserted into the uterus by a medical professional.  After insertion, it can pre-
vent conception for years. Contraception thus does not hinge on a  woman’s 
daily decision; her initiative is  limited to the moment when she has the 
device inserted, and removal requires further medical assistance. By its 
very design, the IUD could narrow a  woman’s day- to- day control over her 
reproduction while widening that of medical professionals. This alignment 
between the design features of the IUD and the goals of population con-
trollers was not coincidental: it was designed with  these goals in mind. The 
Population Council, an organ ization founded by John D. Rocke fel ler III 
with the goal of controlling global population growth, made its first grants 
for IUD research in 1959 to two doctors, Jack Lippes and Lazar Margulies, 
who designed and tested vari ous forms of the device.61 In 1965, with back-
ing from the Population Council, Lippes’s design, known as the “Lippes 
loop” or simply the “loop,” became the contraceptive device of choice for 
India’s newly launched extended  family planning program. Both in its 
design and in its implementation, the IUD exemplifies the links between 
Western fears of a “Third World” population explosion and Indian anx i-
eties about population and development, which together determined the 
course of Indian population control in the 1960s.
At its inception, as Chikako Takeshita has argued, the IUD “disindivid-
ualized” its users. That is, its creators did not imagine the  woman who 
used the IUD as an individual deciding to control her reproduction; rather, 
“Third World”  women en masse  were the “implied users” of this new tech-
nology.62 We may trace this construction of the IUD’s users to some of the 
initial scientific debates about the device, most notably in a “fact- finding” 
conference in New York sponsored by the Population Council in 1962 to pro-
mote IUD research. At the conference, Alan Guttmacher—an obstetrician- 
gynecologist who was president of the IPPF’s World Population division 
and who would  later lead IPPF’s American affiliate, the Planned Parenthood 
Federation of Amer i ca (PPFA)— emerged as an  eager proponent of the IUD. 
As Guttmacher remarked to the assembled gathering of health profession-
als, he had recently visited India and Southeast Asia, where he learned 
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something about population control: “The reason the restraint of popula-
tion growth in  these areas is moving so slowly is the fact that the meth-
ods which we ofer are Western methods, methods poorly suited to their 
culture and to the control of mass- population growth. Our methods are 
largely birth control for the individual, not birth control for a nation. 
Therefore, I felt very strongly that new methods must be ofered and, if the 
new methods are good and proper, results  will be astounding.”63 The IUD, 
Guttmacher suggested, ofered this “birth control for a nation.”
The emphasis on mass population control deprioritized the reproductive 
health needs of individual  women users. Speaking  after Guttmacher, 
Dr. Robert Wilson made this point explicit:
The traditional medical training is  toward a single individual. We are 
concerned with  whether an individual develops infection, or  whether she 
has her baby safely, as one person to another. We are less concerned, by 
training and tradition, about groups of  people, and about the welfare of 
the world in general. This is something that certainly has to be considered 
in any discussion of world- wide population control. We have to stop 
functioning like doctors, thinking about the one patient with pelvic 
inflammatory disease; or the one patient, who might develop this or that, 
or the other complication from an intra- uterine device; and think of the 
need for this in general.64
For Wilson, contraception that focused on individual outcomes might never 
meet the goals of global population control. He thus transformed the cal-
culus of risk. The risk to individual  women patients should not be weighed 
against the benefits to the patient herself but rather to the supposed bene-
fits of controlling population on a mass scale. Thus, Wilson acknowledged, 
the IUD might occasionally be inserted into the “wrong patient,” who would 
sufer complications. Nevertheless, he suggested to his audience, “perhaps 
the individual patient is expendable in the general scheme of  things, par-
ticularly if the infection she acquires is sterilizing but not lethal.”65 Speak-
ing  after Wilson, Dr. Mary Calderone of the PPFA agreed. The risks to 
individual  women, she suggested, must be accepted as “the realities of mass 
application of any medical technique.”66
 These “disindividualized” users of the IUD— whose health or fertility 
might be sacrificed in ser vice of population control— were assumed to be 
poor  women in the “Third World” or racial minorities within Western 
nations. In early clinical  trials, Puerto Rico stood in for the former. For 
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instance, a pre sen ta tion by Adaline Satterthwaite and Clarence  Gamble 
about their work in Humacao, Puerto Rico, discussed their  trials with 125 
 women. Only in one case, they noted, did pain require removal of the device. 
In this instance, a physician removed the spiral- shaped IUD that was ini-
tially inserted: “The spiral was removed and shown to the patient and the 
loop inserted immediately  after that. The patient did not know that the loop 
had been inserted and did not complain of any pain.” Satterthwaite and 
 Gamble represented this deception as a clever workaround to the prob lems 
engendered by what they de cided was a patient’s unfounded anxiety.  These 
results led to their recommendation that the device “may prove a highly 
satisfactory method for widespread population control in overpopulated 
countries.”67 Other clinicians aimed for the mass application of IUDs for 
racial minorities and poor populations in the United Kingdom and the 
mainland United States. Dr. Don Jessen’s study at Chicago’s Wesley Memo-
rial Hospital inserted IUDs into 121 patients selected from among the 
“indigent population,” of whom  there  were “109 Negro, 1 Oriental, and 11 
white.” Jessen’s results  were mixed, and in a rare dissent, he did not recom-
mend the device for use among poor patients “ unless close medical super-
vision is pos si ble.”68 By contrast, Margaret Jackson of the United Kingdom 
noted that she had greater success with 192  women who  were “highly fer-
tile” and  were “prob lem patients and  mothers of prob lem families.”69
Debates about the IUD’s design and use reflected  these population con-
trol priorities. For example, a core question discussed during the New York 
conference was  whether IUDs should have a “tail” that would extend out-
side the uterus. The potential disadvantage of a “tail” was an increased risk 
of infection. Its potential benefit would be to enable  women themselves to 
check  whether the IUD was in place or  whether it had been involuntarily 
expelled. However, clinicians from Puerto Rico and India insisted that 
 women would be unable or unwilling to examine themselves intravaginally 
to check for the “tail.” Consequently, Guttmacher concluded, the fact that 
“ women in undeveloped areas would be unwilling to examine themselves 
is a strong argument against the addition of a tail.”70 Another scientific 
debate centered on the need to take detailed medical histories from poten-
tial users. Such histories might screen out  women with pelvic inflamma-
tory disease (PID), who should not have IUDs inserted. However, as Bombay 
gynecologist and founding FPAI member Dr. V. N. Shirodkar remarked, it 
was difficult in India to obtain accurate patient histories of PID.71 Conse-
quently, Guttmacher suggested that “underdeveloped countries” needed 
fewer restrictions on insertion so as not to “lose sight of our goal—to apply 
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this method to large populations.” Guttmacher also pushed for inser-
tions as soon as pos si ble  after a  woman delivered a child, presumably in 
hopes that this would increase insertion rates. As he reminded his audi-
ence, “If we can insert early, it has  great advantage.  These remarks do not 
concern the ‘carriage trade.’ I am talking primarily about clinic patients.”72 
That is, the safeguards about postpartum insertion and detailed medical 
histories that might be deemed necessary for privileged patients in West-
ern countries did not hold for impoverished “clinic patients” or the  women 
of Puerto Rico and India, whose bodies needed to be made available for pop-
ulation control.
A few years  later, when the Population Council sponsored a second con-
ference on the IUD,  these assumptions about disindividualized users and 
mass population control had taken firm hold. The vice president of the Pop-
ulation Council, Bernard Berelson, announced with excitement that the 
IUD was now a “truly revolutionary development in enabling mankind to 
deal with the major world prob lem of undue population growth. . . .  This 
 simple device can and  will change the history of the world.”73 Among the 
audience members listening to Berelson’s claims was B. L. Raina of the 
Indian government’s Central  Family Planning Board. Raina was attending 
the conference with a collaborator, M. W. Freymann of the Ford Foundation, 
to pre sent a paper on “Intra- uterine Contraception in India.” In tones more 
mea sured than Berelson’s apocryphal claims, Raina agreed that the IUD 
ofered a welcome expansion of India’s “contraceptive armamentarium.”74
The Indian government’s decision to focus on the “Lippes loop” IUD was 
taken in some haste. Only a few clinical  trials  were held within the country 
before the determination was made to use it on a mass scale.75 Within the 
Indian population control establishment, the rapid push for the IUD came 
from a frustration with existing birth control technologies, none of which 
seemed to meet an “emergency” need to curb population growth. As  Sushila 
Nayar noted, for instance, “conventional contraceptives” required “very 
strong motivation and per sis tence,” and birth control pills  were costly, had a 
high dropout rate, and required a thorough medical exam that Indian medi-
cal ser vices would be unable to provide on a mass scale. Moreover,  people 
 were reluctant to be sterilized  unless they had many  children, “which means 
that so far as population control is concerned much damage has already 
been done.” The IUD thus ofered a technical fix, according to Nayar: “The 
contraceptive that does not need that per sis tence and which can be used 
even  after the first child is the loop and that is why we have been trying to 
push forward this program of the loop.”76 The Population Council, the IUD’s 
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chief promoter, encouraged this point of view. The organ ization supplied 
India with one million devices in order to move the program forward 
quickly. Meanwhile, the Ford Foundation funded an IUD factory to ensure 
that India had its own national supply.77 The Ford Foundation also con-
ducted a pi lot study using Lippes loops in the Hooghly District of West Ben-
gal, and this became the model for expanding the program across India.78 
Soon  after, the government was poised to introduce the IUD, or the “loop,” 
as it came to be known among the millions of  women who used it.
Once the device was  adopted,  there was a relentless push to locate IUD 
“acceptors” and increase the rate of insertions. Though  there  were almost 
no IUD insertions prior to March 1965, a total of 800,000  were completed 
during the 1965–66 Plan year.79 Targets for IUD usage  were set at the 
national, state, and district levels;  these ranged from an ambitious twenty 
insertions per thousand population in urban areas to ten per thousand in 
rural India. If achieved, this would have resulted in four million Indian 
 women using the device.80 When  these targets proved difficult to achieve, 
the Indian government  adopted the model of some state governments— and 
the recommendation of Ford, UN, World Bank, and IPPF consultants—to 
introduce incentive payments.
In October  1966, the Health Ministry announced that states would 
receive eleven rupees for each IUD insertion, which they could distribute 
among patients, staf who performed the insertions, and “motivators” who 
recruited and brought in patients.81 The inclusion of motivators, who  were 
not necessarily state employees and had no special training or qualifications, 
helped to vastly expand the network of  people involved in the state’s  family 
planning program. A  woman might receive an IUD and then become a 
motivator to bring in other  women. Alternately, her husband or other  family 
members might receive the payment for motivation;  others in the commu-
nity, both kin and nonkin, government employees and private citizens, 
might supplement their earnings by identifying and persuading IUD “accep-
tors.” Motivators typically brought their acceptors to IUD “camps,” which 
 were multiday events that aimed to bring together large numbers of accep-
tors and insert devices as rapidly as pos si ble. Where  there  were not adequate 
numbers of doctors to do the insertions, states or ga nized mobile squads to 
visit underserved areas. Meanwhile, propaganda eforts— radio programs, 
 family planning exhibitions, films, theater— all aimed to persuade  people 
of the benefits of the “loop.”82 By July 1968, the minister for  family plan-
ning, Govind Narain, reported that over 2.5 million  women had been fit-
ted with IUDs.83
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The technological shift represented by the IUD and its implied users led 
to several changes in  family planning. As we have seen, the first two Five 
Year Plans situated birth control within a category of “ women’s welfare,” 
then delegated such welfare work in large mea sure to  women’s voluntary 
organ izations. By the mid-1960s, however, the state was more directly 
involved, and the IUD campaign became increasingly separated, both in 
rhe toric and in policy, from any claims about the “welfare” of  women. Vol-
untary organ izations, in turn, shifted their activities to participate in 
extended  family planning,  whether by supporting publicity eforts or by 
arranging clinical ser vices themselves. Both the FPAI and the AIWC, for 
instance,  were proponents of the IUD. As Rama Rau proclaimed, the IUD 
was among “the methods likely to bring the quickest and most satisfactory 
results in the emergency the country  faces.”84 AIWC president K. Lakshmi 
Raghuramiah announced with satisfaction that “loop- camps have become 
very very familiar to our members. We have enough grounds to claim that 
we have played a  great part in making  women  Family Planning conscious.”85 
In 1966, for example, the Bombay branch’s Skippo mobile clinic had “moti-
vated” ninety- one  women and fitted them with IUDs while also support-
ing eforts at a loop camp. In Mangalore in the same year, the Bhagini Samaj 
began rural IUD insertions, and its mobile unit had worked with the Pub-
lic Health Department to conduct loop camps across rural parts of the dis-
trict, where they completed 788 insertions. They concluded optimistically 
that the “loop is catching the attention of the  people and the response is 
encouraging.”86 In the following years, branches in Kodaikanal and Mala-
bar similarly began to focus on IUDs in their mobile vans.87
The numbers reported by voluntary organ izations represented only a 
small fraction of the several million IUD insertions performed during this 
period. Yet the reports’ accounting suggests how thoroughly the  earlier 
claim that birth control was a component of  women’s welfare had now 
become folded into a relentless drive to document numbers— numbers of 
loop camps held, IUDs inserted, incentives provided. Numbers had long 
been the vocabulary of debate on population; now they  were also the lan-
guage of birth control. Success or failure was mea sured by numbers, and 
both state agencies and voluntary organ izations aimed to mea sure up. If the 
IUD’s designers had  imagined a disindividualized user whose uterus might 
be defused by the device before it exploded with  children, its proponents 
in India strove to create exactly such a user. They aimed to bring in  women 
en masse, “motivate” them to use the IUD, and then insert the device into 
as many  women as pos si ble. The quest to scale up use of the loop thus 
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became a race of the numbers against time, to inoculate as many  women as 
pos si ble against the threat of reproduction.
At the intersection of all this  were the millions of  women into whose 
uteruses the Lippes Loop was inserted. Their bodies bore the brunt of the 
undue haste that marked the launch of IUDs on a “war footing.” We may 
find evidence of this haste at all stages of the pro cess. The initial devices 
themselves— supplied by the Population Council— arrived unsterilized and 
with only one inserter per twenty devices. The responsibility to sterilize the 
IUDs properly thus fell on medical personnel, but conditions  were often 
inadequate within the large- scale camps and mobile vans that conducted 
the bulk of insertions. Moreover, medical personnel  were poorly trained in 
insertion and removal of the device, and the  limited number of doctors 
available increased the pressure to perform insertions as rapidly as pos si-
ble. Many  women received  little or no follow-up  after an insertion, and com-
plaints of pain, excessive bleeding, or other complications  were often 
ignored.88 As news of  these prob lems began to spread, the IUD fell rapidly 
out of  favor, and  women refused in large numbers to be inserted with the 
“loop.” The result was a dramatic decline in insertions from 1967 onward.89
Whereas the technological promise of the IUD had been to circumvent 
the question of  women’s “motivation,” officials found that, instead,  women 
refused the loop outright. As insertions fell, officials at the highest levels 
ascribed  women’s refusal to their supposed irrationality, which made them 
victim to “rumors” about the IUD. Narain, the minister for  family plan-
ning, blamed rumors that loops caused cancer or death, claiming that “vil-
lage dais and other persons who stand to gain from illegal abortions or sale 
of oral contraceptives  were the chief sources of such distorted statements.”90 
The Bombay gynecologist B. N. Purandare agreed that ordinary  women 
 were susceptible to “rumor,” given their supposedly irrational beliefs and 
lack of education. He insisted that  women targeted for IUDs had to be dis-
abused of the beliefs that they  were “committing sin by its use, of creation 
of the wrath of God, of  going against nature, of danger of developing can-
cer, of injury to herself and her husband and of many other silly notions 
rampant among the uneducated  women folk.” For Purandare  these ideas 
represented a serious setback to the IUD program, and he blamed  women 
even while acknowledging that some of them faced complications  after 
insertion, such as bleeding, pain and cramping, and dysmenorrhea.91
Once they  imagined  women as irrational and prone to rumor, IUD 
proponents could justify multiple methods of persuasion and even coer-
cion. For example, Population Council con sul tant Harry Levin sidestepped 
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questions about why  women might choose or refuse an IUD. He suggested 
instead providing a “gift” to  women who obtained the device or persuaded 
 others to be fitted. In his terms, “ Things like ball point pens and small plas-
tic gadgets and notebooks have proven very efective in other areas when 
used as rewards to encourage insertions.”92 Levin’s startling comment, in 
which a plastic gadget might be traded for a decision with vast implications 
for  women’s health and reproduction, reveals how the IUD’s implied users 
entered into population control discourse. Rather than framing the issue 
in terms of why a  woman might seek contraception or why an IUD might 
ofer an acceptable method of birth control for some  women, Levin imagines 
an Indian  woman user who is swayed by access to a ballpoint pen. Certainly 
 there is no discourse of citizenship  here, nor of welfare or development. 
Rather, Indian  women must be fitted with IUDs despite themselves. Levin’s 
hopes, voiced in the early stages of the IUD program in 1965, would come 
to some fruition  after 1966, when the government approved cash incen-
tives for IUD “motivators.” Though cash was likely more useful to  women 
than Levin’s plastic gadgets, the under lying implication still holds.  Women 
 were not trusted to choose birth control, and thus incentives would become 
the basis of the program.
Although the government insisted that the program was entirely volun-
tary, histories of its inner workings show that it was potentially coercive. 
Evidence from drought- stricken regions in Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and 
Orissa, for example, suggests that starving  women might have “chosen” an 
IUD as an alternative to hunger.93 Paying an incentive to motivators also 
opened up ave nues for coercion, as  those with social or economic power 
might exert their influence to compel  others to “choose” an IUD. Such 
efects have been well documented for  family planning campaigns in  later 
de cades.94 Cases in which  women  were denied removal of an IUD are 
another example of coercion;  these  women sometimes sought removal from 
private doctors or attempted to remove it with the assistance of a dai or 
 family member.
More direct instances of coercion are rarely vis i ble in the historical 
archive, given that  family planners  were invested in claims of voluntarism. 
However, one example comes from a physician working among  women 
employed in tea estates in Assam. Dr. L. C. R. Emmet, chief medical officer 
of the Mariani Medical Association, took the opportunity to impose IUDs 
on  women who had been married at ages below the  legal limit. When three 
young  women  under age thirteen miscarried, Emmet claimed, “their hus-
bands  were given the opportunity to  either induce their wives to volunteer 
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for the IUCD, or be trotted down to the local Police Station.  Needless to 
say, they chose the former and easier course of action.”95 Emmet’s curious 
formulation, whereby he compelled husbands to “induce” the  women to 
“volunteer,” points to the coercive under pinnings of his IUD campaign. His 
assumption that an IUD insertion was “easier” for husbands further dis-
counts the experiences of the young  women. As in the case of the acceptors 
of Levin’s plastic gadgets,  women are not represented as making reasoned 
decisions about IUDs but are assumed to be irrational subjects who have to 
be persuaded, bribed, or coerced into insertion by any available means. For 
such  imagined users of the IUD, the line between coercion and consent was 
porous and, in this case, was disregarded entirely.
Even IUD promoters who  were more sympathetic  toward the loop’s users 
operated within this paradigm, whereby  women’s bodies and uteruses  were 
put in ser vice of another’s reason. The rationality of the population control-
ler, in other words, trumped the supposed irrationality of the IUD’s 
implied user, rendering her into a body that was more or less available for 
an insertion. This was the case for Kumudini Dandekar, a feminist demog-
rapher and critic of some population control certitudes, who conducted a 
study with fellow demographer Surekha Nigam to assess why IUD inser-
tions fell so sharply a few years into the program.96 They  were primarily con-
cerned with “the capacity of the  women to tolerate the device in spite of 
bleeding and similar accompanying discomfort.” Basing their conclusion 
on a study of 2,100 loop adopters in rural Maharashtra, they claimed that 
despite bleeding, most “ women bore the device patiently.”97 This emphasis 
on  women’s bodily abilities to “bear” the device— a language that recurs 
repeatedly across the scientific discourse— reinforces the turn away from 
any comprehensive analy sis of  women’s interests, choices, or reasons for 
controlling their reproduction. In its place,  women’s bodily sacrifice became 
the very basis upon which the IUD program was built.
Sterilization and States of Emergency
Like the IUD, surgical sterilization became a key contraceptive technology 
to put India’s  family planning program on a “war footing.” From a popula-
tion control perspective, surgical sterilization was highly efective at pre-
venting conception, was controlled by medical providers, and required 
patients to make only a one- time decision. Unlike the IUD, surgical steril-
ization was a permanent rather than temporary mea sure, and it was avail-
able to both men and  women. Vasectomy for men was the medically simpler 
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procedure, but tubectomy or tubal ligation for  women also became part of 
the government’s  family planning program. The inclusion of men as tar-
gets of  family planning marked a shift from  earlier technologies and pro-
grams, which had focused on  women and their bodies as reproductive 
threats to the nation. This attention to men even reshaped the gender poli-
tics of population control for a brief period during Emergency rule, from 
1975 to 1977.  After the Emergency, for reasons I discuss below, vasectomy 
was marked as an “excess” of Indian population control, while the program 
for female sterilization, and its regulation of  women’s bodies, was left intact.
Sterilization first became widespread in the southern states, where it was 
a mainstay of  family planning even before the Indian government  adopted 
it on a national level. In Madras State ( later Tamil Nadu), the emphasis on 
sterilization was due in large mea sure to R. A. Gopalaswami, who served 
as in de pen dent India’s first census commissioner and then worked for the 
Madras government. In his 1951 census report castigating “improvident 
maternity,” Gopalaswami had argued strongly for a national population 
control policy, and in Madras he aimed to put this into efect through ster-
ilization. As he explained, “Mechanical and chemical contraceptive appli-
ances”  were useful for “sections of the population who can be largely left to 
themselves.”  These  were middle- class  couples, Gopalaswami implied, who 
might decide to reduce their childbearing for reasons of  family economy 
or national development. However, “from the point of view of the large mass 
of the  people who  will not space their pregnancies or limit their number 
except as a result of Governmental action, reliance should be placed primar-
ily on natu ral methods for securing the former and on surgical methods 
for securing the latter.”98 In other words, surgical sterilization was the tech-
nology of choice to impose the state’s  will upon the reproductive capacities 
of the poor and marginalized. Nonpermanent methods, by contrast,  were 
a luxury of the  middle classes. The government of Madras introduced ster-
ilization in its  Family Planning Manual and noted that both vasectomy and 
female sterilization methods (recommended in the first twenty- four hours 
 after delivery)  were equally impor tant to the state’s program.99 The Madras 
government also became the first in India to ofer cash incentives for ster-
ilization, with thirty rupees for men or  women who underwent the proce-
dure and ten rupees for the “motivator” who brought them to the clinic.100
With the intensification of  family planning regimes during the 1960s, 
the central government joined states like Madras, Mysore, and Kerala in 
promoting sterilization for both men and  women. The number of  these 
surgeries grew rapidly. Government figures, though potentially imprecise, 
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still indicate the scope of the increase. From just over 7,000 sterilizations of 
men and  women in 1956, for instance,  there  were nearly 270,000 in 1964 
and 1.8 million in 1967 through 1968.101 The number of men increased still 
further with the inauguration of mass vasectomy camps, which eventually 
became a defining feature of the  family planning program. The first of 
 these camps was or ga nized by S. S. Krishnakumar, the district collector of 
Ernakulam, Kerala, in December 1970. The camp aimed to bring together 
medical personnel and a large number of patients in a “festive atmosphere” 
in order to convince men to obtain vasectomies. The first Ernakulam camp 
provided transport to patients, was publicized widely in advance, and 
ofered vasectomy “acceptors” a cash incentive alongside gifts. The result, 
as reported by the government, was more than 15,000 vasectomies in one 
month. A second camp in July 1971 resulted in more than 63,000 vasecto-
mies, representing a staggering 42  percent of all such procedures performed 
in Kerala that year.  Others  adopted Krishnakumar’s approach, holding 
camps at a variety of venues, including even Bombay’s Victoria Terminus 
rail station.102
Supporters of mass vasectomy camps promoted the procedure’s cost and 
efficiency. In contrast to female sterilization, vasectomies did not require 
hospitalization, used only a local anesthetic, and could be done relatively 
quickly. The main difficulty was thus not in the procedure itself, according 
to  family planning proponents, but in convincing men to “volunteer” for 
it. Doctors, social workers, and government bureaucrats lamented public 
perceptions of the surgery, especially notions that it might lead to impo-
tence or was akin to castration. They hoped that publicizing vasectomy 
camps might assuage  these fears; the government also paid “motivators” to 
persuade men to agree to the procedure and bring them to the camps.
Whereas promoters of mass vasectomy camps touted them as purely vol-
untary events that destigmatized surgical sterilization, scholars have noted 
their coercive structures and efects. For impoverished populations, cash 
incentives  were large enough to shape decisions about “consenting” to the 
procedure, especially when patients  were uninformed about alternatives. 
The vast majority of camp attendees marked their occupation as laborers, 
most with monthly incomes of  under 100 rupees; incentives at camps ranged 
from 70 to 150 rupees. Moreover, increased numbers at the camps tended 
to coincide with periods of agricultural crisis and scarcity; this indicates 
that men  were more likely to “accept” vasectomy when other means of sup-
porting themselves and their families had failed. Meanwhile, when govern-
ment bud get shortfalls led to the withdrawal of incentives in the mid-1970s, 
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vasectomy adoptions fell sharply, again suggesting that the incentive was 
responsible for men’s “choices” about the surgery.  These implicit structures 
of coercion  were reinforced in some cases by more explicit mea sures, such 
as at one camp in Uttar Pradesh for which the district collector arranged 
for police vehicles to locate and transport vasectomy acceptors.103 In short, 
the mass vasectomy camps exactly echoed the call of population control-
lers like Gopalaswami to make surgical sterilization the primary method 
to control the reproduction of the masses. In the words of one physician 
in West Bengal, temporary contraceptive mea sures could be used by the 
“educated community” but “sterilization would be ideal for the illiterate.”104
Vasectomy campaigns departed from previous  family planning pro-
grams to target men’s reproductivity as a source of national danger and a 
site for medical intervention.  Family planning had already reduced subal-
tern  women’s bodies to their reproductive rather than productive functions. 
Moreover, the state’s development regime had historically prioritized men’s 
productive  labor in providing access to agricultural resources and technol-
ogies, while ignoring  women’s contributions to agrarian production.105 
However, the new campaigns highlighted men’s reproduction as an obsta-
cle to national development, and with vasectomy, the state aimed for new 
kinds of control over men’s reproduction. This shift from production to 
reproduction— from agricultural extension to  family planning— was not 
easy, as one Ford Foundation con sul tant noted. Despite  family planners’ 
best eforts, he wrote glumly, “it is considerably easier to demonstrate the 
benefits of fertilizer than of vasectomy.”106 Perhaps it is unsurprising, then, 
that the targets of the vasectomy camps  were  those men least likely to have 
benefited from agricultural extension and rural development.  These  were 
the landless and land- poor, which meant they  were more likely to be lower- 
caste, Adivasi, and Dalit populations that agrarian development eforts 
overlooked. In the absence of substantive land re distribution, their steril-
ization was touted as a route  toward alleviating poverty. In the pro cess, their 
bodies  were subject to the kinds of reproductive control that had hitherto 
been reserved for  women.
Despite this attention to men, however, we must remember that female 
sterilization continued uninterrupted throughout the late 1960s and 1970s. 
Although vasectomy was the simpler and cheaper procedure,  family plan-
ners insisted that female sterilization was necessary as well, especially  after 
the failure of the IUD campaign. But the ratio of procedures for men and 
 women changed over time. When the government first began keeping rec-
ords in the mid-1950s, female sterilizations accounted for about two- thirds 
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of all sterilizations performed. With the rapid rise in vasectomies in the 
1960s, this proportion fell. Though absolute numbers of sterilizations 
increased,  women  were receiving fewer of them in comparison to men, 
down to just 10  percent of such surgeries in 1967 to 1968.107
The campaign for sterilization acquired new urgency when Prime Min-
ister Indira Gandhi suspended parliamentary democracy and declared a 
state of emergency in June 1975. She was responding to growing economic 
crises and rising social unrest, the latter spearheaded by Jayaprakash Nara-
yan’s anticorruption movement and call for “total revolution.” Her posi-
tion became even more precarious when, in June 1975, the Allahabad High 
Court found Gandhi guilty of malpractice in the 1971 elections. JP, as he 
was known to his followers, called for the prime minister’s resignation, and 
the opposition staged a mass rally in New Delhi on June 25. Just one day 
 later, Gandhi claimed  there was a threat to India’s “internal stability” and 
instituted the Emergency.  Under Emergency rule, the government declared 
public meetings and strikes to be illegal, imposed press censorship, sus-
pended the right of habeas corpus, and amended the Maintenance of 
Internal Security Act (MISA) to allow the detention of po liti cal prisoners 
without charge. Thousands of  people  were subsequently arrested. Within a 
month, Gandhi announced a “Twenty- Point Program” that claimed to 
tackle economic crises by controlling prices and increasing production. 
Soon thereafter, Gandhi’s son and close associate Sanjay Gandhi created a 
“Four- Point Program” ( later Five- Point) that explic itly included  family plan-
ning among its development goals. Though he had no official government 
position, he became the unofficial leader of the government’s population 
control eforts, which he combined with a drive for urban slum clearance.108
In popu lar imagination, the Emergency is inseparable from state- 
sponsored sterilization, so much so that the period is known in Hindi as 
nasbandi ka vakt (the time of sterilization).109 Yet as we have seen, steriliza-
tion did not begin  under the Emergency but already had a history in India’s 
 family planning program. The system of targets and incentives— and their 
under lying coerciveness— had begun a de cade  earlier, as had the attempt 
to introduce the procedure on a mass scale. Moreover, the notion that ster-
ilization was a necessary fix for the country’s disenfranchised, alongside the 
claim that temporary birth control mea sures  were a luxury of the  middle 
classes, circulated openly within the state bureaucracy. The state’s interven-
tion into the reproductivity of its citizens and the claim that such intervention 
alleviated poverty and promoted national development—an economiza-
tion of reproduction— were established facts well before Sanjay Gandhi’s 
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Four- Point Program. In short, virtually all the systems and institutions of 
sterilization that underlay nasbandi ka vakt already existed before Emer-
gency rule.
Given  these continuities, what  were the potential ruptures that linked 
the Emergency so intimately to sterilization, such that Emergency time itself 
became marked as the period of nasbandi?  There was undoubtedly an inten-
sification of existing policies. For instance, in April 1976, nearly one year 
into Emergency rule, the minister for health and  family planning, Karan 
Singh, announced a National Population Policy (NPP) that established new 
targets and further increased incentives for sterilization. The NPP sought 
to downplay any coercive intent, as Ashwini Tambe notes, by adding the 
presumably less controversial goal of raising the age of marriage as a way 
to reduce fertility rates.110 Yet  there  were potentially coercive mea sures 
aplenty. For instance, the NPP proposed freezing states’ repre sen ta tion in 
Parliament based on 1971 census figures, thus rewarding states that slowed 
population growth with greater repre sen ta tion and instituting po liti cal pen-
alties for  those whose population grew more rapidly. At the same time, it 
explic itly enabled states to pass legislation for compulsory sterilization.111 
Maharashtra soon complied with a mea sure calling for the compulsory ster-
ilization of  couples with three or more  children; however, before this pol-
icy could be approved at the central level, the Emergency had ended.112 Thus, 
although coercive practices had existed implicitly before, the doors  were 
now open to more explicit acts of coercion. Fi nally, we must remember, the 
coercive efects of Emergency- era sterilization policies operated within a 
larger system of repression. The imprisonment of Gandhi’s po liti cal oppo-
nents and the suspension of civil liberties and press freedoms  were part of 
the po liti cal environment in which the Ministry of  Family Planning pur-
sued its sterilization targets.
This environment  shaped how the government enforced its steriliza-
tion policies. State employees  were pressed to meet their targets for moti-
vating private citizens to be sterilized, and thus sterilization became a 
condition for continued employment or promotion. However, it did not 
need to be the employee who was sterilized: workers could produce “ster-
ilization certificates” proving that they had “motivated”  others for vasec-
tomy or tubectomy. This pro cess of “motivating” another person to be 
sterilized encompassed all manner of coercive methods. In her study of 
the Emergency in one Delhi neighborhood, anthropologist Emma Tarlo 
unearths a number of strategies to obtain such certificates. One school-
teacher, for instance, announced that students whose parents refused to 
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turn over sterilization certificates would fail their exams. Housing officials 
demanded sterilization certificates to allot land to  people whose homes had 
been demolished during the Emergency drive for “slum clearance.” Steril-
ization certificates became a currency for obtaining state ser vices such as 
health care, food rations, and electricity or  water connections. To meet 
such demands, middlemen developed a thriving trade in such certificates— 
obtaining them through coercion and selling them to  others for a price. 
Consequently, Tarlo concludes, during the Emergency ordinary citizens 
became newly enmeshed in the drive for sterilization,  either as bodies to 
be sterilized or as agents in expanding the state’s reach to ever more “targets” 
for the surgeries. She describes this as a “forcible deal” struck by the govern-
ment with its own citizens, whereby “in theory, every one was  under pres-
sure [for sterilization]. In practice, that pressure accumulated downwards” 
in such a way that only  those at the very bottom rungs of society,  those who 
had nothing to ofer but their own bodies, underwent the surgery.113 In this 
sense, following Tarlo, the pressure for sterilization during the Emergency 
percolated from the highest echelons of power down  toward  those living 
on the margins of society— urban slum dwellers and the landless poor. As 
each layer of the  family planning bureaucracy transferred the burden of 
the surgery to a more vulnerable level, it was fi nally only the bodies of the 
poor that could satisfy the voracious demands for sterilization that kept 
the system  running.
Emergency- era sterilization targets applied to both  women and men, 
but it was the latter whose bodies  were targeted most intensively as the 
numbers surged. Thus, during 1975–76, when Emergency  family plan-
ning mea sures  were being put into place, government figures reported 
over 2.6 million sterilizations, of which just over half (53.9  percent)  were 
vasectomies.114 The numbers grew rapidly when the NPP and Emergency 
mea sures  were in full swing, during 1976–77. As nongovernmental organ-
izations like the FPAI continued to work closely with the state, steriliza-
tions totaled a staggering 8.2 million.115 Equally significant was the shift in 
proportion between men and  women; vasectomies totaled three- fourths of 
all surgical sterilizations, with tubectomies representing just 25  percent of 
procedures.116 Documentation of the Emergency’s  family planning pro-
grams, which is sparse in the archives, rarely discusses this shift from 
 women  toward men. We are left only to speculate about the “efficiency,” 
cost, and speed of this procedure in comparison with tubectomies. In this 
sense, the procedure aligned with the urgency  behind the NPP. Perhaps, 
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then, male sterilization was well suited to a state of emergency, represent-
ing both national crisis and solution.
The Emergency came to an end in January 1977, when Indira Gandhi 
announced elections, released po liti cal prisoners, and rolled back some of 
the government’s authoritarian mea sures. Elections, held in March of that 
year, led to a massive defeat for Gandhi, who lost even her parliamentary 
seat, and for the Congress Party, which lost its majority. The victorious 
Janata Alliance, a co ali tion of Gandhi’s opponents, came to power. Since 
that momentous defeat— the first faced by Congress at the national level 
since in de pen dence— scholars have tried to explain the Emergency in rela-
tion to the history of democracy in India, and of population control trans-
nationally. Connecting the two, Matthew Connelly argues that the elections 
of 1977 represented a repudiation of population control at the ballot box. 
“ People voting, one by one,” challenged the ideological under pinnings of 
the state’s drive to control population in the mass.117
Certainly, the rejection of sterilization played an impor tant role in the 
election campaign, but to represent 1977 as a demo cratic repudiation of pop-
ulation control overstates the case. During the campaign, opposition par-
ties and the media highlighted instances of horrific sterilization abuse; 
indeed, the Congress sufered its worst defeats in the states that Indira and 
Sanjay Gandhi had targeted most intensively for population control. How-
ever,  these electoral defeats  were temporary, as Congress and Gandhi 
returned to power just three short years  later, in 1980. In 1983, she received 
the United Nations Population Award, signaling the support of transnational 
population control networks. Consequently, some historians emphasize 
the continuities that make the Emergency less an aberration and more a 
product of failures in Indian democracy. According to Gyan Prakash, 
Indian po liti cal democracy never addressed the country’s lack of social 
transformation— its ongoing inequalities and entrenched hierarchies. The 
Emergency was a “last- ditch attempt to salvage with exceptional means 
the global and elite- driven proj ects of modernization” that did not have 
popu lar support, or popu lar interests, at heart.118 But while the means  were 
exceptional, the under lying norms of governance and po liti cal power  were 
continuous with the years before, and  after, Emergency rule. Understanding 
this period purely as aberration masks continuities in state policy regard-
ing poverty and population.119 Indeed, as this chapter suggests, although 
the Emergency was a distinct moment in the histories of both democracy and 
population control, nasbandi ka vakt would have been impossible without 
Ch a p t e r 4162
the institutions and ideologies that had already made ( women’s) reproductive 
bodies available for coercive control by the state. Moreover, Emergency’s 
end in 1977 did not signal the end of the government’s coercive reproduc-
tive and population policies.
Yet, in the immediate aftermath of Emergency rule,  there was much at 
stake in marking  those years as aberration. In the heady days  after the Janata 
victory, journalists, activists, and politicians suggested that the Emergency 
was a period of “excess.” It represented a moment when the government had 
overstepped its bounds, and Gandhi’s defeat in 1977 marked a reassertion 
of  these bound aries. This narrative of excess and aberration framed the 
inquiries of the Shah Commission, the Janata government’s only official 
investigation of the Emergency. The Shah Commission report, as Rebecca 
Williams argues, contrasted the Emergency with an implicit “normal” func-
tioning of the state but never questioned this normality. In the realm of 
population control, the commission’s narrative of the normal assumed that 
the program had been entirely voluntary prior to the Emergency and did 
not challenge the system of targets and incentives that had underpinned 
coercion since the 1960s.120 Perhaps most importantly, the Shah Commis-
sion did not question the reigning ideologies of population control, which 
insisted that sterilization of the poor on a mass scale was a necessary com-
ponent of  family planning and that population control was necessary for 
poverty alleviation and economic development. Thus, the under lying sys-
tems of coercion within India’s  family planning program remained 
unscathed while the commission excoriated the most egregious examples 
of repression during the Emergency years. The central question— for the 
commission as for the Janata government— became how to continue India’s 
population control program while rejecting the “excesses” of the Emergency 
years.
The Janata government answered this question, I argue, by making male 
sterilization the site and symbol of Emergency “excess.” That is, in the post- 
Emergency era, vasectomy itself stood in for the terror and repression of 
population control. We may trace this narrative in the Shah Commission 
report, which highlighted violent examples of coerced vasectomy, most 
notoriously in the Dujana House neighborhood in the old city of Delhi. 
Journalists understandably emphasized horrific instances of forced steril-
ization in trying to reckon with the vio lence of the Emergency. Even de cades 
 later, as Tarlo notes,  these narratives of the most explicit forms of force and 
coercion circulate in popu lar understanding of the period.121 But in the pro-
cess, I suggest, the Emergency’s attention to the male body was marked as 
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the “abnormal excess” that enabled the state’s “normal” targeting of female 
bodies to continue unquestioned.  Women’s bodies did not figure as central 
in narratives about the Emergency’s excesses, even though more than two 
million  women  were sterilized and  women alongside men  were ensnared 
in the government’s “forcible deal” to  either undergo the surgery or pro-
duce a sterilization certificate. Rather, even as the Emergency’s “excess” was 
understood to include only the most explicit acts of force in population con-
trol, post- Emergency critiques narrowed their attention to the targeting of 
male bodies as the sites of regulation.
Thus, rather than challenging the entire apparatus of coercive incentives 
and targets, or of the mass camps that prioritized numbers over safety and 
informed consent, the Emergency’s aftermath witnessed a renewed commit-
ment to reproductive regulation as a component of India’s development 
regime. But this time,  there was one impor tant diference: vasectomy was 
sidelined, so sterilization patients  were increasingly  women. Once again, the 
numbers help to tell this story. In the immediate aftermath of the Emer-
gency, sterilizations overall fell sharply, from more than eight million annu-
ally to less than a million in 1977–78. In that year,  women accounted for 
over 80  percent of all such surgeries, in contrast to the Emergency period, 
when vasectomies exceeded tubectomies by three- and fourfold.122 In other 
words, though the “time of sterilization” supposedly ended with the elec-
tions of 1977,  women continued to be sterilized, while men’s sterilizations 
decreased. Moreover, the efects of  these Emergency years and the “abnor-
malization” of male sterilization have had long- lasting efects. Since the 
Emergency, Indian men have had low rates of sterilization, compared both 
to  women and to worldwide averages.123 Meanwhile, female sterilization has 
become the most common form of contraception among  women in India.124 
This, too, is a legacy of the Emergency, which marked the reproductive reg-
ulation of male bodies as an excess of state power while continuing to 
intervene in the reproductive bodies and lives of its  women citizens.
Conclusion
In one scene of Deepa Dhanraj’s 1991 documentary film Something Like a 
War,  women are lined up for sterilization. A surgeon, while conducting the 
procedure, describes to the filmmaker the speed and efficiency of his 
techniques for laparoscopic sterilization, which enable him to “finish this 
operation in forty- five seconds.” Meanwhile, the camera lingers on the face 
of his patient, who is writhing in pain while her mouth is held shut by a 
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medical attendant. The camera then pans out across the clinic, where we 
see dozens of patients in states of bodily pain and sufering as they prepare 
for or recover from the surgery. Juxtaposing  these images with archival foot-
age of Indian  family planning propaganda, the film suggests that India’s 
“war” against population was in fact “something like a war” against  women. 
Yet despite this power ful critique,  women do not appear only as victims in 
the film. Dhanraj’s camera also dwells on an extended conversation among 
 women—of varying age, caste, class, and religious backgrounds— about sex-
uality, reproduction, childbearing, and their families. This conversation 
ofers an understanding of reproduction that transcends the official  family 
planning discourse. The  women’s words connect their reproductivity not 
to population or economy but to their desires, fears, and experiences in mul-
tiple, intimate ways.125 We may find accounts of the connections between 
reproduction and  women’s experiences in ethnographic research as well, as 
in Cecilia Van Hollen’s study of the routine insertion of IUDs in postpar-
tum  women in Madras public hospitals during the mid-1990s. Van Hollen 
documents that insertion occurs both with and without a patient’s consent 
and that  women sometimes resort to private clinics for IUD removal. As 
Van Hollen notes, the state’s mandate to insert IUDs postpartum can be at 
odds with  women’s own understanding of their bodies.  Those who do not 
want or like the IUD suggest that the device “does not agree” with their bod-
ies.126 Taken together, both film and ethnography suggest that  women assign 
multiple meanings to their reproduction that contradict the state’s claims 
about population and their fertility.
Reproduction, moreover, never exists in isolation but is enmeshed in a 
wider net of social, economic, and po liti cal relationships.  Here again, eth-
nography is revealing. Emma Tarlo’s research on the Emergency, discussed 
above, shows that although the stated purpose of sterilization was to con-
trol fertility and defuse the “population bomb,” this was not how or why 
patients encountered the surgeon’s knife. Rather, sterilization became the 
only means for  people to access what they needed to survive, from housing 
and employment to hospital treatment and education. Thus, “for many of 
 those at the bottom end of the socio- economic heap, life in Delhi without 
a sterilization certificate became untenable, if not impossible.”127 Narratives 
of life during the Emergency, therefore,  were dominated by an “idiom of sur-
vival” in which one’s reproductive capacity became something to exchange 
when one had nothing  else to give. This suggests the vast distances between 
the official discourses of the Emergency and the narratives of nasbandi ka 
vakt as  people understood and experienced it.
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Such evidence of experience is more difficult to access from the histori-
cal archive, which tends not to preserve—or ever rec ord— voices that are 
so at odds with the state’s discourse and imagining. Drawing upon ethnog-
raphy and documentary film can thus remind the historian that  there are 
entire lifeworlds not accounted for in the archives. At the very least, we must 
leave a place in our historical accounts for  these alternative understandings, 
and I return to that issue in the epilogue of this book. For now, we might 
remember that, despite the  family planning program’s attempts to make 
 women’s reproductive bodies a terrain for development,  women themselves 
did not passively accept  these interventions into their bodies and lives. They 
questioned the claims of “ser vice” rendered by the middle- class  family plan-
ner and evaded or rejected interventions that positioned their fertility as 
responsible for a population explosion. On occasion, they demanded some-
thing dif er ent or more— treatments for infertility, food and milk for their 
 children, education for their girls. Never simply the disindividualized and 
docile users  imagined by  family planners,  women assigned meaning to 




HETEROSEXUALIT Y AND THE HAPPY  FAMILY
In 1964, the Indian Ministry of Information and Broad-
 casting issued a pamphlet in several languages titled Methods of  Family 
Planning.1 True to its title, the Methods pamphlet outlined several contra-
ceptive options, but its main concern was with what  family planners termed 
“motivation.” It aimed to convince its readers— imagined as the literate 
Indian public—to limit their number of  children. “Remember!” the text 
admonished its audience in one striking image, “A small  family is a happy 
 family” (figure 5.1). The “happy  family” pictured includes a husband and 
wife and their two  children, a boy and a girl. The husband, seated on a 
chair, instructs his wife, who is seated more submissively on the floor, in 
 family planning methods. Their son sits in front of his  father while reading a 
book; the  daughter plays  behind her  mother. All are well dressed and smil-
ing. Hovering in the background of this domestic scene, evoking both 
prosperity and a desire for modern consumption, is a transistor radio.
The image situates birth control firmly within the bound aries of the het-
erosexual nuclear  family.  Women’s use of contraception is associated not 
with sexual freedom but with instruction by husbands in how to plan small 
families.  These small families are happy ones, suggesting that afective expe-
rience is connected to number. The small  family’s happiness is also linked 
to its modest prosperity, suggested by the radio, and its upward mobility, 
suggested by the educated son. Use birth control to limit your number of 
 children, the text implies, and you too may be able to educate your  children 
and engage in “modern” forms of consumption for your home. This seduc-
tive promise, which links heterosexual conjugality and reproductive regu-
lation to emotional fulfillment and material prosperity, circulated widely 
across Indian  family planning discourse. It recurred in government and 
commercially published texts, was repeated in the exhortations of population 
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controllers, and appeared in film, radio, and other media. This vision of 
the small and happy  family was the cornerstone of Indian  family plan­
ning’s quest to “modernize” the  family in the ser vice of national develop­
ment goals. It brought sexuality together with planning, affect with economy, 
and marriage with population control.
This repre sen ta tion of the small  family as happy, as I argue in this chap­
ter, established a heterosexual norm at the center of national planned devel­
opment. An appropriate heterosexuality, in other words, would produce 
the small and happy  family necessary to meet the nation’s economic needs. 
Of course, normative heterosexuality has a long and complex history; it did 
not originate in discourses about small families. However, the small  family 
configured heterosexuality, and attached it to nation and state, in specific 
ways. This  family centered upon a heterosexual conjugal  couple that ratio­
nalized its sexualities, reordered its affective relationships, and economized 
its be hav iors. Husbands and wives,  family planners argued, could use con­
traception to express a “natu ral” sexual desire that was marked as distinct 
both from Indian tradition and from Gandhian models of marital celibacy. 
figure 5.1. This repre sen­
ta tion of a husband, wife, and 
two  children promotes the 
idea that small families are 
both happy and prosperous. 
Courtesy of Rocke fel ler 
Archive Center.
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This “modern”  family also shifted its emotional attachments. Parents  were 
now to find joy in having a small number of  children, whom they could pro-
vide not only with increased love and afection but also with consumer 
goods. Happiness would derive from fulfilling this consumer desire while 
preparing one’s  children for a  future of upward mobility and increased eco-
nomic prosperity. Above all, the small and happy  family was characterized 
by its commitment to planning itself: planning when to engage in sexual 
intimacy, planning how many  children to have and at what intervals, and 
ultimately, planning for the  future. This plan- oriented heterosexuality both 
legitimized, and was legitimized by, national development planning. As the 
Five Year Plans held up a specific heteronormative ideal, in other words, 
normative claims about sexuality and  family helped to promote the act of 
national planning itself.
The small  family thus connected heterosexuality and economic planning 
in ways that might be familiar to readers of Foucault, for whom a “social-
ization of procreative be hav ior” in modern Eu ro pean history hinges upon 
economic and po liti cal rationalities. As he argues in The History of Sexual-
ity, the “Malthusian  couple” was a privileged object of knowledge within 
modern sexual discourses whose be hav iors  were regulated by “an economic 
socialization via all the incitements and restrictions, the ‘social’ and fiscal 
mea sures brought to bear on the fertility of  couples, [and] a po liti cal social-
ization achieved through the ‘responsibilization’ of  couples with regard to 
the social body as a  whole.”2 The “Malthusian  couple” was thus expected to 
align its reproductive sexuality to meet economic need for the benefit of “the 
social body.” One means of this alignment was birth control; thus, contra-
ception became a mechanism to put sexuality into the realm of economy— a 
key component of “transforming sex into discourse.”3 Scholars have dis-
cussed the salience of Foucault’s argument for understanding  family plan-
ning and the governance of population in several national contexts.4 My 
chapter builds upon this research, which incorporates a history of repro-
ductive regulation into a history of sexuality.5
Departing from the chronological par ameters of the previous chapters, 
this chapter examines repre sen ta tions of the small  family from the 1920s, 
when such images and discourses began to appear in print media, to the 
1960s and 1970s, when a small- family norm became yoked to discourses of 
population control. Throughout  these de cades, debates about sexuality, 
about emotion and afect, and about the rationalities of planning prolifer-
ated alongside claims about the value of small and happy families. Some of 
 these debates circulated regionally within India, whereas  others— especially 
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 those in English— aspired to national prominence from the 1920s onward. 
A range of writers and thinkers, from social reformers and sexologists to 
advertisers of birth control and sex tonics, made claims about the benefits 
of contraceptive use— and in the pro cess re imagined both  family and sex-
uality.  After 1952, when the Indian government committed itself to popu-
lation control, the small  family became a bedrock of national development 
planning and a key feature of the state’s  family planning propaganda.  These 
familial images circulated transnationally as well. Networks like the IPPF 
and the Population Council actively promoted small families across Latin 
Amer i ca, Africa, and Asia and viewed India as a test case to develop pro-
motional materials for other countries.6 As a result, the image of the small 
 family in the Indian government’s Methods of  Family Planning might have 
looked familiar to a viewership across the “Third World.” For  family plan-
ners, the small- family norm was both a universal ideal and a key compo-
nent of national pro gress.
To investigate the proliferating image of the small and happy  family, this 
chapter examines a wide variety of texts, including transnationally circu-
lating films and posters, state- sponsored propaganda campaigns, and com-
mercially published books and pamphlets. This includes substantial 
material in Tamil, which circulated among literate (and in some cases, non-
literate) Tamil- speaking populations in Madras Presidency,  later Tamil 
Nadu. I also include texts and films in En glish, produced both in India and 
abroad, that aimed for a national circulation. My focus is  limited to mate-
rials that explic itly advocate contraception, sterilization, or other methods 
of  family planning rather than works on reproductive sexuality more gen-
erally. Given the vast quantity of materials produced, alongside their some-
what sporadic and random collection within archives in India, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States, I do not claim that my sources are com-
prehensive or necessarily representative. However, taken together, they 
suggest how a wide range of Indian writers, illustrators, and government 
bureaucrats, alongside foreign communications experts, made the small and 
happy  family central to their claims about modernizing sexuality and devel-
oping the economy. I read them to ask how a history of heterosexuality 
might be written into the history of Indian population control and devel-
opment more broadly.
This chapter builds upon scholarship in feminist and queer studies of 
South Asia, which illuminates the connections between an Indian sexual 
modernity and proj ects of nationalism, social reform, and neoliberal 
capitalism.7 Temporally, much of this research centers  either on the late 
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colonial de cades or on the postliberalization years of the 1990s on.8 We are 
thus left with a chronological and theoretical gap in the scholarship, a space 
of silence about the sexual politics of India’s  family planning regime in 
the mid- twentieth  century, when the Five- Year Plans held sway over state- 
led development planning. Yet during this period, I argue, public dis-
courses about small, happy families transformed the terms by which both 
sexuality and economy  were understood. To investigate this history, I first 
turn briefly to its contexts in twentieth- century print culture. The chapter 
then considers the heteronormative ideal of the small  family in relation to 
its sexualities, its economic rationalities, and its commitments to plan-
ning. The final section examines the small and happy  family as a point of 
tension between the universalizing ambitions of population control and the 
specific anx i eties engendered by national diference.
Small Families in Print Culture
During the early twentieth  century, visions of the modern  family using birth 
control  were intimately linked to a proliferating culture of print. Increas-
ing numbers of publishing  houses and printing presses produced material 
in En glish and in Indian languages for a growing reading public.9 Although 
literacy rates  were low, representing just over 12  percent of the Indian pop-
ulation in 1941,  these literate classes became the readership for newspapers, 
magazines, books, and pamphlets that circulated in urban centers and in 
smaller towns.10 This surge in popu lar publishing, in India as elsewhere in 
the colonized world, was part of a growing culture of print capitalism that 
underpinned the rise of nationalism.11 But national identities  were not the 
only modes of identification forged by the new markets for print, nor did 
print materials displace older modes of communication or community.12 
Rather, while commercial publishing used nationalist ideologies as a legit-
imating paradigm, the new newspapers and books also engaged with top-
ics that  were not always, or necessarily, tied to the production of national 
subjects. Moreover, markets in print  were also linked to other markets, spe-
cifically to a growing consumer economy, whose products began to be 
advertised in newspapers and magazines.
Birth control was among the topics addressed within this new market 
for print. Unlike in Britain or the United States, colonial law in India did 
not explic itly prohibit the dissemination of birth control information, and 
such material was part of a thriving marketplace of “contraceptive commer-
cialism” during the 1920s and 1930s.13 Thus, as one con temporary observer 
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in Madras noted in 1931, “Books on the subject [of birth control] are to be 
found in any bookstall or publisher’s list and  whether they are read as mild 
pornography or for serious guidance, it is unlikely that they can fail to exert 
some influence.”14 As this quote suggests, the print culture of birth control 
skirted the bound aries of respectable and nonrespectable sexualities— 
suggestive at once of a titillating “pornography” and of “serious guidance” 
for married  couples.
This boundary was an impor tant one for publishers, since although 
contraceptive information was not forbidden, colonial authorities some-
times did prosecute sexually explicit texts on the grounds of obscenity. 
To avoid prosecution, as Charu Gupta notes in her study of Hindi sex 
manuals, authors and publishers “camouflaged themselves with the lan-
guage of sexual science” while si mul ta neously highlighting erotic ele-
ments through color pictures and in book advertisements.15 Indeed, the 
birth control manual perfectly allowed this combination of a science of 
sex with its eroticization. Such manuals implicitly disavowed nonnorma-
tive sexualities in  favor of heterosexual marriage and reproduction, while 
claiming to reveal the “truth” of sex through the scientific investigation 
of reproductive anatomy and physiology. Thus, the title of one popu lar 
Tamil birth control manual, Ilvazhkkaiyin irakaciyankal (Mysteries of 
wedded life), served as both invitation and admonition to readers while 
situating birth control as a necessary component of modern marriage 
and  family life.16
While the commercial publication of birth control manuals continued 
to thrive  after in de pen dence, the media landscape shifted with the Indian 
government’s official commitment to  family planning. The state entered into 
existing markets in print by publishing pamphlets and books and also uti-
lized newer media such as film and radio to spread its  family planning 
message. State involvement rendered birth control information part of a 
technocratic field of “communications,” to be practiced by experts and stud-
ied for its efectiveness in persuading  couples to use contraception. State- 
sponsored  family planning communication became one component of a 
larger drive to marshal media in ser vice of education and information to 
serve the state’s development goals.17
Working with commercial advertisers and with voluntary organ izations 
like the FPAI, the Indian government during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s 
launched media campaigns, promoted films, designed posters, sponsored 
radio programs, and in multiple other ways sought to fill public spaces with 
 family planning messaging.18 Thus, by 1968, about six hundred  family 
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planning programs  were broadcast on the radio each month.19 All movie 
theaters in the country  were expected to screen  family planning films in 
advance of features, and five hundred audiovisual vans brought media to 
rural areas. Ten thousand billboards and fifty thousand bus boards  were 
part of this proliferation of imagery as well.20 The state’s massive interven-
tion did not exhaust the spaces of sexuality discourses— which, as Sanjay 
Srivastava notes, also developed outside the realms of state control and reg-
ulation.21 However, the government’s entrance into the field of  family plan-
ning radically shifted the terms of “contraceptive commercialism” that 
characterized the interwar years, edging it away from the liminal spaces 
between respectable and nonrespectable sexualities and more firmly into 
the field of development. That is,  family planning messaging represented 
itself as a kind of public ser vice. Postcolonial  family planning manuals drew 
from the ideological and material resources of the state and claimed to 
uphold the ideals of the Five Year Plans.
Even while the government of India thus became a purveyor of birth con-
trol discourse, foreign funders  were also  eager to be involved in India’s 
 family planning experiments. For example, the Ford Foundation made its 
first population control grant to investigate “how to communicate and edu-
cate  people about  family planning.”22 This became a momentous begin-
ning to Ford’s many eforts in developing  family planning propaganda 
in support of a “small- family norm.” Foreign funders like Ford worked 
alongside the government of India to produce a range of media, such as flip 
books to be used by  family planning extension workers, posters to be hung 
on clinic walls advertising their ser vices, and pamphlets that “motivators” 
could share with their clients. Sometimes the messaging was more outland-
ish. Locomotive engines, for instance,  were painted with  family planning 
messaging. Even an elephant was pressed into ser vice, and it traveled to vil-
lages dispensing government- subsidized contraceptives and pamphlets 
with its trunk.23 Some of the Indian  family planning program’s most iconic 
messaging was produced in this period of the mid-1960s, notably the 
inverted red triangle and the stylized “four  faces” of husband and wife with 
son and  daughter. In sum, the contexts for visioning the small and happy 
 family— rendered modern through its size and use of birth control— changed 
significantly over time. Yet across  these changes, as we  shall see below, the 
normative ideal of the small  family promised its adherents a better future— 
characterized by modern sexualities, economic prosperity, and a commit-
ment to planning.
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Sexuality and the Small  Family
The questions of how to modernize sex and the appropriate relationship 
between sexuality and modernity occupied public discourse across the 
twentieth  century. For  family planners, any claims about modernizing sex-
uality had to grapple with Gandhian thought, which famously rejected 
birth control in  favor of a “married brahmacharya,” which Gandhi defined 
as follows: “When a man has completely conquered his animality, involun-
tary incontinence becomes impossible, and the desire for sexual gratifica-
tion for its own sake ceases altogether. Sexual  union then takes place only 
when  there is a desire for ofspring. This is the meaning of what has been 
described as ‘Married Brahmacharya.’ ”24 Gandhi’s claims drew upon clas-
sical Indian thought that marked brahmacharya as both a lifelong celibacy 
observed by ascetics and a stage of life practiced by young men. It was linked 
to notions about the conservation of semen, a practice thought to give spiritual 
power. Gandhi was one among many nineteenth- and early twentieth- century 
leaders who, as Shrikant Botre and Douglas Haynes note, “espoused brah-
macharya as a vehicle for renewing Indian masculinity and militancy.”25 
At the same time, Gandhi drew  women into the practice, noting in his 
famous debate with Margaret Sanger that  woman was not “prey to sexual 
desire to the same extent as man. It is easier for her than for man to exer-
cise self- restraint.”26 By suggesting that husbands and wives could practice 
brahmacharya through a control and transcendence of sexual desire, 
Gandhi opened up the practice to a much larger group of  people and ofered 
an alternative to contraception. Thus, rather than recommending control-
ling reproduction via birth control, he called for an “education of the pas-
sions,” which would enable married  couples to limit their  children while 
also gaining spiritual strength for the national strug gle.27
Supporters of  family planning, however, rejected  these Gandhian notions 
of brahmacharya as outmoded and unscientific and claimed instead to ofer 
a modern science of sex. Indian eugenicists and sexologists such as R. D. 
Karve, A. P. Pillay, and N. S. Phadke  were at the forefront of this modern 
revisioning of sexuality, which they claimed was in line with the “natu ral” 
functions of the  human body. In a quest to modernize sexual ideology and 
practice within India, they engaged with transnationally circulating sexology 
research that challenged existing social and sexual norms.28 In par tic u lar, 
they attacked brahmacharya as an unnatural practice that caused physical 
and psychological damage.29 In some cases, as Ishita Pande demonstrates, 
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promoters of sexual science developed a “chronological view of brahmachar ya” 
that marked it as a life stage before marriage that “ensured the preservation 
of semen and strength for conjugal sex.” This notion of brahmacharya as a 
kind of adolescence helped to situate sex— alongside work— within mod-
ernized clock time, linking sexuality to the chronological rhythms of con-
temporary capitalism.30 Naturalizing sexual activity as part of a life stage 
that followed brahmacharya also opened space for discussion of birth con-
trol within heterosexual marriage.
Birth control was an essential technology in the modernization of sexu-
ality, sexologists argued,  because it enabled the expression of sexual desire 
within marriage while meeting economic imperatives to control reproduc-
tion. This argument became the basis for contraceptive advocacy during the 
interwar de cades and gathered increasing momentum in the context of eco-
nomic depression. For instance, an advertisement for Contrafant tablets 
pulls together twin motives of sexuality and economy to suggest that “the 
necessity of preserving the health and beauty of  women and the increasing 
economic depression requires  every man to adopt methods of birth con-
trol” (figure 5.2).31  Here, contraception is represented as a rational choice 
made by men to limit reproduction without limiting sexual expression when 
faced with economic constraints. At the same time, the pills promise to pro-
mote the “health and beauty of  women,” perhaps gesturing  toward pleas-
ur able sexuality within heterosexual marriage. Contrafant, in short, was 
invoking a modernized sexuality that was at once pleas ur able and subject 
to economic needs and rationalities.
Like the advertisers of Contrafant, many authors of birth control man-
uals in the interwar period similarly positioned contraception as a sexual 
solution to economic scarcity and crisis. One example is the Tamil manual 
Karppatci, allatu cuvatina karppam (Contraception, or control over preg-
nancy). Like writers of many other such manuals in the 1920s and 1930s, 
the anonymous author begins with a justification for writing about birth 
control— and, by extension, sexuality. Although many readers might assume 
that discussing sexuality was “vulgar or disgusting,” in fact sexual inter-
course was a natu ral, even “divine” aspect of  human experience. This atti-
tude  toward sexuality was not new, the author hastens to add, but had been 
recognized by long- standing Tamil tradition. However, in recent times, 
married  couples had lost touch with this divinity  because of concern that 
their expression of desire would lead to the birth of many  children and con-
sequently the impoverishment of their families. The manual thus ofers birth 
control as a solution to the prob lem of sex in an era of scarcity. Contraception 
H et e rose x ua l i t y a n d t h e H a ppy Fa m i ly 175
would enable husbands and wives to experience the “domestic plea sure” 
(inpam) that came from sexual intimacy while also allowing them “to have 
fewer healthy  children who can be cared for properly.”32 Birth control would 
bring together traditional Tamil appreciation for reproductive sexuality 
within marriage and the insights of Western scientific research on prevent-
ing conception. Readers would thus be able to link a timeless and natu ral 
experience of sexuality to a distinctly modern approach to both repro-
duction and economic life.
The pseudonymous author Devidasan makes a similar argument about 
birth control, natu ral sexuality, and modern life in the Tamil birth control 
manual Karppatatai (Birth control, 1929). According to Devidasan, hetero-
sexual expression was a natu ral part of  human relationships: “Men and 
 women  were created to live together and their body structures  were also 
made for the same purpose. It is very necessary for man and  woman to have 
intercourse  after they attain puberty.”33 Implicitly disavowing nonhetero-
sexual intimacies, Devidasan identifies marriage as the necessary institu-
tion to contain this sexual expression, noting that anyone who “wants to 
enjoy conjugal happiness should get married.” Thanks to birth control, 
figure 5.2. This advertisement links sexuality and economy to promote Contrafant 
contraceptive tablets. Courtesy of the Wellcome Library.
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however, this “natu ral” (hetero)sexuality need not result in uncontrolled 
reproduction. Karppatatai develops this argument most dramatically in an 
illustration within the book. The drawing depicts a  woman standing on the 
edge of a clif over an ocean marked “poverty.” Menacing her in the fore-
ground is a demonic figure representing “wrong customs and habits.” 
Threatened by  these “wrong customs”— presumably conventional sexual 
norms involving marriage and widowhood— she risks a plunge into pov-
erty. The  woman’s only salvation is an airplane marked “birth control” that 
has landed nearby.34 Associated with that other quin tes sen tial modern tech-
nology, the airplane, birth control saves  women from the demonic cus-
toms that prevent the expression of a natu ral sexuality and from the poverty 
that results from un regu la ted reproduction.
Both manuals, published just a few years apart, make monogamous mar-
riage the linchpin of their arguments about modern sexuality and birth 
control. For instance, Karppatatai locates all sexual expression within the 
marital relationship, which Devidasan argues is good for the body, the mind, 
and the “development of the soul.”35 He supports  these claims through ref-
erences to Western sexual science, noting research from vari ous Eu ro pean 
countries suggesting that abstinence leads to physical and  mental debility 
and even early death. Rendering brahmacharya a life stage to adopt  until 
marriage, he insists it is “against nature and  human disposition to remain 
abstinent  after marriage. . . .  The feeling of love for each other is very natu ral 
and marriage is meant to enjoy that feeling.” Sexual expression, in turn, 
strengthens the marital relationship: “ There is natu ral and mutual attrac-
tion between male and female. . . .  [Sex] strengthens love in the pro cess.”36 
Karppatatai thus evidences an openness to discourse about sexual desire 
but also regulates sexual expression more closely in terms of time and life 
stage, such that a temporary period of brahmacharya gives way to norma-
tive heterosexual intimacy. The anonymous author of Karppatci makes a 
similar claim, noting that heterosexual marriage is the locus of  human sex-
ual expression.
 These arguments about modernizing sexuality via birth control trans-
formed the terms of public discussion about marriage during the 1920s and 
1930s. Marriage reformers in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
privileged romantic love as a force to improve marital relationships. A few 
de cades  later, in the context of growing movements for eugenics and a sci-
ence of sexuality, they increasingly looked  toward sex as the impetus for 
change. As J. Devika observes, reformers began to insist that sexual plea-
sure was necessary to sustain monogamous marriage; sexual satisfaction 
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became a mea sure of marital success.37 This argument created space for the 
supporters of birth control, who claimed that contraception could enforce 
heterosexual monogamy by locating the pleasures of sexual intimacy within 
marriage itself. Birth control thus became the bedrock both of moderniz-
ing marriage and of scientizing sex.
With the establishment of state- directed population control  after 1952, 
 family planners began to advocate what they termed a “small- family norm” 
as a sign of  these modern marital, sexual, and scientific ideals. They claimed 
that small families  were attuned to both the economic needs of the nation 
and the “natu ral” bodily and sexual needs of its citizens.  Family planning 
manuals published during the 1950s and 1960s thus began to cast the small 
 family as a site of aspiration. Families who had a small number of  children, 
they suggested, had successfully reconciled other wise competing claims 
between the expression of sexual desire, which was necessary for a happy 
marriage, and the need to limit  children, which was necessary for economic 
pro gress at the familial and national levels.  Whether published commer-
cially or by the government,  family planning manuals during the first few 
Five Year Plans tended to follow a similar pattern to make their case for the 
small  family. They often begin with a discussion of reproductive physiol-
ogy, followed by a social and economic argument about the need to control 
reproduction. Having situated the question of modern sexuality this way, 
they ofer birth control as a solution to the prob lem of aligning sexuality 
with economy. They typically conclude with a description about vari ous 
contraceptive methods.38
This growing dominance of a small- family norm in Indian  family plan-
ning contributed to a centering of heterosexuality that Nivedita Menon 
identifies as critical to modern nation- building proj ects. In her terms, the 
nationalist production of the “naturally heterosexual, properly bi- gendered 
(unambiguously male or female) population of citizens” went hand in hand 
with the “delegitimation of homosexual desire.”39 In India as in other 
national contexts, the production of heterosexuality thus depended upon 
marking homo sexuality as “deviant.”40 Normative heterosexuality was pro-
duced upon this foundational distinction from the homosexual; the small- 
family norm, I argue, was a key site for its elaboration. That is, proponents 
of the small  family insisted that not any and all heterosexual desires repre-
sented a modernized, nation- building sexuality. Rather, they valorized the 
regulated reproductive sexuality of the married  couple, while rendering all 
be hav iors and intimacies outside of this norm both antinational and anti-
modern. Repre sen ta tions of the small  family thus became co- constitutive 
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with discourses of normative heterosexuality. The small- family norm helped 
to elevate heterosexuality as serving the interests of national development. 
At the same time, the turn to national development—as expressed in het-
erosexual monogamous marriage— helped to separate discussion of sex and 
birth control from its associations with obscenity and situate it more respect-
ably within nation and  family. In this sense, the small- family norm  shaped 
the contours of a modern, respectable, and nationalized heterosexuality in 
the twentieth  century.
Menon notes further that nationalist respectability went hand in hand 
with a pro cess of desexualization, particularly for  women. Postcolonial dis-
courses marginalized  women’s desire, rendering them “respectably desex-
ualized.”41 While this was certainly true in many cases, attention to  family 
planning complicates this history. By the 1960s, through its programs of 
population control, the Indian state had emerged as a chief purveyor of sex-
ual discourse. Rather than desexualizing its citizens to render them 
respectable,  family planning discourse aimed to produce a specific sexual 
subjectivity that could align “natu ral” be hav iors with national planning 
goals. Thus, the promise of the small  family was not that it ofered a desex-
ualized and therefore respectable form of conjugality. Rather, it reinvigo-
rated conjugality by rendering sexual desire respectable only within 
heterosexual marriage. This was the promise ofered by the government’s 
Methods of  Family Planning (1964), discussed at the start of this chapter, 
which informed its readers that  after vasectomy, “men enjoy sex just as they 
did before.”42 Similarly, the author of a commercially published volume, 
Katal rakaciyam (Secrets of love, 1960), assured his audience that the best 
methods of contraception, including vasectomy, would not diminish male 
plea sure.43 In both  these cases, husbands are the subjects of heterosexual 
desire within the small  family, and wives are rendered the objects of their 
passions. This was, indeed, the most common framework of sexual dis-
course within my archive of midcentury  family planning manuals.
Nevertheless, a few texts did address female desire explic itly. Among sev-
eral Tamil examples is the oeuvre of T. S. Janakakumari, a  woman author 
who published prolifically on subjects of birth control, sexuality, and fer-
tility. Her 1959 book Kuzhantai ventam enral? (What if you  don’t want 
 children?) begins with the assertion that “in  today’s conditions, it is enough 
for every one to have three or four well- educated  children.”44 The book 
rehearses the statistics of Indian population growth, infant mortality, and 
familial poverty to argue that birth control is immediately necessary for the 
country. Having established this rationale for contraception, Janakakumari 
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devotes most of the book to explaining the male and female reproductive 
systems. She describes how conception occurs and how it can be avoided 
via the rhythm method, vari ous barrier methods, medicinal means, and sur-
gical sterilization. The text is addressed to both  women and men, and its 
discussion of female anatomy explic itly includes mention of female sexual 
arousal. Similarly, in her Kuzhantai ventum (You want a child, 1960), which 
was addressed to  couples concerned about infertility, Janakakumari stressed 
the “ human instinct” of heterosexual desire among  women alongside men. 
Of course, this desire is always contained within marriage and is “central 
to the marital relationship.”45 In Janakakumari’s work, therefore, both men 
and  women appear as desiring subjects, and their desires are best under-
stood within a framework of knowledge about reproductive anatomy and 
physiology. Having thus rooted sexuality in biology, Janakakumari suggests 
that it finds social expression via heterosexual monogamous marriage.
Another example of attention to female sexuality comes from Dr. K. 
Satyavati’s  Family Planning (Birth Control).46 Written in En glish by a “lady 
doctor” identified as a “sterility and fertility specialist,”  Family Planning 
opens with a neo- Malthusian view of population, then turns to sexuality. 
Like other manuals of the time, the text is premised on the notion that het-
erosexual desire is a natu ral, universal physiological response among all 
 people.  Family Planning naturalizes female sexuality in par tic u lar through 
reference to  women’s reproductive anatomy and physiology. Unusually 
among the texts I have considered from this period,  Family Planning even 
mentions female orgasm and sexual satisfaction. However, Satyavati’s 
acknowl edgment of female desire is not by itself a critique of patriarchal 
sexual norms;  there is no liberatory history of sexuality that can be read 
from  Family Planning’s attention to orgasm. Instead, the text valorizes mar-
ital heterosexuality as both natu ral and pleas ur able through its condem-
nation of  women’s sexual expression outside marriage. For instance, when 
discussing sterilization methods, Satyavati insists that a wife who under-
goes tubectomy to meet familial and national economic goals stands in stark 
contrast to “ widows and prostitutes” who do so for other reasons. In Satya-
vati’s terms: “Sometimes  widows and prostitutes want to get themselves 
sterilized for enjoying sexual relations safely. Such  people cannot be enter-
tained.”47 In other words, sterilization for controlling reproduction within 
marriage is admirable; the same procedure for sexual plea sure outside mar-
riage is not. The text’s insistence on the naturalness of female sexual expres-
sion thus collapses when confronted by the social constraints of widowhood 
or the long- standing division of  women into “wives” and “prostitutes.” Her 
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support for female sterilization hinges on this distinction. Sterilized 
wives stand as exemplars of sexual modernity who enjoy both sexual 
plea sure and the benefits of national development. This modernizing sexu-
ality left  little room for the “ widows” and “prostitutes” who peopled its 
margins, an implicit threat to the married heterosexual  couple.
Economy, Prosperity, and the Small  Family
The small and happy  family, envisioned as modern through its sexuality and 
reproductive regulation, stood in contrast to large families,  imagined as 
poor, sad, and backward. The association of large families with poverty has 
a long Malthusian genealogy, as we have seen. Malthus himself made this 
connection, as did his late nineteenth- century disciples, including Annie 
Besant and the Madras Malthusian League. Less explic itly Malthusian 
thinkers in the late nineteenth  century— including M. G. Ranade and Beh-
ramji Malabari, discussed in chapter 1— warned of the risks large families 
posed to the nation and its economy. By the interwar de cades, birth con-
trol discourses consolidated  these claims into visual images of large and 
small families. In contraceptive manuals and birth control advertising, the 
large and poor  family came to represent a dystopian vision. Marked as the 
opposite of the modern and well- regulated small- family norm, large fami-
lies with multiple  children signaled both sexual and economic disorder. 
With uncontrolled bodies and finances, the large  family exhibited not mod-
ernizing pro gress but rather its aimless and timeless lack. By contrast, the 
small  family mea sured its pro gress in clock time and life stage, signaling 
its happiness through its economies of both sex and finance. With the advent 
of state- sponsored  family planning, images of the small  family consolidated 
a range of discourses about  family life into repre sen ta tions of parents and 
their two or three young  children. Yet, as we  shall see, this image of the small 
and prosperous  family did not necessarily resonate with its intended audi-
ence, who may have understood both “ family” and “prosperity” diferently.
During the interwar de cades, in the age of eugenics and concerns about 
the health of the Indian “race,” birth control activists highlighted physical 
weakness alongside the poverty of large families. Consider, for instance, the 
birth control manual Karppatci, allatu cuvatina karppam (Contraception, 
or control over pregnancy, 1931), discussed above. The book’s cover image 
is a drawing of a husband and wife, obviously poor and hungry, surrounded 
by their numerous  children. Their poverty, which is evident from their torn 
clothing, thin bodies, and sorrowful expressions, stems from their “excess” 
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of  children, who huddle sadly around parents incapable of providing for 
their needs. Thus, from the outset, the reader of Karppatci encounters birth 
control as a remedy for familial poverty and bodily decline. The written text 
continues this theme, recommending that readers use birth control to 
“reduce the financial difficulties of the  family, and to keep the  mother in 
good health so she can care for the  family properly and maintain feelings 
of afection [anpu]  toward the husband.” Birth control would thus amelio-
rate “poverty, disease, and sufering . . .  the most impor tant goal is to have 
fewer  children who can be properly cared for.”48
Many texts and images made explicit comparisons between the large and 
impoverished  family and its smaller, more prosperous counterpart. This 
approach became increasingly common in both state- produced and com-
mercially published texts  after the First Five Year Plan. The Tamil pamphlet 
Pale Tankam: Kutumpak kattupatu virivakkappattatu (Well done Thangam: 
 Family planning explained), for example, ofers a visual contrast between 
planned and unplanned families (figure 5.3).49 The drawing of the planned 
 family with few  children shows a husband leaving the home on a bicycle, 
presumably on his way to salaried employment. His wife stands by with an 
older  daughter and younger son, both of whom carry books and are headed 
to school. All are well dressed. The husband’s dhoti, the wife’s sari and the 
flowers in her hair, the  children’s school uniforms, and the  family’s tile- roof 
 house all indicate prosperity and intergenerational upward mobility. Mem-
bers of the  family each have distinct responsibilities based on age and gen-
der, which are also linked to a specific organ ization of time. We glimpse 
this  family, apparently in the morning, as they head of to their respective 
occupations. The unplanned large  family, by contrast, has five  children, all 
of whom are apparently boys. The  mother comforts one crying child while 
 others play in the dirt. The  children do not wear school uniforms, and the 
 mother’s clothing indicates her poverty. The husband is seated on the veran-
dah, presumably without salaried employment, and their  house has a 
thatched (not tiled) roof. The organ ization of time and  labor that drives the 
small  family seems absent  here; this glimpse of their lives could have 
occurred at any moment and indicates their aimless lack of modern 
pro gress.
Thus, the small  family, which uses  family planning, is clearly poised to 
benefit from a modern economy. Its modest prosperity, as Nilanjana Chat-
terjee and Nancy E. Riley note, does not imply a Westernized or wealthy 
lifestyle but rather highlights the developmental promises of the Five Year 
Plans.50 The larger  family, marked as unplanned, remains outside this 
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promise of modernity and pro gress. Contraceptive advertisers  adopted 
this kind of contrasting image to market the economic rationalities of birth 
control. One example among many is an advertisement for Planitab Con-
traceptive Ovules, which appeared in the souvenir volume of the FPAI’s 
fifth All India  Family Planning Conference in 1964. The text proclaims, “It 
is the number that upsets your bud get” (figure  5.4).51 The references to 
numbers and bud gets evoke broader national population trends, but the 
imagery also links to individual families. Viewers see a drawing of a wife 
facing her husband while he gazes upward, preoccupied by “fooding [sic], 
clothing, education, housing,  etc.,  etc.” Meanwhile, in a separate draw-
ing, we see contrasting visions of a happy  family with two  children and a 
squabbling  family with many  children. Planitab is offered as the solution 
to the husband’s worries and preoccupations about the material necessities 
of daily life and is “reliable,  simple, [and] inexpensive.” Contraception is 
thus one purchase a married  couple can make in the pre sent in order to 
figure 5.3. The visual contrast between small and large families is emphasized in the 
Tamil captions. On the left: “Few  children: raising them is easy.” On the right: “Many 
 children: raising them is a torment.” Reproduced from the original held by the Roja 
Muthiah Research Library Collection.
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enable a lifetime of  future material consumption. By adopting economic 
rationality to plan their reproduction, the advertisement suggests, all fami-
lies can become prosperous in a modernizing India. Such comparisons cir-
culated in films as well. For instance, the Indian government production 
Three Families (1963) features a large  family, a  family with two  children, 
and a  couple that decides in  favor of  family planning. The FPAI sponsored 
a similar film, Enough’s Enough (1973), which emphasizes the disadvan-
tages faced by a large  family in comparison with a small one in terms of 
food, discretionary spending, and living space.52
Texts like  these highlighted the happiness, alongside the prosperity, that 
families might achieve through their small size. For instance, an advertise-
ment for Volpar contraceptive paste and foaming tablets, directed at physi-
cians, raised an alarm about large numbers. Under neath a graph with a 
sharp upward trajectory outlined by the text, “How many mouths to feed” 
is the following conclusion: “An increasing number of patients agree that 
the planned  family is the most likely to be the happy  family in the twentieth 
 century economy.”53 Another advertisement, this one for Protecto Jelly, 
envisioned what this familial happiness might look like (figure 5.5). View-
ers see a well- dressed and smiling husband and wife, both facing a laughing 
infant, whom the  mother carries. Their two older  children— a boy and a 
figure 5.4. Like many advertisements for contraceptives during the 1950s and 1960s, 
this one for Planitab highlights the expense of large families. Courtesy of the National 
Archives and Rec ords Administration.
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girl— face away from the viewer  toward their baby sibling and parents. 
Together, this  family forms a social unit entirely sufficient unto itself; all 
members gaze happily at each other in a circle of emotional fulfillment and 
joy. Accompanying text urges readers to use Protecto as a “reliable, safe, 
hygienic, easy to use method of birth- control.”54
The comparison between small/prosperous and large/poor families chal-
lenged conventional understandings of  children and wealth; it introduced 
diff er ent economic rationalities to underpin its heteronormative ideal. 
 Children, especially sons, had conventionally been a marker of prosperity, 
and we find traces of this popu lar mentality in proverbs, song, and classi-
cal lit er a ture. Moreover, for poor families, having many  children could be 
a strategy of economic survival, since both boys and girls contributed to the 
 family’s support from a young age. By contrast, the small- family ideal 
 imagined  children not as economic assets but as liabilities.  These  children 
did not work in the fields, care for their younger siblings, or perform house-
hold  labor. They attended school. However, for many poor families, this 
vision of a middle- class, school- going childhood may have been unattainable 
figure 5.5. This advertisement for Protecto Jelly envisions what familial happiness 
may look like. Courtesy of the Wellcome Library.
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or even undesirable, regardless of their size. Many villages lacked even a 
primary school, and  children’s access to education was mediated more by 
class, caste, and gender than by the size of their families. Consequently, 
 family planners’ assertion that prosperity followed the small  family— one 
that by definition was “poor” in  children— was at odds with popu lar under-
standing. For some  people, the dissonance between  these repre sen ta tions 
of small and large families and their own experiences may have made  family 
planning discourses unintelligible. According to one study that investi-
gated a  family planning poster campaign, for instance, many in the targeted 
audience identified with the image of the large  family with undernourished 
 children. Perhaps they saw themselves more in that repre sen ta tion than in 
the images of a smaller and wealthier  family.55
The image of the small  family may have difered from many  people’s 
experience in another way, insofar as it assumed a nuclear  family structure 
composed of husband, wife, and their minor  children. This unit was the 
basis of a proliferating visual imagery across urban and rural landscapes, 
such as one Tamil poster proclaiming that “a small  family is a happy  family” 
that hung outside the doors to the government’s  Family Planning Center 
in Vellore during the mid-1960s.56 In the genre of Indian calendar art, a hus-
band and wife, marked as Hindu and modestly prosperous, stand side by 
side facing the viewer. A young son stands in front of his parents, while the 
wife holds her baby  daughter; both  children gaze out to the viewer. This 
vision of the small  family displaced other notions of  family composition and 
familial relationships that may have privileged multigenerational  house holds 
composed of extended kin. Relegating  these other  family forms to the realm 
of “tradition” and nostalgia, repre sen ta tions of the small  family erased other 
 house hold members— grandparents,  uncles and aunts, other kin—to imag-
ine a domestic life centered on the relationships between the conjugal  couple 
and their young  children. This small- family norm also ignored families 
and  house holds whose composition was not patrilineal, thus contributing 
to a broader marginalization of heterogeneous  family forms as a condi-
tion of “modern”  family life.57 Happiness and prosperity  were not be found 
within  these extended and variable kin networks,  family planners implied, 
but within the warm afective bonds of a smaller group. In par tic u lar, they 
 were rooted in the attachments— both emotional and sexual— between 
husband and wife.58
The  children of the small  family  were invariably represented as one boy 
and one girl; if a third child was pre sent, as in the advertisement for Pro-
tecto, it was typically a baby of indeterminate gender. On the one hand, this 
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vision of a small planned  family implied that the gender of the child was 
less relevant than the number. In a social context of widespread son prefer-
ence and disparate sex ratios in some regions, perhaps this claim suggested, 
subversively, that a  daughter— equally with a son— was also a descendant 
and heir. Given the history of debate about the childhood of girls in mod-
ern India,59 this proliferating imagery may have helped to  counter a long- 
standing demographic and repre sen ta tional absence of the girl child. Indeed, 
some designers of such images noted that specifying only two or three 
 children was a “bold and risky step” since it pushed against Indian tradi-
tions that valued sons, regardless of the number of  children; they took the 
risk  because they feared the demographic consequences of a fourth child.60
On occasion, state- sponsored publications acknowledged the demo-
graphic impact of son preference, noting that it might lead to large families 
since parents would have multiple  children in hopes of bearing sons.61 How-
ever, repre sen ta tions of the small  family generally sidestepped any direct 
confrontation with son preference and the devaluing of girl  children. The 
state discourses of  family planning during the 1950s and 1960s did not chal-
lenge the patriarchal ideologies and institutions that encouraged parents 
to value sons over  daughters. In the imagery of the small  family, son pref-
erence was not even explic itly mentioned, let alone questioned or rejected. 
Moreover, within the archives, I have not found a single repre sen ta tion of a 
small  family from this period that includes  children of only one gender. 
Thus,  family planners avoided asking  whether a  family composed of par-
ents and their two  daughters was also a small and happy  family. This unasked 
question, and its implied refusal to engage with the ideological and eco-
nomic structures that underpinned gender disparities, lurked  behind the 
image of the small, happy  family.
Planning Families for the  Future
Underpinning the small  family’s economic rationality and sexual moder-
nity was a commitment to planning itself. Planning signaled the small 
 family’s orientation  toward an  imagined  future, marked as wealthier, more 
modern, and more joyous than the pre sent. In this sense, the discourse of 
the small  family was deeply embedded in, and contributed to, a larger nar-
rative about national development, which claimed that the  future would 
be better than the past and pre sent through the mechanism of planning. 
While the Five Year Plans signaled this orientation  toward  future pro gress 
on the national and global stage, the individual  family’s planning signaled 
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a  future orientation on the part of ordinary citizens. Planning, moreover, 
implied a specific relationship to time and a willingness to defer pre sent 
desires to meet  future needs. In other words, the discourses of  family plan-
ning promised a better  future to  those families who delayed or prevented 
childbearing in the pre sent. Significantly, this “better  future” was invariably 
defined in and through consumption.  Family planning discourses oriented 
the small  family  toward markets, suggesting that reproductive regulation 
would eventually allow access to the pleasures of consumer capitalism. With 
market- based consumption thus  imagined as a sign of modernizing pro-
gress, planning one’s  children became the necessary precondition for entry 
into more prosperous  futures.
Government  family planning manuals called upon citizens to plan their 
 family lives as a ser vice to the nation. For example, the Madras government’s 
official  Family Planning Manual (1956) called for readers to remember that 
“ family planning is no longer a  matter of purely private interest to married 
 couples. The welfare of the nation as a  whole  will be promoted or retarded 
by what  every married  couple does or fails to do about  family planning.”62 
The suggestion of “no longer” implies that, although the decision to use con-
traception may once have concerned only husbands and wives, it was now 
vital for national development. As the text argues, this urgency was due to 
an imbalance between birth and death in India, resulting in population 
growth and causing food shortages, rationing, and unemployment.  Under 
 these circumstances, it was a patriotic duty to regulate reproduction: 
“ Whether you do or fail to do your duty is not merely a  matter of concern 
to you and your  children. It is a  matter of vital concern to that larger  family 
to which we all belong— ‘The Indian Nation.’ ”63
The Madras government’s Tamil handbook Kutumpa kattupatu titta 
kaiputtakam ( Family planning instructional handbook, 1962) takes  these 
claims further. Since the country was unable to “grow food crops corre-
sponding to the ever- increasing population,” citizens needed to recalibrate 
the balance by regulating their reproduction: “By controlling the population 
explosion, each  couple is contributing to the welfare of the country, and to 
implementing national development schemes, thereby discharging their 
duties for their country.”64  Family planning is thus the sign of responsible 
citizenship, a “duty” that citizens owe to the nation in the wake of in de pen-
dence. However, this position of the responsible citizen- planner was not 
equally available to every one; heterosexual monogamy was its necessary 
precondition. Husbands in par tic u lar  were the rational agents of planning. 
Addressing them directly, the manual exhorts men “to make  every efort 
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to ensure that your wife gets pregnant only  after a minimum period of three 
years  after the birth of your first child; you should plan  things accordingly.”65 
The husband’s plans within the space of the home thus paralleled the Five 
Year Plans within the space of the nation.
Even more than in the exhortations of government manuals, the call to 
plan for the  future unfolded most fully in stories about families. Didactic 
in their approach,  these narratives invited readers to imagine the life course 
of a single  family over time. The texts  were relatively formulaic and tended 
to revolve around similar plot points. Beginning with a  couple’s marriage 
or birth of the first child and continuing through to a decision about  whether 
or not to use contraception, the stories concluded with a vision of the  family’s 
prosperous or impoverished  future.  These narratives about  family life 
echoed the message about small/prosperous and large/poor families dis-
cussed above. But unlike an image— which usually pictured a  family at one 
moment in time— stories about families explored the relationship between 
past, pre sent, and  future. Asserting that choices in the pre sent moment 
afected  future happiness,  these stories valorized husbands and wives who 
weighed the pre sent delights of many  children against a  future of scarcity 
or plenty. With a more explicit focus on change over time,  these narratives 
crafted a more thorough commitment to the  future.
One example of  these narratives is a didactic Tamil short story men-
tioned above, Pale Tankam: Kutumpak kattupatu virivakkappattatu (Well 
done Thangam:  Family planning explained, 1961). Written by Ca. Pasyam, 
the story was published commercially as a short pamphlet— but, as we  shall 
see, its themes adhere closely to the government- sponsored  family planning 
manuals of that era. Pale Tankam narrates the early married life of Thangam 
and Murugan, whose names mark them as Hindu (likely caste Hindu). 
Pasyam represents them as ideal subjects and agents of national develop-
ment. Murugan is a salaried worker in a bicycle factory, signaling his 
position in the modern industrial sector rather than in a “traditional” occu-
pation in agricultural  labor. His wife, Thangam, is described as beautiful, 
literate, and good at managing  house hold expenditures. She is an educated 
 house wife and companion to Murugan. The two newlyweds live blissfully 
together, since “Thangam was Murugan’s life’s breath [uyir].”66
When Thangam becomes pregnant, she and Murugan have a sober dis-
cussion about the shape of their  future  family. Murugan, as the gentle ped-
agogue, suggests to Thangam that having only a few  children  will benefit 
both the  children themselves and the  couple’s own loving relationship. 
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Contrasting his goals with an impoverished neighboring  couple that has 
many  children, Murugan suggests that “we should always live together as 
one. Let’s have just one or two  children. Only then  will we be able to pay 
attention to them and raise them well.”67 He goes on to enumerate the 
same reasons for  family planning that  were common to public discourse 
in this period: having fewer  children would be good for both infant and 
maternal health; it would enable the  family to be prosperous; it would con-
tribute to national development. Murugan also teaches his wife about 
government programs that ofer  free sterilizations at state- operated  family 
planning centers.
Throughout, Thangam is positioned as a somewhat recalcitrant subject. 
With visions of a large  family, she has doubts about each of Murugan’s argu-
ments. Nevertheless, he insists that  family planning  will be good for 
 couples, families, and the nation: “Each  family should plan their size to hav-
ing one or two  children based on their income. Only then can the  family 
prosper. . . .  Husband and wife  will live without fights. Each  couple should 
plan their  family for the betterment and growth of the nation.”68 Thangam 
fi nally agrees to this alignment of familial happiness, economic rational-
ity, and future- oriented planning. At the end of the story, Thangam and 
Murugan become so confident of their choices that they persuade their pro-
lific neighbor, Velayuthan, to inquire with a doctor about birth control 
methods. Their conclusions are summed up in an illustration captioned, 
“ Family planning is impor tant for implementing the Five Year Plan for 
national development” (figure 5.6).69 The image shows a well- dressed  family 
composed of husband, wife,  daughter, and son; in the background is their 
tiled- roof  house and fertile agricultural land.
In Pale Tankam,  family planning and national planning thus occur in 
tandem, merging sexual with economic rationalities to produce a better 
 future. For Thangam and Murugan, a modernized sexuality enables a mod-
ern economy; their careful sexual and economic planning enables their 
 future prosperity. This was the seductive promise of the small- family ideal. 
Moreover, like other texts, Pale Tankam makes Murugan the chief agent of 
such planning; Thangam’s role is to understand and acquiesce. Murugan’s 
reward for enacting this patriarchal authority is not only a grateful and lov-
ing wife but a  future with a tiled- roof  house, plenty to eat, and happy 
 children. Pale Tankam does not dwell on this  future, perhaps leaving read-
ers to imagine the joy and wealth that may flow from the  couple’s decision 
to limit childbearing.
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Another narrative, the English- language We Two Our Two, makes  these 
 futures more explicit. This is an illustrated comic book published by the 
Central Board for Workers’ Education (India) and financed by the UN Fund 
for Population Activities. Intended for an Indian working- class audience, 
the book was likely published in the late 1960s. We Two Our Two explores the 
pleasures and rationalities of consumption- oriented  family planning. The 
color- illustrated comic book tells the story of Ram, the first- person narrator, 
and his wife, Rashmi. When the narrative opens, Ram has just completed 
a training course and secured employment in his town’s textile mill. The 
accompanying image— the first in the book— shows Ram touching his wid-
owed  mother’s feet and receiving her blessing upon obtaining a position in 
the industrial workforce. We see Ram and his  mother inside their home, a 
bare but clean room furnished only with a  table and single chair. Through 
an open door, the viewer glimpses a factory with smokestacks, signaling 
Ram’s  future employment. Soon thereafter, Ram marries Rashmi, described 
as a “coy  little girl from a neighboring village.”70
figure 5.6. “ Family planning is necessary for implementing the Five Year Plan for 
national development.” Reproduced from the original held by the Roja Muthiah 
Research Library Collection.
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Rashmi gives birth to their first child, a son; signaling the modernity of 
the  couple’s choices, the birth takes place in the hospital. Ram’s  mother wel-
comes her grand child with the words, “This is the  will of God!” As the 
child grows, Rashmi “thought of lending her helping hand to our income” 
and takes up a “small job” in a local welfare center, while Ram’s widowed 
 mother cares for their son. Soon, Rashmi becomes pregnant again, leaves 
her job, and gives birth to a  daughter. With two  children and only one 
income, Ram and Rashmi strug gle to manage their finances; in order to buy 
milk for their  daughter, they are forced to forgo small luxuries, such as toys 
for their son. One night, Rashmi shares her worries that a pos si ble third 
child may shatter their dreams: “What about our ambition of having our 
own small  house?  Shall we never be able to save for the  future?”71 She is con-
cerned, as well, that they  will be unable to provide three  children with 
nutritious food, take care of their health needs, and send them to school. 
Thus, although Ram and Rashmi are presented as an ideal working- class 
 couple, their finances do not allow for a third child. Even Ram’s steady 
employment in Indian industry and Rashmi’s “supplemental” income 
through welfare work can barely support two  children.
As Ram soon recognizes,  family planning ofers a solution to the  family’s 
financial precarity. In a visit to his  union office, he encounters his friend 
Rahim, who introduces him to the idea that  couples can plan their  children. 
Ram is marked as Hindu, and it is significant that he learns of  family plan-
ning through the Muslim Rahim. In keeping with the text’s broader claims 
that all Indian workers need to practice  family planning, Rahim emerges 
as an elder confidant, already experienced in life and ready to guide the 
Hindu protagonist.  There is no discussion by  either Ram or Rahim about 
religious objections to  family planning. The decision is entirely economic, 
and planning is framed as a universal and modern common sense across 
religious bound aries. In the meantime, Rashmi has also learned of  family 
planning from a neighbor and suggests to Ram that “our  future is in our 
own hands.” This is the moment that Ram and Rashmi make an explicit 
commitment to the  family’s  future as a reason and impetus for  family plan-
ning. Ready to seize their destiny, they visit a  family welfare clinic, where 
they learn of methods from a doctor. The image accompanying this text 
highlights an IUD alongside vari ous foams and creams. Ram and Rashmi 
decide to adopt  family planning methods. Although Ram’s  mother has been 
an impor tant figure in their story so far, they do not consult her. Rather, 
the choice involves only the conjugal  couple, represented as the sole agents 
of planning. They “or ga nize better our privacy” by hanging a curtain between 
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themselves and their  children’s sleeping mats, and “make changes . . .  to 
adopt  family planning.”72 Without referencing sexuality explic itly, the text 
nevertheless suggests that the reor ga ni za tion of sexual intimacy—an essen-
tial component of the logic of planning— represents the  couple’s commitment 
to the  future of their  family.
The benefits from Ram and Rashmi’s decision to align their  family’s 
finances with its reproductive  futures are immediate. Rashmi is less tired, 
and the  children thrive. Soon, the  family can engage in discretionary 
spending and begin consuming modern commodities. On Ram’s birthday, 
he “had a surprise when Rashmi presented me [with] a small transistor 
radio.” The accompanying image suggests the significance of this gift. Ram 
is surrounded by his joyful wife and  children, all looking happily at the 
radio, which occupies the center of the drawing. Meanwhile, Ram is able to 
purchase an even bigger gift: “On the next anniversary of our marriage I 
told her about my acquiring a small  house through the trade  union hous-
ing cooperative society.” On the advice of Rahim, Ram also purchases an 
insurance policy that  will provide for his  daughter’s marriage. One of the 
final images of the text shows Ram and Rashmi as a happy, companionate, 
and prosperous  couple drinking tea together in a new home. In the back-
ground, we see the material evidence of their financial success. A stove, a 
 water drum, the teapot and cups, and pots and dishes populate their kitchen. 
The transistor radio occupies pride of place on a  counter (figure 5.7).73 The 
image seems full of  these modern con ve niences, in contrast to the bare room 
that held Ram and his  mother’s lives at the start of the text. Via limiting 
their  family when young, the Ram and Rashmi in  middle age can now pro-
vide for their  children, consume modern products in their  house hold, and 
enjoy leisure time in each other’s com pany.
We Two Our Two ofers a vision of the prosperous working- class  family 
that entirely sidesteps fundamental social or economic transformation. 
Though Ram is employed in the industrial workforce— arguably the most 
“modern” of occupations in postcolonial India— his wages alone are insuf-
ficient to maintain his  family. When faced with a tight bud get  after the birth 
of his  daughter, Ram never raises the question of higher wages. Though 
he is portrayed as a  union member, the  union ofers no support in this 
regard  either; it serves only as a welfare organ ization, enabling Ram to 
purchase a  house and insurance. If the working classes have no power 
over their wages in We Two Our Two, what can they control? For this text, 
the answer is deceptively  simple: workers can plan their own reproduction 
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in accordance with their financial goals. The visit to the doctor, the reor-
ga ni za tion of Ram and Rashmi’s sleeping arrangements, and their deci-
sion to buy a  house, radio, and tea set instead of having more  children all 
signal their commitment to rationalizing their reproductive sexuality and 
financial decisions in the pre sent to usher in a more prosperous  future. 
More than Ram’s employment, it is this planned alignment of reproduc-
tion with finance that produces the  family’s modest prosperity at the end 
of the text.
Ram and Rashmi’s economization of their  family life, which weighs each 
reproductive decision in light of its  future financial costs, marks their com-
mitment to planning and to  future prosperity more broadly. Foregoing 
reproduction enables the  family’s entrance into a world of market- based 
consumption, companionship, and joy. On one level, this vision of a future- 
oriented small  family was central to the imagination of a specifically Indian 
modernity, especially during the reign of developmentalist ideologies in 
the mid- twentieth  century. Ram and Rashmi thus emerge as ideal citizens 
who plan with an eye  toward pro gress. On another level, We Two Our Two 
also participated in a transnationally circulating discourse that valorized 
small families as a necessary step  toward modernity in Asia, Africa, and 
Latin Amer i ca, to which I turn next.
figure 5.7. According to We Two Our Two,  family planning enables Ram and 
Rashmi’s prosperity and leisure time. Courtesy of the Ward M. Canaday Center for 
Special Collections, University of Toledo.
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Universalizing the Small  Family
During the 1960s, in light of fears about a planetary “population bomb,” dis-
courses of the small  family  were not only national but also aspired to global 
circulation and relevance. Population controllers claimed that the  future of 
the planet hinged upon millions of  people around the world adopting a 
small- family norm and limiting their childbearing. The image of the small, 
planned  family thus became ubiquitous. In many countries, as Matthew 
Connelly notes, “posters, films, flip charts, and folk per for mances depicted 
the ‘unplanned’  family as unclean, unhealthy, violent, and ugly.”74 Mean-
while, the planned  family was not only small but more beautiful. Sur-
rounded by consumer goods, this  family benefited from better housing, 
health care, and education. Consequently, the image of the small  family we 
see in texts like We Two Our Two represented a distinctively “Indian” small 
 family, but one that also resembled the aspirations of  family planners in 
many other parts of the world. Moreover, beyond its seemingly endless rep-
etition across population control programs globally, the discourse of the 
small  family also claimed a universalizing impulse. Supposedly relevant 
across national bound aries and achievable by anyone, the small  family func-
tioned as a universal sign of modernity and pro gress and signaled that a 
population had conformed to global norms. Yet, as this section  will show, 
 these universalizing aspirations of the small- family norm also grappled with 
national, racial, and class diference and  were haunted by fears of failure. 
While maintaining that every one would benefit from limiting their fami-
lies,  family planners worried that the rationalities of planning  were not, in 
fact, understood by all  people. Pushing for the economization of  family life, 
they also despaired that some  people could not translate relations of kin-
ship and afect into economies of consumption and  future planning.  These 
anx i eties  shaped the attempt to universalize small- family norms in the era 
of the population bomb.
The animated film  Family Planning (1968), a Disney Studios venture with 
the Population Council, made  these universalizing ambitions explicit.75 
According to the Population Council, the impetus  behind  Family Planning 
was to create a “universal film on a topic of universal concern,” and a color 
cartoon was “one of the most familiar, most popu lar, and most efective 
materials for mass exposure.” The ten- minute film was the most expensive 
of the kind for its time and aspired to reach “men and  women of reproduc-
tive age in the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin Amer i ca.”76 
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To this end, it was translated into twenty- five languages, including Hindi, 
Urdu, Bengali, and Tamil.77 In hopes of appealing to  people across the “Third 
World,” the Population Council and Disney sought characters that would 
resonate with all viewers.
The film introduced as its protagonist a “common man,” described by 
the Population Council as a “composite of men from major regions of the 
world.”78 Despite this claim to represent all  people, one critic notes that the 
result was a “curious ethnic mix: [the common man] speaks with a Yiddish 
inflection, looks Italian, and has an Indian wife dressed in a sari.”79 The 
common man and his wife are introduced to  family planning with the help 
of Disney’s cartoon character Donald Duck, whose charts help to explain 
the prob lem of population growth and who ofers birth control as a solu-
tion. An authoritative narrative voiceover explains that  family planning is 
a “new kind of personal freedom” and ofers guidance to the common man 
and his wife. The film follows them as they envision their  future as taking 
two paths, and the resulting narratives may be familiar to us by now. The 
large  family is poor and hungry. By contrast, the small  family engages in 
the pleasures of consumption, from abundant food at  family meals to a tran-
sistor radio for the  family’s enjoyment. Eventually, the common man and 
his wife are persuaded to choose their  family’s  future prosperity by adopt-
ing  family planning methods. As the narrator concludes, “ Every  couple has 
the opportunity to help build a better life not just for themselves, but for 
 people everywhere. And all of us have a responsibility  toward the  family of 
man, including you.”
While the narrative voiceover thus claims a universal applicability, we 
have seen that the Population Council aimed for an audience of Asians, 
Latin Americans, and Africans. The film itself marks its characters as not 
white and not North American or Eu ro pean. The common man’s diference 
from “First World” audiences is also mea sured by gender norms; through-
out the film, his wife is too shy to ask questions of the narrator and whis-
pers her queries to her husband instead. Moreover, the common man’s 
prosperity is mea sured by a radio, not a tele vi sion, suggesting his distance 
from the wealth and consumption practices of US families. In this sense, 
the film modeled a vision for “modern” families in the Global South, a vision 
of modernity that gestured  toward universality but was also marked by its 
diference. While  every  family could plan for its  future by planning repro-
duction,  these  futures themselves diverged. The prosperity of the small 
 family, held out as a seductive promise to  couples everywhere, hinged on 
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national and class diference. The “common man” in the “developing” world 
could aspire, at best, to a radio. As Donald Duck explains in the film, an 
error of planning—an extra child— could erase even this goal. Thus, while 
all  people (or men, in the language of the film)  were expected to orient 
themselves to  future consumption and to a market economy, only some 
men could experience their full rewards. The  others must content them-
selves with a more modest prosperity, a diference that is ever pre sent but 
never addressed within transnational discourses of the small  family.
Despite appeals like  Family Planning, population controllers  were con-
cerned that the rationalities of planning would not, in fact, translate to the 
“Third World” in general or to India in par tic u lar. They feared that fail-
ure would be the inevitable result of their eforts. Specifically, organ izations 
like the IPPF, the Ford Foundation, and the Population Council expressed 
anxiety that the small- family norm was too novel and too “modern” to bridge 
the diferences between India and the West. Even as they aimed to jump- 
start a demographic transition through a reor ga ni za tion of  family life, they 
worried that Indian families  were simply too dif er ent— too backward, too 
mired in tradition—to adopt this ideal. Two Ford Foundation con sul tants 
summed up  these fears in 1971, nearly two de cades  after the organ ization 
had begun funding  family planning in India: “ Family Planning in India is 
still somewhat of an alien creed. This is  because a small  family is not entirely 
a question of numbers; it carries with it a par tic u lar way of life which 
includes the diminishing authority of the wider kin group with a corre-
sponding increase in the authority of the immediate parents; emancipa-
tion of  women from the drudgery of child- bearing accompanied very often 
with their social employment and consequent financial in de pen dence and 
greater scope for companionship between man and wife.”80 However, the 
con sul tants lamented, the conditions that provoked such changes in 
the West  were lacking in India, where “concepts such as ‘emancipation of the 
individual’ ”  were making only “hesitant pro gress.”81 Perhaps India, then, 
would always lag  behind the West’s march  toward modernizing families, 
sexualities, reproduction, and economies. For transnational population 
controllers, the small  family, while repeated across India’s print and visual 
landscape, still seemed elusive.
Within  family planning communications— a technocratic field devoted 
to population control messaging that emerged in the 1960s— debates ensued 
about  whether Indians could truly be convinced through “rational” argu-
ment to adopt a small- family norm.  These debates grew especially fraught 
by the  middle of the de cade when, as we have seen, the Indian government 
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put  family planning on a “war footing.” Two of the leading communications 
experts working in  family planning at the time, Deep K. Tyagi and Frank 
Wilder, raised  these concerns explic itly. Tyagi was assistant commissioner 
for media in the Indian government’s Department of  Family Planning; he 
worked closely with Wilder, who was hired by the Ford Foundation as con-
sul tant to the government of India in mass communication for  family plan-
ning. Together, Tyagi and Wilder pioneered some of India’s most iconic 
 family planning imagery. They developed the symbol of the inverted red 
triangle, which would eventually mark all of the state’s  family planning 
eforts, from signs posted on dispensaries to the armbands of  family plan-
ning extension workers.
The team also produced the famous “four  faces” symbol, which repre-
sents the “stylized front- view  faces of a smiling  mother and  father, a son and 
a  daughter.”82 Accompanying text usually included the message “Have only 
two or three  children . . .  that’s plenty!” (figure 5.8).83 The “four  faces” relied 
upon the small- family norm; the image represented the ideal members of a 
properly constituted small  family. At the same time, as Tyagi and Wilder 
argued, the four- faces symbol sidestepped the aspirational claims of other 
figure 5.8. This message from the Indian government’s Department of  Family 
Planning exhorts its audience to “Have only two or three  children . . .  that’s plenty! 
Follow your doctor’s advice.” Courtesy of the Ward M. Canaday Center for Special 
Collections, University of Toledo.
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images. Rather than figuring the small  family as a site of desire in a ratio-
nal economization of  family life, it represented an explicit call to limit 
childbearing: “Does the small- family- happy- family message transmit the 
specific action to be taken? Can fertility programs succeed if  people are left 
to ‘Have Only  Those  Children You Can Aford?’ And are  these not rather 
elusive concepts for a villa ger whose personal aspirations do not parallel 
 those of the educated program administrator or the foreign communica-
tions advisor?”84 Tyagi and Wilder aimed to move away from “elusive con-
cepts” that idealized the small  family  toward a “direct exhortation to have a 
specific number of  children.” More complex messages, including  those that 
asked  people to plan their families or explained vari ous contraceptive 
options,  were liable to be misunderstood.  These messages missed their 
mark, Tyagi and Wilder insisted, due to the “ great intellectual distance 
between message- maker and audience. . . .  By definition, the message can 
be got across only within the audience’s frame of reference.”85 Defending 
this approach to US readers, Wilder added that the “massed  human mis-
ery on a Calcutta street” made it impossible for the Indian government to 
spend time educating  people in general about the need for  family planning 
or its vari ous goals and methods. Rather, he called for a “forceful message” 
such as “You  Don’t Need Another Child Now” or “Postpone the Next 
Pregnancy, and Never Have a Fourth.”86
Tyagi and Wilder’s more “forceful” messages turned away from evoking 
the small  family as a vehicle of upward mobility for all Indians. This mes-
sage was deemed irrelevant—or wasteful of time— for an audience marked 
as irreducibly dif er ent from the middle- class Indian bureaucrats or the for-
eign con sul tants who developed the government’s  family planning propa-
ganda. The  middle classes, it was assumed,  were already aware of the need 
to regulate their fertility, but the masses of rural and urban poor would not, 
or could not, follow the same logic. They would not be seduced by the prom-
ise of middle- class lifestyles, and the idea that small families  were neces-
sarily happier and more prosperous was simply outside their “frame of 
reference.” This distinction echoed what we have seen already in the imple-
mentation of  family planning programs, discussed in chapter 4. Population 
controllers insisted that temporary methods— condoms, diaphragms, 
pills— were best suited to the  middle classes, which  were presumed capable 
of choosing them. For the masses of ordinary  people, however, population 
controllers pushed permanent methods like surgical sterilization. Simi-
larly, as population control entered a “war footing” in the mid-1960s, the 
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small- family ideal was entrusted only to some. They might occupy the 
position of the citizen- planner, capable of inhabiting the economic and 
(hetero)sexual rationalities that focused on the  future. For the rest, whom 
transnational population controllers represented as Indians- in- the- mass, 
 family planning became a state- sponsored injunction. Thus, even as the 
small- family norm was held forth as a universal ideal, it was marked by 
national, race, class, and caste diference. “Have only two or three  children . . . 
that’s plenty!” ofered this vocabulary of distinction; it marked the vast dif-
ference between  those who could be persuaded to choose to have a few 
 children and  those who must be told to do so.
Conclusion
The small  family represented a seductive and aspirational ideal. It prom-
ised a life of happiness and prosperity to  those who  adopted its normative 
sexualities and economic rationalities. By reor ga niz ing bodies and lives, the 
small- family norm ofered nothing less than a modern  family alongside a 
modern Indian  future. Consequently, the discourse of the small  family was 
far more than just a call for reproductive regulation. It also required trans-
formations on multiple levels, from reor ga niz ing time to rethinking kin-
ship to re orienting  toward consumption and markets. It called forth new 
logics that put heterosexuality in ser vice of familial well- being and national 
development and  imagined a global economy composed of such rational 
subjects. Yet, although they yoked the conjugal  couple to a vision of the 
 future that they claimed was universally applicable, repre sen ta tions of 
the small  family  were also troubled by questions of diference and haunted 
by fears of failure.  Family planners expressed concern that subjects marked 
as too dif er ent from the planner would never adopt  these new rationalities 
of  family life.
The small- family ideal thus marks a point where the history of hetero-
sexuality intersects with the history of development. In the era of the Five 
Year Plans, national development required par tic u lar kinds of subjects, 
whose sexuality was expressed through heterosexual monogamy in mar-
riage and whose economic rationality was expressed through the use of 
birth control.  These ideal subjects of development  were, at base, commit-
ted to planning for the  future by aligning their reproduction with an 
 imagined national and familial futurity. Scholarship in queer studies has 
theorized  these connections that link reproduction to heterosexuality and 
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 imagined  futures, arguing that heterosexuality becomes normalized  because 
of its supposed contributions to reproducing the  future. Homo sexuality is 
marked as “deviant”  because of its supposed failure to do so.87 Within this 
heteronormative ideal, the figure of “the Child”—as abstraction— represents a 
“reproductive futurism,” which, in Lee Edelman’s terms, justifies the abjec-
tion of the queer subject as incapable of working  toward the  future. In 
other words, the figure of the child emerges as “the emblem of futurity’s 
unquestioned value,” such that all  those who do not participate in hetero-
normative reproduction are marked as opposed to the  future itself.88 The 
discourse of reproductive futurism that Edelman identifies is, arguably, 
the product of specific Western and modern contexts.89 However, as 
Eithne Luibhéid suggests, as an analytic framework it may be expanded to 
include not only queer but also other marginalized subjects and histori-
cized beyond a general abstraction of “the Child” to account for how systems 
of racism, geopo liti cal inequalities, and gender vio lence position dif er ent 
subjects diferently in relation to an  imagined futurity.90 For Luibhéid, 
therefore, Edelman’s “reproductive futurism” is manifest diferentially 
across time, place, and history. It can illuminate the heteronormative poli-
tics underpinning claims to the  future at specific moments, within specific 
systems.
The discourse of the small and happy  family, as I have argued, relies upon 
a set of claims about heteronormative reproduction and the  future. As in 
the case of texts like We Two Our Two, reproduction is exclusively respon-
sible for creating the  future envisioned by the Five Year Plans. Rather than 
socioeconomic transformation, the text calls for regulation of reproduction; 
appropriate reproduction breeds appropriate  futures. This discourse of the 
small and happy  family thus leads us to ask: what constitutes reproduc-
tive futurism in an antinatal regime? In other words, how might the  future 
be  imagined when it is secured not through valorizing reproduction but 
through limiting and even demonizing it? Within the population control 
mandates of the Five Year Plans, whose reproduction is understood to pro-
duce the  future, and whose is seen as opposed to futurity itself? As we have 
seen throughout this book, the call to limit reproduction was always dif-
ferential. Modes of reproductive stratification fueled the drive to curtail the 
childbearing of some  people, not of  others. As upper- caste and middle- class 
Indians aimed to diferentiate their own sexual- reproductive practices and 
 futures from  those marked as lower caste or class, Western population con-
trollers stigmatized Indian reproduction itself as incapable of working 
 toward the  future. The vision of the small and happy  family aimed to 
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contain  these tensions, gesturing  toward a prosperous  future secured by 
having only two (or perhaps three)  children. However, despite its claim 
of universality— every one could be part of a small and happy  family— this 
vision of the  future was always  limited. Only some  people  were rendered 
capable of receiving its afective and financial benefits, while  others  were 
subjected to exclusion in its name.
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EPILOGUE
 Family planning is a critical,  human rights- based, and cost efective 
approach to climate change adaptation and resilience building.
— international planned parenthood federation  
and the Population Sustainability Network, 2016
 Family planning is considered universally as the smartest 
development investment. For India to realize its sustainable 
development goals and economic aspirations, it is impor tant to 
ensure that  people have informed access to contraception and 
quality  family planning ser vices.
— niti aayog, 2019
Nowadays, expenses are high. When we had  children, it was less 
difficult. The way  things are now, it’s not pos si ble to keep them in 
school and marry them of. They  shouldn’t experience the difficulties 
that we faced. For [my  daughters] one or two  children are enough, 
and then they should get the operation.
— devi, agricultural laborer in tamil nadu, 2014
Each of  these epigraphs frames reproduction, at least in 
part, as an economic concern. The report from the International Planned 
Parenthood Federation (IPPF) and the Population Sustainability Network 
(PSN) begins from the premise that controlling population growth is a 
means to control green house gas emissions. If fewer  people equal less pollu-
tion, then contraception becomes a “cost efective” way to prevent births and 
combat climate change.1 NITI Aayog, a policy- making body that replaced 
India’s National Planning Commission, represents  family planning as a 
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“development investment” that allows the country to pursue economic 
growth. It is both a universal strategy— relevant to all countries— and a spe-
cific Indian need.2 For Devi, who shared her story in an oral history inter-
view conducted as part of the research for this book,  family planning is a 
kind of economic decision  because of the costs of raising  children. She  will 
advise her  daughters to get “the operation”— tubal ligation—so that they 
can manage the costs of schooling and marriage.3  These varied connections 
between reproduction and economy should be familiar, given the tangled 
histories of marriage reform and famine, of eugenics and migration, of 
birth control and national sovereignty, and of population control and post-
colonial development examined in this book. Yet the epigraphs also out-
line the shifting contours of this long- familiar connection and situate 
reproduction in the context of changing global, national, and personal cri-
ses. The epilogue examines  these points of continuity and change.
Within transnational population control networks, and in Global North 
countries,  family planning has recently gained new visibility in the context 
of climate change. Reducing population growth in the pre sent, the logic 
goes, is a means  toward reducing green house gas emissions in the  future. 
Repurposing 1960s models that calculated the number of “births averted” 
by contraceptive use in a quest to defuse the “population bomb,” the new 
discourse views “averted lives” as “averted emissions.”4 The IPPF and PSN 
report outlines this argument, suggesting that eliminating the global “unmet 
need” for  family planning could achieve 16–29  percent of the emissions 
reductions required to reach targets  under the Paris Agreement on climate. 
Moreover, the document argues that contraception is among the cheapest 
ways to meet  these targets, calculating that “emissions averted through 
investments in  family planning would cost about $4.50 per ton of carbon 
dioxide, compared with more expensive options such as solar power ($30 
per ton) or carbon capture and storage from new coal plants ($60 per ton).”5 
The Sierra Club, an environmentalist organ ization, makes the point even 
more directly: “A concerted, worldwide family- planning campaign can be 
just as efective at reducing carbon output as conserving electricity, trap-
ping carbon, or using alternative fuels.”6 Reducing population growth 
through contraception, in short, becomes a key mechanism to address cli-
mate change.
Certainly, population size impacts the environment. However, feminist 
scholars have identified prob lems with the  simple equivalence between 
averted births and averted emissions. As Jade Sasser reminds us,  there has 
never been a “single, evidence- based model that has successfully calculated 
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or predicted the global environmental impact of  human numbers alone.”7 
We have seen throughout this book that numbers acquire meanings within 
specific contexts; it is impossible to abstract the impact of  these numbers 
from the social, po liti cal, economic, and environmental contexts in which 
they are embedded. Thus, for instance, transnational  family planning net-
works tend to target  women in sub- Saharan Africa, where fertility rates are 
higher than in most of the world. However, per capita emissions rates in 
the region are among the very lowest globally.8 Meanwhile, industrialized 
countries, which encompass just 20  percent of the world’s population, are 
responsible for 80   percent of accumulated carbon dioxide in the atmo-
sphere.9 Claiming that  family planning is a “cost efective” means to fight cli-
mate change ignores  these disparities between who is responsible for 
emissions and who is rendered responsible for addressing them. The accom-
panying rhe toric that it is “easier” to institute  family planning in sub- Saharan 
Africa than it is to require change in consumption patterns in the Global 
North, or to curb industrial emissions, similarly refuses to ask for whom is it 
“easy,” and who  will pay the cost. Consequently, as Betsy Hartmann argues, 
focusing on  family planning as a solution to climate change shifts attention 
away from the root  causes of environmental degradation.10 Disregarding the 
role of fossil fuel industries and the biggest emitters of green house gases, dis-
courses that equate births and emissions blame  women in the Global South 
for planetary crisis and ofer  family planning as a solution.
This idea that  family planning can solve planetary crises is not new; it 
has been part of contraceptive advocacy since at least the mid- twentieth 
 century. As we have seen, the IPPF made a similar link at the very moment 
of its founding in Bombay in 1952. Dhanvanthi Rama Rau and Margaret 
Sanger came together to advance a neo- Malthusian argument connecting 
 family planning to global population crisis, while sidelining a competing 
agenda about contraception and sex education. This choice by Rama Rau 
and Sanger was, in part, strategic. By connecting their cause to an emer-
gent global prob lem, they brought new attention and resources to birth con-
trol; this contributed to the vast expansion of  family planning programs 
during the 1950s and 1960s. Now, de cades  later, as we face the material 
impacts of climate change, the IPPF and PSN may similarly be making a 
strategic connection between births and emissions. Their report thus notes 
that highlighting the impact of  family planning on climate change “could 
lead to significant programmatic and funding opportunities” for the 
IPPF’s national affiliates as countries strive to meet their targets  under the 
Paris Agreement.11 Pivoting  toward climate, in other words, may allow 
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organ izations like the  Family Planning Association of India to tap into the 
development dollars directed to climate change adaptation and mitigation.
 Whether strategic or not, however, such decisions have consequences. 
 There is clearly an ongoing need for contraceptive access, and  there is still 
a long road ahead to ensure sexual and reproductive health care on an equita-
ble basis for all  people. Linking to climate change may well allow increased 
resources to flow in this direction. However, when  family planning is posed 
as a solution to climate change, it risks the same pitfalls we have seen in 
de cades past, when it was posed as a panacea for economic development. 
In both cases,  family planning is not geared  toward reproductive auton-
omy for persons who may become pregnant. Instead, it becomes a means 
 toward a dif er ent end— defusing the “population bomb” or mitigating cli-
mate change. Moreover,  people, through their reproductive capacities, become 
the means  toward this end, rather than ends in themselves. In the mid- 
twentieth  century, this logic drove  family planners’ assertions that birth 
control ofered a mechanism to solve the prob lems of poverty without con-
testing under lying in equality. This was a seductive logic for some, since it 
avoided structural change in  favor of a supposedly easier intervention in 
the fertility of poor  women. But this logic also opened the door to coercion 
and abuse, as  women’s bodies and lives came to be sacrificed to prevent a 
“population explosion” or promote economic development. Ultimately, this 
neither served  women nor addressed poverty. Similarly, the notion that 
 family planning can solve the growing climate crisis ofers its own seduc-
tions, implying that global warming can be  stopped by curtailing the fer-
tility of poor  women, rather than through structural changes that address 
green house gas emissions. As in the past, this is only an empty promise, 
one that neither increases reproductive freedom nor guards against the 
dangers of a warming planet.
Even as  family planning has been repurposed as a climate change solu-
tion in transnational contexts, it remains a linchpin of development dis-
course in con temporary India. Development policy is no longer outlined 
in Five Year Plans, since the government dismantled the National Planning 
Commission and ended centralized planning in 2017. The policy board NITI 
Aayog serves as a partial replacement for the NPC, but it is an advisory body 
that does not grant funding; its three- year action plans are recommenda-
tions only, and not binding. In 2019, NITI Aayog called attention to pop-
ulation, as noted in the epigraph. The policy board promoted  family 
planning for “population stabilization” in ser vice of the country’s “sus-
tainable development.”12 The reference to sustainability alludes to climate 
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change, now increasingly part of development discourses, thus bringing 
climate into the long- standing nexus between population and national 
economic development. Although NITI Aayog’s call echoes Indian develop-
ment planning from an  earlier era, it confronts a demographic landscape 
that has changed substantially. For the last several de cades, Indian  women 
have been giving birth to fewer  children than they did before. As of 2018, the 
total fertility rate— a calculation of the average number of  children born 
per  woman— was 2.2. This figure approaches a replacement rate and is 
below the global average. Despite regional variations in this number, which 
ranges from 1.6 in some states to 3.3 in  others,  there is no current “explo-
sion” of population growth in India.13 Indian population is continuing to 
increase, but this is due to the large number of  people who are currently 
within childbearing age; it does not portend significant population growth 
in the  future. To this extent, the “population stabilization” that NITI 
Aayog calls for already exists.
Nevertheless, the framework of crisis pervades con temporary reference 
to population.  There are some changes to the terms— NITI Aayog thus calls 
for “stabilization,” not control, and emphasizes “informed” contraceptive 
access with “quality”  family planning ser vices. The shift in language is due, 
in large mea sure, to transnational feminist organ izing that successfully 
challenged the under lying logics of population control and called for a 
reconceptualization of population policy worldwide.  These feminist eforts 
culminated in 1994, at the Cairo Conference on Population and Develop-
ment, sponsored by the United Nations. The conference’s Program of Action 
marked a radical departure from  earlier policies; it asserted that reproduc-
tive rights  were universal, highlighted  women’s empowerment, and called 
upon governments to abandon targets and quotas in their population poli-
cies.14  These  were impor tant changes, and they signaled the promise of a 
sexual and reproductive rights agenda that centered  women. However, fem-
inists at the time voiced concern that the Program of Action did not go far 
enough in rejecting the core premises of population control.15 In hindsight, 
we know that the declarations at Cairo ran headlong into rising neoliberal 
ideologies that promoted market- based solutions and encouraged the priva-
tization of health care globally.16 In that context, the goals of the Program 
of Action still remain largely unfulfilled.
In response to the Cairo declaration, the Indian government abandoned 
its population targets, but it maintained an assumption that population 
posed a crisis for development. Consequently, the state supports a “two- 
child norm” that is enforced through policies that serve as both carrot and 
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stick.17 Meanwhile, the government’s continued underinvestment in health-
care, including in maternal and child health, becomes plain in its  family 
planning programs. For instance, between 2003 and 2012, an average of 
twelve  women died per month due to botched surgical sterilization proce-
dures across the country.18 Occasionally,  there have been catastrophic fail-
ures, as in the case of a sterilization camp in Chattisgarh in 2014, when 
thirteen patients died  after a surgeon operated on eighty- three  women in a 
single day using the same unsterilized gloves, syringes, and sutures, spend-
ing just three minutes per patient.19 While this case was exceptional in its 
high death rate, it reflects a disregard for poor  women’s health, rights, and 
well- being that is widespread among the sterilization camps that are still a 
mainstay of Indian population programs.
If the  actual workings of the Indian  family planning system employ a 
model of population crisis, so also does the government’s rhe toric. In his 
2019 In de pen dence Day speech, for instance, Prime Minister Narendra 
Modi announced his concern about the country’s “population explosion” 
due to “uncontrolled population growth.” He praised families that regulated 
their reproduction, and urged  others to follow their example: “Before a child 
arrives into our  family we should think— have I prepared myself to fulfill 
the needs of the child? Or  will I leave it dependent on the society?”  Those 
who recognized the need for  family limitation, Modi concluded,  were con-
tributing not only to the “welfare of their  family but also to the good of the 
nation.”20 Modi’s words resonate with long- standing Malthusian assump-
tions about population and poverty, and they echo, nearly unchanged, the 
pronouncements of postcolonial India’s first population controllers, who 
insisted that reproductive control was a chief method of promoting national 
development. Yet at the same time, the long history of representing Indian 
population as a crisis— and thus as a target of intervention— now shapes new 
modes of reproductive regulation as well. Alongside the rhe toric of popu-
lation control, which we see in Modi’s speech, emerging population dis-
courses sometimes function without explic itly pathologizing fertility. 
Beyond reducing numbers, they also aim to promote economic development 
through a “demographic dividend,” which capitalizes on a high ratio of 
younger workers to older retirees, or to produce a “bio- citizen” who man-
ages her own fertility in line with markets.21
The question of population and reproduction rears its head in yet another 
way in con temporary India, in its skewed and worsening sex ratio. As I dis-
cussed in chapter 5, the question of son preference was both hinted at and 
obscured in  family planning propaganda that centered the heterosexual 
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happy  family. However, the demographic consequences of son preference 
have grown increasingly clear in the de cades that followed. Currently, the 
sex ratio (expressed as the proportion of “Females/1000 males”) stands at 
900 nationally and falls as low as 837 in the state of Haryana.22 This dispar-
ity is due not only to the neglect of girl  children but also to the use of tech-
nologies to determine the sex of the fetus before birth, followed by the 
selective abortion of female fetuses.
Feminist activists have called attention to this prob lem and, in 1994, 
pushed for legislation to prohibit health- care workers from revealing fetal 
sex to prospective parents.  Today, campaigns against sex selective abortion 
are an impor tant part of feminist health movements. Nevertheless, the ratio 
continues to worsen and is now a fact of life even in states where, a few 
de cades ago, this was not a prob lem. The government has intervened through 
policies that provide financial incentives to families of  daughters. Known 
as Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs,  these policies provide 
monetary incentives to parents whose  daughters meet certain milestones, 
such as immunizations, schooling, or remaining unmarried  until age eigh-
teen.23 However, although  these policies may have ofered some benefits to 
recipients, they are also tied to ongoing legacies of population control. 
Some state plans, for instance, provide cash incentives only if the parents 
accept sterilization  after two  children;  others limit incentives to only two 
 daughters and not to a third.24 In this way, policies that claim to promote 
the value of girls enact potentially coercive mechanisms of reproductive 
control against their parents, and in par tic u lar, their  mothers.
The relationships of  mothers and  daughters— and the attendant ques-
tions of reproduction, population, and economy— emerge diferently in 
Devi’s narrative, the third epigraph above. As a  mother of four  children who 
works as an agricultural laborer in rural Tamil Nadu, Devi spoke about her 
difficulties in raising  children and her hopes for their  future. Her story was 
among fifteen oral history interviews conducted in the Thiruvallur Dis-
trict as part of my research for this book.25 The  women interviewed ranged 
in age from about thirty to ninety years, with the majority in their fifties 
and sixties. Most worked in agricultural  labor and  were also enrolled in 
programs  under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guar-
antee Act, which provides one hundred days of wage employment to  people 
willing to do manual work. All fifteen  women depended on the public 
health- care system, which meant they visited Primary Health Centers 
(PHCs) for their basic health needs, including for reproductive health care, 
and  were sometimes referred to secondary and tertiary centers, such as 
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public hospitals. Some  women also used their own funds to access priva-
tized healthcare for themselves or their families. As patients within the 
public healthcare system, and as poor and working  women, they fit the 
demographic profile most targeted by state- led  family planning and popu-
lation control. The state of Tamil Nadu, in par tic u lar, has historically pri-
oritized targeting  women like Devi. During the late colonial de cades, as 
we have seen, organ izations like the Madras Neo- Malthusian League and 
the Self Re spect movement brought birth control to public attention in 
Madras Presidency. Since in de pen dence, the state of Madras, now Tamil 
Nadu, has been heralded by the Indian government and international 
agencies as a “success story” of Indian  family planning.  Today, the state’s 
total fertility rate, at 1.6, is lower than that of the country as a  whole.26
In collecting and learning from  women’s narratives, my first instinct was 
to seek alternatives to the kinds of economic rationalities that I analyze 
throughout this book. In an admittedly oversimplified fashion, I initially 
sought a way out of the reproductive injustices this book has documented; 
I hoped for ways of thinking and speaking that did not filter reproduction 
so narrowly through population and economy and that ofered dif er ent 
imaginings of reproductive  futures. However, upon hearing  these stories, 
and in light of the enduring connections among reproduction, population, 
and economy that this book documents, I eventually began to approach 
 women’s narratives diferently. Rather than seeking an  imagined alterna-
tive that severed reproduction from economic rationalities, I began to ask 
how  women narrated  these intersections.
Thus, for instance, our interview questions invited  women to speak about 
their reproductive histories in relation to pregnancy and childbirth; how-
ever, our interlocutors tended to focus more on the reproductive  labor of 
raising  children and grandchildren. For instance, Devi spoke of this  labor 
in intergenerational terms. Her  mother, she said, had eight  children, since 
“ there was no  family planning back then.” She managed to raise them all, 
but Devi herself made a dif er ent decision.  After having two sons and two 
 daughters, and despite the opposition of her father- in- law, Devi de cided to 
have the “ family planning operation.”27 Her advice for her own  daughters, 
as cited in the epigraph, would be to have just one or two  children, in order 
to be able to pay for their education and their marriage. In this way, Devi 
represented her reproductive decisions, at least in part, in relation to their 
economic costs. Surgical sterilization became a technology that would align 
reproduction with her  house hold’s economic capacity, and in this sense, 
Devi’s words seem to fit the mold of the “rational” subject figured by  family 
E pi l o gu e210
planning discourses. Like the responsible citizen praised in Modi’s In de-
pen dence Day speech, Devi recounts her reproductive history in terms of 
her ability to bear the financial costs of raising  children. However, her nar-
rative is not exactly in alignment with Modi’s call for citizens to contribute 
to the “welfare of the  family but also to the good of the nation.” It is less a 
story about modern and prosperous  futures— the seductive ideal of much 
 family planning discourse— than it is one about scarcity and precarity. So 
that her  daughters  will not experience “the difficulties that we faced,” she 
 will encourage them to have just one or two  children.
Many  women spoke similarly about the reproductive and economic exi-
gencies of the pre sent, rather than the promise of  future prosperity. 
Darshini, an agricultural laborer and  mother of three, for example, de cided 
upon surgical sterilization  after her son and two  daughters  were born. She 
had considered it even  earlier,  after the birth of her son and first  daughter. 
But her son fell ill, and fearing she might lose him, she delayed the opera-
tion.  After her third child, a  daughter, she and her husband de cided it was 
time: “Costs are high, and so  people like us cannot care for many  children. 
 People like us  don’t have land and all that. Only if we earn that day, do we 
eat that day.”28 Darshini’s  family’s landlessness, a fact linked to her class and 
caste position, meant that they  were entirely dependent on wages earned 
from  labor, and in  these circumstances, she and her husband saw steriliza-
tion as a necessity. Like Devi’s story, Darshini’s narrative models a kind of 
economic rationality, but it also challenges the promise of small and happy 
families to narrate stories of difficult survival. It is “ people like us,” and 
emphatically not all  people, who face  these burdens on their reproduction. 
While national governments and transnational  family planning networks 
have long  imagined the small  family as a site of desire for all citizens com-
mitted to familial and national prosperity, Darshini figures the small  family 
as a necessity of survival for landless laborers. More than achieving the 
promises of development, it is development’s failures— the failure to redis-
tribute land, the failure to provide other sources of employment— that shape 
Darshini’s account of reproduction as a point of intervention into her own 
economic  future.
Kasturi, who was the  mother of one son, now deceased, and the grand-
mother of two  children, made explicit this distinction between  people who 
had to limit their childbearing and  those who  were truly  free to choose. The 
issue, she explained, was money: “That’s how the country is. If you  don’t 
have money, no one re spects you. If you have money, you could have as many 
 daughters as you want and  settle all of them in marriages.  Those who  don’t 
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have money are just beggars.” Throughout her interview, Kasturi was con-
sumed with worry about supporting her grandchildren, especially her 
grand daughter. Kasturi helped to pay for her grand daughter’s school fees, 
and the girl was  doing well in school. Kasturi also planned to help her 
daughter- in- law pay for the grand daughter’s marriage when the time came. 
She was deeply concerned about  these responsibilities: “Back in the day, it 
was common to have even seven  children without any concerns. But now, 
every one says one is enough, or two is enough. Somehow, back then, my 
 mother got four  daughters married of. But now, even the guy who delivers 
the newspaper asks for [a dowry of] eight savaran [sixty- four grams of gold]. 
So nowadays, if you have so many  children, how could you manage all 
this. . . .  People who  don’t have wealth, if they have so many  children, 
how could they do it? I myself, how  will I be able to marry of my grand-
daughter?”29 Like Darshini, Kasturi ties her narrative about  children and 
grandchildren to economic precarity. As the quotation suggests, this 
precarity is also gendered.  Because of the costs associated with her mar-
riage, Kasturi represents her grand daughter as a tremendous financial respon-
sibility. Since the girl’s  father is deceased, Kasturi adds, this is a responsibility 
that falls exclusively to  women. While wealthy  house holds can aford to 
raise girls and “ settle all of them in marriages,” she and her daughter- in- 
law confront a pre sent and  future of strug gle.
 These concerns about the costs of raising  children and grandchildren 
echo across the narratives, linking reproductive choices to economic con-
straints and posing “the operation” as a necessary response to financial pre-
carity. Among all the  women interviewed, Veena made this point most 
explic itly. At the time of her interview, Veena was thirty- three years old and 
the  mother of two  children, a son and  daughter. Although her husband 
wanted more  children, she dismissed his logic: “Even when  there was no 
food to be had, he thought we should have another child.”  After giving birth 
to her first child, a son, Veena was ready for sterilization and obtained a con-
sent form from the hospital, but she was dissuaded from this decision by 
her aunt.  After her  daughter was born, she de cided to have the operation. 
When the hospital asked for her husband’s signature on the consent form, 
she recounts, “I said, ‘I’m the one who works hard for the kids, and I’m not 
able to take care of another one’ . . .  I do every thing. So I just de cided that 
two is enough.”30 Her husband, she added, brought some income into the 
 house hold, but he refused to contribute in any other way. Veena’s narrative 
is a recounting of reproductive, and social reproductive,  labor. She connects 
reproduction and economy through work— and in par tic u lar, through the 
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work that  women do to bear  children, to raise and educate them, to arrange 
their marriages, and to support their grandchildren. Like the discourses of 
population control, she is concerned about what  children “cost,” but hers is 
not the rationale of “averted births” or, indeed, of “averted emissions.” 
Therefore, Veena’s decision to have “the operation” was based not on “the 
economy” in some abstract sense, but on her experiences of her  labor in rais-
ing and caring for  children. While linking reproduction to economy, she 
does not employ the justificatory frameworks of national development or 
global environmental crisis. Rather, her  labor justifies  these connections 
and, in her telling, guides her reproductive decisions.
As this book demonstrates, enduring connections among reproduction, 
population, and economy have  shaped over a  century of reproductive poli-
tics. Colonial officials alongside nationalists, eugenicists alongside postco-
lonial bureaucrats, transnational population controllers alongside Indian 
feminists have argued that regulating reproduction was a necessary mech-
anism to intervene in the population and insisted that limiting the popula-
tion was essential to economic development. They have blamed reproductive 
practices for poverty and the failures of development, while hoping that 
more efective methods of contraception would enable more efective repro-
ductive regulation in the  future.  These connections have endured even 
when population growth rates  were not increasing, such as in the late nine-
teenth  century or in the con temporary moment, and have redoubled when 
faced with documented growth in population. They have been part of a spe-
cifically Indian story, but Indian developments have come to shape the 
global and modern history of reproduction as well. We have seen, more-
over, that the connections linking reproduction to population and economy 
have created situations of reproductive injustice—of top- down control of 
 people’s reproductive capacities, of a disregard for their bodies and lives, of 
a demonization of some  women’s reproduction as the cause of national and 
planetary catastrophe. This history should make us wary of the ongoing 
instrumentalization of  women’s reproduction to serve other ends,  whether 
to shore up state claims about economic pro gress or to claim action on cli-
mate change. Yet this history also shows us how to ask questions and think 
diferently. From the  women of Gomet who asked the  family planner for 
schools when they envisioned alternative reproductive  futures for their 
 daughters to Veena, who insisted that her work as a  mother gave her the 
right to decide about “the operation,”  women have challenged the instru-
mentalization of their bodies. They pose dif er ent means of connecting their 
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